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Abstract 
Roosevelt’s Monetary Policy 
Steven Napier 
 This qualitative analysis of the monetary policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
administration covers his entire presidency. Through scholarly research based on 
arguments presented in major scholarly publications, great questions are raised as to the 
primary causes of the economic successes of the Roosevelt administration. Some of the 
most conservative and reputable scholars in history, while disagreeing with most of the 
measures taken by Roosevelt to regulate the economy, agree that the goals by the 
administration to raise the prices of basic commodities was generally achieved. The 
thesis demonstrates that almost all of FDR’s economic successes were the direct result of 
the gold and silver purchase programs sought by the United States and the restoration of 
America’s banking and financial institutions. The thesis also challenges the claim that 
World War II alone brought our nation out of the great depression and that America 
merely transferred the depression entirely to other nations. Although other nations faced 
difficulties maintaining either gold or silver monetary standards, once currency 
stabilization was reached, many countries financed war and recovered from economic 
hardship by selling gold and silver to the United States.  Roosevelt’s monetary policies 
had tremendous implications and applications, both domestic and international, and 
continued to be a driving force behind a postwar economy in which the United States 
became the world’s largest creditor nation. 
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 Introduction 
 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s monetary policies rank as the single greatest achievement 
of his presidency and are only rivaled by his successes in World War II. Not since the 
original monetary statutes of 1792 have such far reaching measures been enacted with 
respect to currency and banking as during FDR’s first term. Never before had such all-
extensive powers been conferred on the executive. FDR’s presidency, therefore, is 
distinctive in terms of the regulation and powers granted to his administration. 
Roosevelt’s power to issue currency greatly exceeded the powers voted by Congress 
during the Civil War. Roosevelt was given the authority to artificially establish 
bimetallism (gold and silver) at any exchange ratio he might find necessary and to reduce 
by as much as fifty percent the weight of the gold dollar, which had been only slightly 
altered since the establishment of the Republic. Monetary legislation and executive orders 
issued during Roosevelt’s presidency had tremendous implications and applications both 
domestically and internationally. FDR envisioned and recognized a mechanical 
relationship between the price of gold and silver, the quantity of currency, bank deposits, 
prices of goods and services, and business activity. Roosevelt brought the nation out of 
the Great Depression, restored America’s banking and financial institutions, raised the 
value of the U.S. dollar, and strengthened America’s economy for decades to come. As a 
result of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s monetary policy, the United States went from running a 
deficit during the depression to becoming the world’s largest creditor nation after World 
War II. Roosevelt’s monetary policies lay at the root of his economic success, which shall 
be the central theme and focus of this research.1 
 
2 
CHAPTER ONE: BANKING AND FINANCE 
 The New Deal brought about vast changes in increased regulation of banking and 
finance. As a result, a new era of banking and financial history emerged. The Hoover 
Administration considered monetary policy of little importance in affecting the course of 
economic affairs and the former president’s policies were hesitant and passive. Roosevelt 
profoundly modified the American financial structure and the nation’s monetary 
standard. The developments were a direct reflection of the previous years. The apparent 
failure of Hoover’s subtle change in monetary policy to stem the Great Depression led to 
the dramatic regulation of America’s financial institutions, banking, and money, which 
tremendously affected the course of economic events for years to come. Roosevelt, faced 
with a national banking crisis at the time of his inauguration, initiated changes in the 
Federal Reserve System, was involved in the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, proposed a change in the structure and powers of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and brought about closer regulation of banks and 
other financial institutions.2 
 
BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 
 President Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, in the middle of the worst 
banking crisis in American history. Banks had been forced to close because of a 
tremendous proliferation of bank runs on currency and deposits. The problems associated 
with the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing depression is attributed to a variety of 
factors. In retrospect it is not possible to point to any single factor that precipitated the 
crisis, because successive instances of banking and financial difficulties continued to 
3 
recur from that time until March of 1933. Between the end of December, 1929, until 
February, 1933, approximately five thousand banks, or more than one bank in every five, 
declared banking holidays, amounting to $3.5 billion of bank deposit shortfalls.3 
 There was a substantial reduction in the rate of bank suspensions under the 
Hoover administration following the formation of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation in February, 1932. There were relatively few failures during the remainder of 
1932, until December, and most of these were among small banks. In December, 1932, 
suspensions became more numerous and more widespread in the first six weeks of 1933 
and involved more banks of substantial size. Renewed banking difficulties in February, 
1933, led to the temporary closing of all banks by administrative action at the state level 
and then by Roosevelt’s presidential executive order throughout the entire country in 
March, 1933.4 
  The most obvious contributor to the banking crisis was Black Tuesday.* 
Preceding the economic crisis, an average of more than six hundred banks per year failed 
between 1920 and 1929, which was more than ten times the rate from 1910 through 1920. 
The closings evoked little concern because they were primarily small rural banks and the 
problems were thought to be the result of inadequate management practices. This 
                                                          
*
 Black Tuesday, occurring on October 29, 1929, was the day of the great New York Stock Exchange 
crash. The Crash began a tremendous proliferation of banking collapses than was associated with the 
1920s. Its aftermath eventually led to the Great Depression of the 1930s. This historic day constituted a 
thirty point or 11.7% decrease in the general average stock market prices. The decrease in the stock market 
was not the largest on record, but in the early twentieth century financial institutions were involved in 
unsafe and unsound activities that exacerbated this tragedy to a more intensive level than had ever been 
seen in U.S. history up until 1929 and that has ever occurred since. The name “Black Tuesday” derives its 
origins from Friday, September 24, 1869, that came to be known as “Black Friday”. On this day in 1869 a 
group of investors tried to control the gold market and by doing so initiated a business panic followed by an 
economic depression in the 1870s. Subsequently, since another banking and financial panic of 1873 began 
on Friday, the term “Black” now applies to any day of the week when there is a large downturn in the stock 
market. See Jean Edward Smith’s Grant, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 488-490. See also 
Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downs and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York: 
Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 63-65. 
4 
optimism disappeared in late 1929 and early 1930. By 1930, banking failures exacerbated 
widespread attempts of depository conversions into currency. Many banks seeking to 
accommodate currency demands or liquidity contracted credit or liquidated assets.* This 
resulted in a reduction in the amount of the nation’s money supply available to the public, 
which placed additional difficulties on banks to comply with currency demands. Banks 
were forced to restrict credit and liquidate assets, exacerbating the problems of meeting 
currency demands. As banks were unable to meet withdrawals and were forced to close, 
more apprehension and fear emerged within the American public. Confidence in the 
banking system among Americans deteriorated substantially as failures became 
prevalent.5 
 
UNSOUND BANKING PRACTICES DURING THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION 
  Also contributing to the banking crisis of 1933 were dangerous practices and 
policies of the banking industry. Banks, even before the Great Depression, were involved 
in unsafe and unsound practices contributing to the intensification of economic 
catastrophe and to bank failure. Banking disorders were induced by an over expansion of 
bank investments and excessive accumulation of bank reserves. Roosevelt’s policies 
virtually eliminated these problems by 1937.6 
 Prior to the 1929 stock market crash, banks became involved in profitable stock 
investment adventures already indulged in by a heavy proportion of their depositors. 
                                                          
*
 Many problems arose during the 1920s and the early 1930s with the ability of various Banks to liquidate 
assets. Banks often meet the demands of their customers by liquidating assets by converting various funds 
into cash. Examples include money-market fund shares, U.S. Treasury bills, and bank deposits. Liquid 
assets are often categorized as cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable. See Dictionary Of 
Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downs and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York: Baron’s 
Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 385-386. 
5 
Banks and financial institutions organized affiliates for handling securities. Banking 
executives often became directors on boards of numerous corporations interested in stock 
market investments. Many banking officials purchased stocks by borrowing heavily from 
their own or affiliated banks from funds already serving as security obligations for bank 
loans. The banks lent money to many borrowers, both corporations and individuals, 
accepting stocks as collateral backing. Credit extensions were made to banks and 
financial institutions which dealt solely in stock investments. The Great Depression 
followed the 1929 stock market crash added to financial difficulties.7 
 The public confidence in the nation’s financial structure had been severely 
tarnished following the 1929 turmoil. Those problems associated with the banking 
industry played a large role in the following decade. New industries and normal trading 
activities were at all-time low levels. Few investors dared to venture into business 
because credit and normal trading relationships were destroyed. Many persons with 
capital or available credit invested abroad or deposited capital in foreign banks, seeking 
to retain remaining finances from the 1929 crash and the depression conditions that 
followed. Hoarding of currency became prevalent. Retention of currency in private hands 
was a major contributor to banking failures prior to Roosevelt’s banking holiday. The 
importance of this was stated in the Comptroller’s annual report to Congress. The report 
examined the 1931-1932 fiscal year. In this report, the Comptroller, had recognized a 
trend that originally began during autumn of 1930 to the beginning of autumn, 1932, an 
increased demand of currency for hoarding purposes. The report included an estimation 
of the total contracted currency in the country in July, 1932, held by private citizens to be 
in excess of $1 billion to $1.5 billion. The essential cause of currency retention was 
6 
attributed, for the most part, to the shaken confidence of the American people, and 
currency retention added to banking problems of liquidation.8  
 Withdrawals of banking deposits for the purpose of currency retention are 
different from withdrawals for ordinary purposes in that the currency involved is neither 
spent nor returned to banks but is withdrawn from circulation completely. Between 1928 
and the end of 1932, bank deposits throughout the United States declined from 
approximately $56 billion to $41 billion. During this same period, there was a 
tremendous increase in Postal Savings deposits. The balance of total deposits in the 
Postal Savings System was approximately $150 million at the close of the fiscal year 
1928. Deposits had increased to over $1 billion at the close of the fiscal year in 1933. 
From the year 1930 on, it became obvious that the public was apprehensive over the 
safety of bank deposits. Many sound banks, unable to meet withdrawals, were forced to 
close due to liquidity and solvency complications. Under ordinary circumstances, failure 
of one banking institution has little effect on other banks except to contribute to the loss 
of confidence of depositors. In the situation leading up to March, 1933 almost all banks 
were interconnected and interrelated to each other.* The failure of one bank in a group 
seriously jeopardized the ability of others to meet liquidity and solvency obligations. This 
type of interlocking bank condition existed in many states at that time and banks were 
usually interconnected by way of holding companies. This American financial structure 
existed in an era of an already apprehensive American public that had lost fortunes with 
                                                          
*
 A typical holding company is a corporation owning enough stock in another company to control the 
policies and practices of that company by influencing the board of directors. A holding company does not 
necessarily own a controlling amount of the voting shares of a subsidiary to control it. The holding 
company only needs to hold enough shares to place the company’s financial health in jeopardy if the votes 
are able to be consolidated with other conflicting sides of various policies. Dictionary Of Finance And 
Investment Terms, by John Downs and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York: Baron’s Educational Series, 
Inc., 2003), pp. 310-311. 
7 
the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression.9 
 A typical holding company was structured with a number of banks, either state or 
national, in which a majority of their stocks are held by a company organized for the 
primary purpose of obtaining and holding bank securities. Usually the charter of the 
holding company conferred a wide range of powers in addition to acquiring and owning 
stock in banks. Most companies could also purchase stocks of other corporations, deal in 
securities, and borrow money. In some instances, they could bring about a type of group 
banking in states in which branch banking was unlawful. Theoretically holding 
companies are set up to effect greater autonomy of operation in the individual banks and 
to provide greater sources of capital. Greater sources of revenue would arise out of the 
ability of an individual bank to handle larger credit extensions by passing them on to 
aggregated bank reserves. Trust or fiduciary business could be adequately conducted with 
accumulated banking assets large enough to handle it. In addition, investment of 
otherwise idle capital in credit or investments held by other banks was permitted. 
Members of the banking and financial industries believed this practice would produce 
extra profits in the individual banks, resulting in greater royalties afforded to the holding 
company and to its shareholders.10 
 Many holding companies were highly successful in the beginning. After the stock 
market crash, the continuing depressed conditions produced a tremendous depreciation in 
market prices. When it was realized that these stocks had been widely used as collateral 
for obligations of individual borrowers from various constituent banks of the holding 
company, the effect of the depreciation of banking stock values upon the financial 
structure of holding company member banks can be easily understood. Adding to the 
8 
difficulties of all commercial banks, the proliferation in the withdrawal of funds 
continued. To meet the demands of depositors, it became necessary for banks to liquidate 
by selling most of their assets. In addition banks had to rediscount heavily with the 
Federal Reserve banks and borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Some 
larger banks of those organizations were in need of additional capital. Banks began to 
close their doors, causing tremendous difficulty for affiliated banks. When affiliated 
banks were closed, liquidity and solvency problems were transferred to independent 
banks at a time when the banking industry was not in a position to meet the demands of 
massive withdrawals. The nation’s banking structure, dealt such a severe blow by the 
1929 stock market crash, was unable to recover, resulting in the banking crisis of March, 
1933.11  
 
BANKING LEGISLATION OF 1933-1935 
 Four years of depression had revealed dangerous policies and practices in the 
activities of American banking.* Banking reform became the central area of focus for the 
Roosevelt economic recovery program. The reform of U.S. banks was enacted in four 
statutes including the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933; the Banking Act of 
June 16, 1933; the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of June 16, 1934; and the Banking Act 
                                                          
*
 Even though the country was in the middle of the worst banking crisis and economic depression in our 
nation’s history, President Herbert Hoover continued to deny there were any problems with banking and 
finance in America. He also expressed virtually no concern for the banking crisis and took no action as 
President to correct any deficiencies. On November 15, 1929, Hoover said that U.S. banks were, “in 
inherently sound condition.” On December 3, 1929, Hoover said that the nation’s banking system was “in a 
strong position.” On October 2, 1930, he spoke of, “the soundness of our credit system.” On October 6, 
1931, Herbert Hoover spoke of “the strength of our banking system.” Years afterward Hoover looked back 
on banking and finance during his administration as the center of the problems in our entire economy. He 
also stated that they were horribly structured and fallible almost beyond expression. None of which, 
however, could be seen or heard from Hoover at the time he held the office. See The Age Of Roosevelt: The 
Crisis Of The Old Order 1919-1933, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
9 
of August 23, 1935. These statutory enactments mark the beginning of modern era of 
bank regulation in the United States.12  
 The immediate conditions preceding the banking crisis of March, 1933, reflected 
the cumulative effects of a sharp decline in industrial and business activity which had 
existed for three and a half years. Immediately after inauguration on Saturday, March 4, 
1933, Roosevelt ordered all banks closed in the United States. On Sunday, March 5, the 
President issued an executive order, declaring a four day banking holiday. In this 
presidential proclamation banks could reopen only for limited business. Until the 
following Wednesday, banks could not accept deposits, make loans, or pay cash on 
checks. They could exchange forms of currency, give access to safe deposit boxes, pay 
checks drawn on the federal treasury, accept payments on obligations, accept business 
necessary to the distribution of food, permit deposits and withdrawals on special trust 
accounts, and continue trust activities. On the same day he called a special session of 
Congress to pass the Emergency Banking Act. On March 7, the Treasury issued a 
regulation authorizing Clearing House Certificates* to be issued after March 10, 1933. 
The authorization was later withdrawn because the Emergency Banking Act provided for 
special Federal Reserve Bank Notes and made the certificates unnecessary. Congress met 
on March 9, and without debate passed Roosevelt’s Emergency Banking Act.13 
 Under the authority of the Emergency Banking Act, President Roosevelt issued an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1957), pp. 474-475. 
*
 Clearing House Certificates were authorizations of Clearing House banks, which members and other 
banks agreed to accept instead of currency in settling imbalances. They were issued to commercial banks in 
return for their own obligations secured by collateral acceptable to a committee of bankers. Clearing House 
Certificates were issued by banks as currency for the public’s use. The authorization was nullified by the 
Emergency Banking Act allowing for the issuance of Federal Reserve Notes that served the same purpose. 
By issuing Federal Reserve Notes, the federal government could have more centralized control over the 
amount of different classifications of money issued. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A 
Monetary History Of The United States, 1867-1960. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
10 
executive order on March 9, 1933, that continued the banking holiday. This was followed 
by an executive order on March 10, granting the Secretary of the Treasury the power to 
issue licenses to Federal Reserve member banks to reopen. Every member bank was 
directed to apply for a license to the Federal Reserve Bank of its district, which served as 
a designee of the Treasury Secretary in granting licenses. The executive order also 
authorized state banking regulatory agencies to reopen sound banks that were not 
members of the Federal Reserve System. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 prevented 
a bank from acting as a medium or agent for non-banking corporations, firms or 
individuals in extending credit to brokers on stocks, bonds, and other investments. 
Another executive order dated March 18, 1933, authorized state banking regulatory 
organizations to appoint conservators for unlicensed state member banks as long as they 
were in compliance with state law. In a statement to the American public on March 11, 
and a radio address on March 12, FDR announced the program for reopening licensed 
banks on March 13, 14, and 15. Member banks licensed by the U.S. Treasury were 
opened to do business without restrictions. Nonmember banks, licensed by state banking 
officials were also authorized to reopen with respect to legal contracts between the banks 
and depositors concerning withdrawals on March 13, in the twelve Federal Reserve Bank 
cities.* On March 14, additional banks were authorized to reopen in more than two-
hundred fifty cities having accredited Clearing House Associations. On March 15, all 
other banks were authorized to open back up for business.14  
                                                                                                                                                                             
1963), pp. 160, 327. 
*
 Twelve Federal Reserve banks were established under the Federal Reserve Act Of 1913. The newly 
created Federal Reserve System contained twelve district reserve banks serving members as depositories 
and rediscount agencies. The capital for the reserve banks was originally contributed by member banks. 
They were authorized to issue currency to member banks, based upon their commercial currency and 
securities. See William J. Shultz and M.R. Caine, Financial Development Of The United States (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937), pp. 481-482. 
11 
 In the ensuing months the licensed banks operated mostly without restrictions, 
though legal contracts in some cases limited withdrawals by depositors to a specified 
reduction of the total amount deposited. Many of the unlicensed banks, when allowed to 
reopen on March 15, were restricted to a limited range of transactions, with banking 
officials permitted to receive new deposits subject to the demands of the customer and 
separated from other accounts. The line between unlicensed and licensed banks became 
less distinctive in actual practice than in theory. Both licensed and unlicensed banks had 
to operate under strict banking regulations. The difference is that licensed banks had to 
comply with stricter regulations imposed by the FDIC on the amount of their currency-
deposit ratios. Each licensed bank, in order to remain so, had to make application and 
become a member of the FDIC. The Banking Act of 1933 did not remove the functions of 
any existing government regulatory agency concerned with banking and finance. It 
simply introduced an additional regulatory agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), whose powers both broadened and enhanced those of existing 
organizations.15 
 Prior to 1933 there were four types of commercial banking institutions operating 
in the United States: national banks, private banks, state banks which were members of 
the Federal Reserve System, and state banks which were not members of the Federal 
Reserve System. Approximately nineteen-thousand of those banking and financial 
organizations held capital of approximately $56 billion. One-third were national banks, 
holding two-fifths of all the banking capital. The state banks were organized primarily 
under state laws and regulated by state banking authorities. Private banks, in most states, 
had the freedom of operating under fewer constraints than either national or state banking 
12 
organizations. All national banks were regulated and authorized under the direction of the 
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency.16 
  The Comptroller of the Currency* was given the authority to appoint executives 
or supervisors for closed national banks. Reorganization of a closed bank might be 
undertaken with the approval of three-fourths of the bank’s customers and two-thirds of 
the bank’s stockholders. National banks were authorized to issue debentures or preferred 
stocks which were purchased by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 authorized Federal Reserve credit to member banks, and non-
eligible currency was broadened. Some forms of currency previously classified by the 
Reserve as eligible currency now became ineligible under the Glass-Steagall Act. A 
provision was made in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act for direct credit 
extensions for construction and business demands.** An amendment of March 24 
permitted Federal Reserve banks to extend credit to non-member banks for the period of 
the emergency determined by the President.17 
 As a result of tremendous conversion of bank deposits into money, the figure for 
currency in circulation reached an all time high of over $7.5 billion on March 11, 1933. 
                                                          
*
 The Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency was established May 9, 1863, pursuant to a law signed by 
President Lincoln February 25, 1863, and which was enacted for the primary purpose of assisting in 
financing the Civil War and the establishment of a circulating medium designed to move freely throughout 
the United States, without regard to the bank issuing such currency. It is from this secondary purpose that 
the Bureau probably acquired its name. Later, the name of the office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
was changed to the National Bank Administrator with little change in the office’s responsibilities, except 
that it was made responsible only to the Federal Reserve System and totally independent of the U.S. 
Treasury. See Ross M. Robertson, The Comptroller and Bank Supervision: A Historical Appraisal, 2-3 
(Washington, D.C.: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1968).  
**
 Eligible currency includes all of the mediums of exchange that the Federal Reserve will accept for 
rediscount. The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act made several forms of exchange that were previously classified as 
ineligible currency now eligible for rediscounting by the Federal Reserve. Those included all commercial 
and agricultural paper, drafts, bills of exchange, and banker’s acceptances. See Dictionary Of Finance And 
Investment Terms, by John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York, Baron’s Educational Series 
Inc., 2003), pp. 210-211. 
 
13 
The U.S. Federal Reserve reduced the amount of currency in circulation and by June 30, 
1933, it was down to $5.7 billion. Toward the close of 1933 a minor expansion occurred 
along with increased economic activity. Under the surface of this relative stability in the 
quantity of currency, a dynamic change was instituted in the regulation of circulating 
money.18 
 Modifications of banking policies and procedures were primarily instituted by the 
Banking Act of June, 1933. Some additional regulations were amended by the Banking 
Act of 1935. Both enactments resulted from careful study. Problems of earlier bank 
supervision were reviewed by the House and Senate Banking committees in 1930. They 
also held prolonged hearings in 1931 and 1932. Similarly, nearly two years preceded the 
1935 statute. Both laws involved compromises resulting from conflicting interests, 
prejudices, and partisan politics. A major accomplishment of the two acts was the 
separation of commercial banking, investment banking, and investment trust institutions, 
either directly or indirectly with the cooperation of banks through security affiliates like 
holding companies. Banks associated with security affiliates at the passage of the 1933 
Act were granted a year to complete the separation. In 1933, public opinion invoked a 
discussion to remove restrictions on branch banking. The text of the 1933 Emergency 
Banking and Relief Act, introduced in the Senate, authorized a broad extension of the 
branch banking principle. Only one modification was made by the new banking law with 
regard to branch banking. National banks could organize branch banks in states that 
already permitted state branch banking.19 
 Further changes were implemented to eliminate various banking abuses. Member 
banks were restricted from making brokers’ loans for other banks. This practice was 
14 
already unlawful under a New York Clearing House regulation. Interest payments were 
forbidden on demand bank deposits except where state law required it. Interest rates on 
savings accounts were instituted by the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors. 
Interest rates were restricted to seven percent with national banks or one percent more 
than the rediscount rate on ninety-day currency set by the Federal Reserve, whichever 
turned out to be higher. The minimum requirement for national banks’ capital stock was 
increased to $50,000, and new national banks had to have an excess of twenty percent of 
its deposits before they could open for business. Despite conflicting theories, one 
contrasting specification was implemented into the 1935 Banking Act. National banks 
were allowed greater autonomy in credit extensions on real estate. Such credit could now 
make up a portion of the combined banking capital stock and surplus, or up to sixty 
percent of the bank’s total savings accounts.20 
 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
  The Banking Act of 1935 went beyond the Emergency Banking and Relief Act of 
1933, placing further restrictions and regulations on banking and financial institutions. It 
restructured the Federal Reserve System, setting up the basic organizational structure 
existing today. The Board became the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, with seven governors, with one designated as chairman. The U.S. Treasury 
Secretary and the Comptroller of the Currency were eliminated from the Board, further 
separating the Federal Reserve as an independent regulatory agency from the executive 
branch. The Act formally assigned the board the authority to use its powers to promote 
favorable conditions associated with business activity.21 
15 
 The Banking Act of 1935 altered the title of the Federal Reserve Board to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and reorganized the Board by 
eliminating ex officio members. It also increased the salaries and prolonged the terms of 
the Board members and restructured the Federal Open Market Committee*. The latter 
was to consist of the seven members of the Board in addition to five executives from the 
Federal Reserve Banks, as opposed to the twelve heads of the Banks, under the Banking 
Act of 1933. It also completed a process begun in the Banking Act of 1933 by making it 
unlawful for banks to purchase and sell government securities for other corporations. 22 
 Banking legislation during the Roosevelt administration drastically altered the 
policies and procedures of the Federal Reserve System. The Emergency Banking Act 
permitted Federal Reserve Banks to rediscount eligible currency on a temporary basis for 
nonmember banks, and to extend credit to member banks with non-eligible securities. By 
the Banking Act of 1933 and the Industrial Working Capital Loan Act of 1934, Federal 
Reserve Banks were authorized to extend credit directly to industrial corporations. New 
powers of control over member bank loans were allocated to the Federal Reserve Board 
by the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Banking Act 
of 1935, all of which consolidated responsibility and regulation within the Reserve 
System.23 
 The Emergency Banking Act authorization for Federal Reserve credit extensions 
                                                          
*
 The Federal Open Market Committee was established under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The 
primary function of the committee is regulation of the money market and money market accounts and it 
determines the interest rate and credit policies of the Federal Reserve System. The FMOC has twelve 
members. Seven are Federal Reserve Board members and are appointed by the President of the United 
States. The other five are presidents of the other twelve Federal Reserve banks. Of the five, four are picked 
on a rotating basis and the fifth is president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York who is permanent. 
The committee decides on increasing or decreasing interest rates by the purchase of government securities. 
See Jan Warren Duggar, “The Federal Open Market Committee’s Proviso Clause: Application and Usage.” 
26 Journal Of Finance 885-895 (Sep., 1971). 
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upon ineligible funds or even without backing continued and with increased frequency. 
Those powers were already provided for by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Extending 
credit to nonmember banks was a change in policy. Both powers were defined as 
emergency measures and confined to one year. However, an extension by executive order 
was allowed. The Banking Act of 1935 gave the Board permanent authority to allow 
financial advances to member banks on ineligible securities as it deemed necessary. 
Those advances were restricted to four months. Those financial advancements were set at 
a half percent higher interest rate than the current rediscount rate. More important was the 
authorization for direct Federal Reserve credit extensions to corporations when local 
banking institutions lacked the resources. Under the Emergency Banking Act, this 
provision had been temporary and limited to short term credit. The Industrial Working 
Capital Loan Act of 1934 made such loans an official policy of Reserve bank procedure, 
and permitted them for average terms of up to five years. Applications for these direct 
loans were numerous, and by the end of 1935, $32 million of those loans were 
outstanding.24 
 Federal Reserve regulations over the loan policies of member banks were directed 
against the use of bank loans for speculative purposes. Under the Banking Act of 1933, 
the Federal Reserve Board* was authorized to issue a maximum ratio of collateral credit 
                                                          
*
 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System as an independent regulatory 
agency. The agency, acts as the nation’s central bank.. The agency’s duties currently include conducting the 
nation’s monetary policies, supervising and regulating banking institutions, protecting the credit rights of 
consumers, and providing financial services to the government, financial institutions, and the general 
public. The Federal Reserve System is directed by a Board of Governors, which consists of seven members 
who each serve a fourteen year term of office. Governors are appointed by the President of the United 
States and confirmed by the Senate. The President also designates one of the governors to serve as 
chairperson of the board for a four year, renewable term. The Board of Governors sets the interest rate that 
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks charge member banks for loans, as well as the amount of reserves that 
banks must keep on hand. The board also sets margin requirements for financing securities traded on 
national security exchanges. Finally, the board establishes maximum interest rates on time deposits and 
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extensions consisting of capital and assets to member banks for each district. Specific 
restrictions were instituted on the collateral credit policies of individual member banks. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized the Board to set margin requirements on 
brokers’ credit and on collateral bank credit allocated for the purpose of buying or 
holding securities. Finally, the 1935 Banking Act empowered the Board to increase 
member bank reserve requirements up to twice their former ratios. A small stipulation of 
the Banking Act of 1933 changed the responsibility over foreign financial exchanges 
from the New York Reserve Bank to the Federal Reserve Board. One stipulation limited 
Reserve bank purchases and marketing of U.S. securities to open market transactions. 
Control of open market transactions was transferred from the Reserve banks to the Board. 
These changes in regulation and responsibility, in addition to the increased control over 
member bank credit extensions given to the Board by other statutory provisions, provided 
an increased system of bank regulation.25 
 The Federal Reserve System played a small role in providing the capital means of 
digging the banks out of the 1933 banking crisis. The RFC was primarily responsible for 
giving America’s banks the financial means that led them to economic recovery. 
However, the Federal Reserve did help to restore America’s banks by increased 
oversight, regulation, and structure. Between May 17 and October 25, 1933, the Reserve 
banks purchased $550 million of federal securities. Discount rates were decreased in 
1934 and 1935. Federal Reserve purchases of $500 million of federal securities were 
minor when the government was allocating billions of dollars. Commercial loans 
continued to decrease, economic activity proliferated, and by 1935 the Board encountered 
                                                                                                                                                                             
savings deposits for its member banks. See Clark Warburton, “Monetary Control Under The Federal 
Reserve Act.” 33 Political Science Quarterly 505-534 (Dec., 1946).  
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a new problem associated with excess reserves. Member bank surplus funds first attracted 
public notice in 1934 when they exceeded $1.5 billion and continued to increase. Under 
authority allowed by the Banking Act of 1935, the Board increased reserve requirements 
for all member banks by fifty percent. The change was instituted as of August 15, 1936. 
In one single change of policy, excess reserves were decreased from $3 billion to 
approximately $1.9 billion. In addition, full doubling of the reserve requirements was 
implemented on January 30, 1937, thereby eliminating an additional $1.5 billion in 
excess reserves, reducing them to $500 million.26  
 Between March, 1933, and December, 1936, the most notable banking 
achievement was the establishment of nearly fifteen-and-a-half-thousand state and 
national banks. An increase in bond prices over the next three years helped to prevent a 
return to banking failures. In 1936 the nation had eight thousand fewer banks than in 
1929, and banking capital was reduced by $2.5 billion. The survivors formed a less 
dangerous and more efficient banking system than had existed in 1929. Many companies 
were, to an increasing extent, providing capital for their operations and making purchases 
from working finances rather than through bank loans. Increasingly they were using 
banks as holders for their excess profits as an alternative to credit. Likewise, the Federal 
Government’s economic stimulus packages and recovery programs, along with a steady 
increase in gold stocks after 1933 added to banking capital without expanding bank credit 
extensions. Both demand and time deposits in commercial banks increased from $28 
billion in June, 1933 to $35 billion in June, 1936. Commercial loans declined over these 
three years from $7.8 billion to $6.5 billion. Not until 1936, according to the Federal 
Reserve, did commercial credit increase.27 
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RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION 
 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation had been established by the preceding 
administration and was inherited by the Roosevelt Administration. The Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation could lend up to $3.8 billion to financial institutions, agricultural 
credit institutions, railroads, and public agencies. Various legislation, from the 
Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933, to the Disaster Loan Act of July 26, 1935, 
broadened the range of RFC activities, extending its total funds to $5.7 billion. The total 
of its reserves and funds eventually exceeded this amount. Repayment of prior loans 
increased its capacity to make additional loans by replenishing the Corporation’s 
capital.28  
 Nearly two billion dollars, almost one-third of the RFC’s advances after March 
1933, were lent to banks, but the structure and purpose of banking credit had changed 
tremendously. During the Hoover Administration, most credit had been given to prevent 
established banks from closing. In the summer of 1933 the decision was made to allow 
the RFC to lend to closed banks on their available assets, to enable them to liquidate at 
least part of their remaining deposits. The prior restriction of such loans to $200 million 
was lifted. By April, 1934, over $700 million had been extended to executives and 
officials of closed banks, allowing them to repay an equivalent value of frozen deposits 
far sooner than previously anticipated.29 
 A second authorization of RFC aid to financial institutions came about with the 
Emergency Banking Act, which permitted the RFC to purchase preferred stock and 
debentures of banks. These investments were authorized in order to allow closed banks to 
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reopen, to permit open banks to extend their loan guarantees, and to support the capital 
assets of open banks to meet FDIC and Federal Reserve requirements. Usually the 
stockholders of the banks and other local groups were required to invest an amount equal 
to the RFC’s allocation. Although the RFC did not specifically invest, it participated by 
making loans, and it retained a controlling influence over the policies of banks they 
financed. After autumn of 1933, the RFC increased its investments in loans to banks.30 
 By December 31, 1935, the gross banking credit and disbursements permitted 
since RFC’s founding amounted to $3.658 billion. From these authorizations, credit and 
investments totaling $2.972 billion equaled 52.6 percent of the country’s reported 
commercial banking capital for 1935. Nearly $1.7 billion of the credit and finances, 
however, had been repaid. RFC advances to banks during 1935 were far under the 
amount for the previous year, and were rapidly decreasing. The repayment of banking 
loans during 1935 exceeded new credit by more than $200 million.31 
 The Federal Treasury provided the $500 million of original RFC capital stock. By 
far most of the capital was provided for by the sale of demand or short term notes. Most 
of these notes were bought by the Treasury, excluding the $250 million of the Series E 
notes* purchased by banks which marketed preferred stock or debentures to the RFC, and 
the $100 million of February, 1934, notes paid out for RFC gold purchases in Roosevelt’s 
dollar devaluation program. As successive series of short term notes purchased by the 
Treasury matured, they were replaced by new series and also sold to the Treasury. Since 
the RFC continually expanded its programs through 1935, the later series were 
                                                          
*
 The Series E notes were first issued during the Roosevelt administration. The Series E notes were accrual 
bonds that were issued at seventy-five percent of their face value. Interest is paid at redemption as part of 
the current redemption value. Series E bonds had varying maturity dates depending on the date of issuance 
ranging from five to ten years. They were originally issued in 1935 to provide means of funds for the U.S. 
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consistently greater in amount than the notes they replaced. By December, 1935, almost 
$4.35 billion of these notes had not matured. In 1936 there was a formal reduction in the 
figure to under $4 billion.32 
 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 
 Federal Deposit Insurance was not originally part of President Roosevelt’s 
program for banking recovery. Nevertheless the program became an integral part of the 
nation’s financial recovery. The proposal was introduced by Congressman Harry B. 
Steagall, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee in 1932, but died in 
the Senate because of tremendous opposition led by Senator Carter Glass, a senior 
Senator presiding over the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. Glass supported 
only a financial organization to advance to closed banks the approximate amount of 
frozen deposits needed to complete restoration. In 1933, Steagall and Glass compromised 
to include each of their proposals and recommendations to incorporate them into 
Roosevelt’s Emergency Banking and Relief Act of 1933. The final document set up a 
national deposit insurance program with a comprehensive plan to become effective on 
July 1, 1934. A banking insurance proposal had passed the House in May, 1932, and was 
introduced on the floor for debate in the 1933 Congress. The FDIC was set up under the 
Glass-Steagall Act, and became an integral component of the Emergency Banking Bill of 
1933. The completed draft provided for the establishment of a Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation to insure bank depositors’ accounts up to $2,500 per depositor and to 
liquidate the assets of failed member banks.* The regulations contained in the Act 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Treasury. See United States Code 31 U.S.C Sect., 3105. 
* The FDIC limit has undergone significant revisions over the past several decades since the establishment 
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required all current members of the Federal Reserve System to have their banking 
accounts insured by the Corporation. Nonmember banks also could join to obtain 
insurance on their deposits upon application to and approval by the FDIC. After the FDIC 
was fully established on January 1, 1934, most of America’s banks gained membership in 
the Corporation. By June, 1934, almost 14,000 of our country’s 15,348 commercial 
banks, that held ninety-seven percent of all commercial bank deposits, were covered by 
insurance.33 
 There were two classes of capital stock involved. Non-dividend shares in the 
amount of $139 million were purchased by the Federal Reserve Banks. The Treasury 
purchased $150 million. This amounted to six percent of the total stock. Each member 
bank also bought six percent of the stock amounting to one-half percent of their total 
deposits. If needed, the FDIC could issue bonds up to three times its assets. All Federal 
Reserve member banks had to become members of the FDIC. Nonmember banks could 
also apply for membership, but if their deposits were over $1 million by July 1, 1941, 
they would be required to join the system or leave the FDIC. Members of the FDIC were 
to pay a yearly fee not exceeding one-twelfth percent of their total deposits and 
uncollected assets. In addition, deposits would be insured no more than $5,000 per 
deposit after July 4, 1934. Obviously, the Corporation would secure only small deposits. 
Large depositors would receive limited benefits. The Corporation insured only forty-five 
percent of the total bank deposits. Providing for further protections, the FDIC was 
granted the authority to examine the banking practices of its members. Upon notification, 
it could restrict a bank for unsound banking practices.34  
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the FDIC. The limit was increased to $5,000 on July 1, 1934, and successive alterations after Roosevelt 
left office increased the current level of $100,000. 
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 In 1933 many of the banks that became members of the FDIC still faced many 
problems after several months of operation under the Corporation’s guidelines. If allowed 
to join without reorganization and restructuring, there existed the threat of closure in the 
near future that would institute heavy burdens on the FDIC. To avoid this liability, the 
RFC, throughout 1933, afforded to these institutions enough capital to complete the 
restoration process. Because of the financial assistance provided by the RFC to economic 
and banking recovery, no heavy burdens were placed upon the FDIC at the beginning of 
the Corporation’s existence. The National Housing Act of June, 1934, aided the FDIC by 
granting insurance for the accounts of federal savings and loan associations, building and 
loan associations, savings and loan associations, homestead associations, and cooperative 
banks. One specific institution, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, held 
capital stockpiles of $100 million. The institution was formed by the Home Owner’s 
Loan Corporation (HOLC).* Members were required to pay an annual fee of .25 percent 
of their aggregate deposits, until a surplus fund totaling five percent of the insured 
deposits was reached.35 
 
RESTORATION OF AMERICA’S BANKS 
 On January 1, 1933, two months before Roosevelt took office, almost eighteen-
thousand commercial banks were in operation. When the banking holiday ended, just 
over seventeen thousand remained and fewer than twelve thousand of those were licensed 
                                                          
*
 In April, 1933, Roosevelt introduced legislation, patterned on the farm mortgage bill, designed to protect 
small homeowners from foreclosure. The Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC), founded in the 
summer of 1933, allowed home owners who had lost their homes as far back as 1930 to seek government 
assistance by recovering lost homes and refinancing their homes through the Corporation. See The Age Of 
Roosevelt: The Coming Of The New Deal, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1959), pp. 297-299. 
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for operation. More than five thousand unlicensed banks were left unopened, either to be 
reopened after restructuring and reorganization or to be closed indefinitely and either 
liquidated or merged with other financial institutions. Three thousand of these financial 
institutions were soon licensed and reopened while over two thousand never reopened. 
Changes in deposits were very consistent with the fate of unlicensed banks. From 
December, 1932 to March 15, 1933, deposits in banks conducting transactions dropped 
by one-sixth. Seventy percent of the decline can be attributed to frozen accounts in banks 
unable to obtain licenses, yet not reorganized, restructured, or liquidated and remained 
closed. By July, 1933 just over two-thousand of the banks, containing almost half the 
total restricted deposits, were liquidated. However, the closed banks held a greater 
amount of aggregate deposits. Three-fifths of the banks eventually opened for business 
but contained only three-eighths of the total deposits.36 
 Roosevelt’s policies caused a tremendous decrease in commercial bank failures. 
A bank’s losses associated with a bank’s failure were passed on to the customer. 
Roosevelt’s administration greatly reduced banking failures and this helped to restore the 
nation’s economy. From 1921 through 1933, there were an average of six hundred bank 
failures and closures per year, reaching a height of over four thousand in 1933. That 
number declined to an average of under one hundred per year until 1942. The number of 
bank failures continued to decrease to an average of fewer than ten banks annually from 
1943 to recent times. For a thirteen year period beginning 1921, depositors’ losses 
averaged $146 million annually. For the next twenty-seven years, losses averaged only 
$706,000 annually. In addition, more than half the total losses over the twenty-seven 
years occurred in 1934 and were mostly an inheritance from the years preceding the 
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FDIC. The decrease in banking closures cannot be attributed to any correspondingly 
major improvement in the competency of bank officers or in the efficiency of financial 
executives. Nor can it be attributed to the FDIC even though it involved increased 
regulation and supervision of licensed state banks. Rather it is a reflection of two other 
factors. First, poorly managed and troubled banks are seldom allowed to close if they are 
insured. Instead, they are restructured under new management and organization. The 
supervision by federal bank regulatory agencies and sound bank mergers virtually 
eliminate closure. In addition, the establishment of the FDIC federalized banking in the 
U.S. and brought about closer supervision because banks had to become members of the 
FDIC in order to get their services and therefore have to comply with their requirements. 
The FDIC assumes responsibility for losses associated with depleted capital. Second, the 
confidence of small depositors increases, enabling them to rely on their finances even if 
the bank experiences financial difficulties, preventing the closure of one bank from 
influencing the transactions of other banks and forcing profitable banks to declare a 
banking holiday.37 
 Roosevelt’s policies, as a result of the widespread losses imposed by bank failures 
from 1933 to 1960 and beyond, were successful in fulfilling what had been a major 
objective of banking reform for almost a hundred years. Public confidence in banking 
organizations soared. The banking crisis arose out of or became greatly intensified by a 
loss of confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into money and the public’s 
desire to increase the amount of currency held in the form of money.38  
 If, for example, there should be a large and prolonged continuous decrease in 
monetary stocks, like the one that occurred from 1929 to 1933, the effects on the amount 
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of banking capital would most likely cause so many banks to become unsound as to 
eliminate available reserve funds of the FDIC. However, a large portion of the 1929-1933 
decrease in monetary stocks was not independent of the previous bank closures. It was 
rather a contributor to them, because of their effect on the deposit-currency ratio and the 
incapacity of the Federal Reserve to compensate for the decline in the ratio by a 
significant increase in currency or solvency. Had the FDIC existed in 1930, it would very 
likely have prevented the decline in the deposit-currency ratio in the later part of 1930 
and therefore the catastrophic unraveling of events that followed, including the 
tremendous decrease in monetary stocks. It may be true in modern times, that a radical 
change in the deposit-currency ratio would incite another crisis and a more suitable 
response in monetary policy making, so that, even without the support of federal deposit 
insurance, a banking crisis, once it began, would not be allowed to escalate. The 
establishment of federal deposit insurance greatly decreases, almost eliminates, the need 
to depend on such modifications.39 
 Requirements for admission to the Federal Reserve were changed to authorize the 
membership of mutual savings banks. Policies for regulating the founding of branch 
banks were changed, and double liabilities on national bank stocks were removed. 
Investment groups associated with commercial banks and other financial institutions were 
restricted. National bank notes were converted into a Treasury responsibility and a 
procedure was established to remove them from circulation. The license for distributing 
them terminated on August 1, 1935, with the redemption of the two remaining issuances 
of United States bonds carrying the circulation authorization. Banks were restricted by 
statute or official regulation from providing interest on demand deposits and from paying 
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interest rates on savings deposits greater than those stipulated by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System for member banks and by the FDIC for licensed 
nonmember institutions. Member banks were also restricted from serving as agents of 
nonmember banks in providing capital in the form of securities in the stock market. 
Throughout U.S. banking history, scholars have entertained a theory in regard to interest 
payments on deposits. They claim it leads to unhealthy competition among banks, and 
requires them to lower reserves to a dangerously low level and engage in unsafe and 
unsound investment practices and credit policies because of the need to produce profits to 
pay the interest on bank loans. The suggestion was often made to abolish interest 
payments. Interest payment prohibition was finally administered for demand deposits in 
member banks with the Banking Act of 1933. Regulations for demand deposits for other 
licensed banks were outlined in the Banking Act of 1935. This was possible due in part to 
the greater autonomy after 1933 to regulate banking and finance.40 
 One consequence of the exclusion of interest payments on demand deposits 
(checking accounts) was an increased decline in the need for associated banking deposits. 
The decline in bank to bank deposits in addition to the restriction of licensed banks acting 
as agents of non-bank creditors in providing investments in the stock market added to the 
decrease in security credit by banks and the declining roll of credit extension as a way of 
providing secondary reserve investments.41 
 
 EFFECTS ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY  
 As a consequence of the restoration of America’s banking and financial 
institutions, a rapid increase in personal income and industrial productivity came about. A 
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minor economic downturn in the last six months of 1933 was followed by economic 
recovery in the first part of 1934 and then another downturn. A prolonged and fairly 
continuous increase in income and productivity did not get underway until late 1934 and 
then it was primarily related to the production of nondurable products and services and 
government purchased goods. At the price level peak in 1937, the non-durable prices of 
industrial production were over twenty-one percent above 1929 levels, whereas the 
durable price level was around six percent under the 1929 value. This variation reflects 
an abnormally low level of private capital formation. Private investment remained at low 
levels until 1936. When it became positive in 1936 and the first part of 1937, an 
abnormally large portion constituted inventory replenishments. At its highest peak in the 
first part of 1937, private construction was only one-third of the highest level attained in 
the 1920s.42 
 In addition to production, wholesale prices began to increase in early 1933, 
mostly for the same reasons as other economic activity. Wholesale prices then stabilized 
to increase again at a more moderate rate from 1934 through mid-1937, disturbed only by 
a mild decrease in 1936. From the 1933 through 1937, wholesale prices increased almost 
fifty percent. The cost of living increased markedly less, by thirteen percent. The large 
changes in monetary stocks are aligned with those in income. From April, 1933, the 
recorded monetary stock increased fifty-three percent to its highest point in March, 1937, 
or at an average yearly rate of almost eleven percent. The increase is unparalleled in U.S. 
history during a four-year period except for the years 1879-1883; in response to the 
depression of 1897-1901; and during World Wars I and II. Monetary stocks in 1933-
1937, like personal income, did not attain the average 1929 level. The variation was, 
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however, much lower for currency than for income, so a difference between 1929 and 
1937 of two percent in monetary stocks was transferred into a seventeen percent change 
in personal income. The 1937 peak was accompanied by an abnormally severe 
contraction in money as personal income. Monetary stock rises occurred during 
contractions* in the economy, though at a slower rate than during the previous 
expansions. A truly interesting component of the 1933 to 1937 expansion is the 
relationship between the increase in monetary stocks and the increase in prices.43 
 After a recession in 1937, economic recovery came after the money stock was 
increased. Total output in GDP increased at continuous yearly percentages of 7.8, 13.1, 
and 12.1 from June, 1938, to June, 1941, in spite of a continued decrease in the deposit-
reserve ratio in 1940 as an aftermath of the rise in reserve requirements. Doubtless, other 
factors contributed to the recovery and to its speed, but the rapid expansion in monetary 
stock certainly at least supported their activity. The economic gains remained high 
primarily due to the unprecedented magnitude of the preceding decline. Averaged over 
twelve years from 1929 to 1941, the growth rate of monetary stocks was less than two 
and a half percent annually. The real output growth was lower than two percent annually. 
Both were far under the overall average U.S. figures. How different the outcome would 
have been if the monetary stock had consistently grown at the average annual rate of two 
and a half percent, much less at the higher long-term rate, instead of decreasing by one-
third from 1929 to 1933 and then increasing from 1933 to 1941.44 
 
                                                          
*
 The term “contraction” is commonly used by economists and is used interchangeably with the terms 
“recession” or “depression” to describe the prevailing economic conditions of the times. The “Great 
Depression” has also long been referred to as the “Great Contraction” by leading economists. See Milton 
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History Of The United States, 1867-1960. (Princeton, 
30 
CONCLUSION 
 By the end of the 1930’s, America’s banks had completely recovered from the 
horrid situation in March of 1933, when Roosevelt took office. Perhaps this is best 
illustrated by calling the attention of the reader to the fact that on December 31, 1928, 
7,635 national banks contained total deposits of over $24.3 billion, whereas 5,266, with 
1,515 branches operating in the United States on December 31, 1937, held deposits of 
over $26.5 billion. This was an increase of over $2 billion in national bank deposits. A 
restored banking system proved invaluable in meeting expanding commercial needs and 
should not be underestimated. A sound banking and financial system requires a monetary 
structure insuring the protection of the depositors.45 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 299-418. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REGULATION OF GOLD AND SILVER 
 After being inaugurated in March, 1933, Roosevelt, changed the regulation of 
gold and silver for the next several decades. Among Roosevelt’s challenges was an 
economy beset by the depression. He had to create jobs, raise prices, and increase the 
available money supply, but to do so while on the gold standard would depress the dollar 
and lead to an outflow of gold. Increasing the money supply without adding to the gold 
stock could have made the dollar less valuable and exports cheaper, attracting foreign 
purchases of U.S. goods, causing a decline of gold stocks. He promptly halted gold 
exports, ceased convertibility of currency into gold and ordered U.S. citizens to turn in 
their gold. Almost five-hundred million tons of gold, mostly coin, worth $321 million, 
was handed in for currency. The restriction on gold lasted until the Nixon administration. 
Such measures, however, did not resolve the issue of the money supply, so Roosevelt 
decided to increase the price of gold. Initially the price was raised a few cents a day 
without much effect. Thus, on January 31, 1934, Roosevelt determined on a final 
increase. The price was set at $35 per ounce, which was a dollar devaluation of forty 
percent in the relation to the old value of $20.67 per ounce. With the passage of this 
legislation the United States decided to go back on a limited gold standard under which 
the U.S. Assay office would not only buy all gold offered to it at $35 an ounce, but sell to 
any central banks of foreign countries. In addition, Roosevelt decided to establish a silver 
purchase program in which the U.S. Treasury would buy all newly mined silver.46 
 
DEPLETION OF GOLD STOCKS UNDER HOOVER 
 The external drain upon the quantity of the United States gold and silver stocks, at 
32 
the end of 1931 through the beginning of 1932, threatened the ability of the U.S. to stay 
on a traditional gold standard. The depletion of gold stocks totaled $1 billion, a large 
percentage of the monetary base within the span of a year. Before 1931, central banks 
and governments abroad had deposited $1.5 billion with interest in U.S. banks, but 
France made a withdrawal of $120 million in gold from New York on September 22, 
1931. From September 16 to September 30, 1931, the U.S. monetary gold stock declined 
by $275 million. The U.S. Treasury suffered a depletion of another $45 million in 
October that returned gold stocks to their 1929 level. By the end of June, 1932, the 
monetary gold stock of the United States had fallen twenty percent from its 1931 amount 
of $5 billion, which, up until then, was at the highest level that our gold stock had ever 
attained. The decrease in public confidence led to a heavy outflow of gold for hoarding 
purposes. The reserves of our banking system were threatened both by heavy withdrawals 
of gold and accelerating domestic currency demands, leading to a period of great 
borrowing difficulties from autumn of 1931 until the spring of 1932.47 
 On February 7, 1932, President Hoover was informed by Treasury Secretary 
Ogden Mills that the United States was within two weeks of being unable to meet the 
demands for withdrawals from abroad. The U.S. would have to leave the gold standard 
unless something was done to reverse the outflow of gold. In addition to foreign 
withdrawals, a large portion of the nation’s gold was tied up in reserves as backing for 
deposits and currency in commercial banks. Federal Reserve banks were required to hold 
at least forty percent of the backing of Federal Reserve Notes in gold. In addition, Federal 
Reserve bank accounts had to be supported by no less than thirty-five percent gold or 
other lawful forms of barter, or short term commercial paper. Since most commercial 
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banks lacked enough support to meet the demands of their depositors, they were forced to 
use additional gold. Even more gold was hoarded by the American public as well as 
foreign entities.48 
 The year 1932 ended with a net rise in monetary gold stocks. The changing 
dynamics of both size and the direction of gold flows in 1932 constituted a decline in 
gold stocks of approximately $500 million in May and June, that differed from an 
increase of nearly $200 million in December. The total increase for 1932 as a whole 
amounted to $53 million. During the first six months of 1932, the external decrease in 
gold and the internal currency retention were dominating influences. They were of large 
enough volume to permit banks not only to satisfy both the gold supplies and currency 
demands, but also to initiate a reduction in outstanding loans extended by the Federal 
Reserve Banks. In the last six months of 1932, the movement of gold and currency 
changed direction. Monetary gold stocks increased over $50 million in July and over 
$100 million in August and September, and almost $75 million in October and 
November. In addition, U.S. banks were allowed to increase reserves from two other 
sources, such as the issue of new National Bank Notes and currency deposits.49 
 In the beginning of 1933 the foreign and domestic outflows of gold and money 
were part of the immediate cause of the banking panic. In December, 1932, a list of 
financial institutions published by the U.S. Treasury Department depicted those who 
obtained loans from the RFC. Publication of the list made known to the general public 
and depositors the extent to which each bank had had to resort to the RFC for support. 
Publication of the list helped to erode the confidence of the American people in banking 
and finance.50 
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EARLY ROOSEVELT GOLD REGULATION EFFORTS 
 After 1929, widespread bank closure led to tremendous deflation. The decline in 
prices was the direct result of existing gold policies. From March, 1933, to the fall of 
1934, the U.S. monetary system was greatly modified. Even though the classification of 
the U.S. monetary system changed at different times, gold had existed as part of our 
circulating currency or stored as support for the possible payment of debt since the 
founding of our nation. Roosevelt put the nation on a limited gold standard.* The nation’s 
supply of gold was stockpiled in the U.S. Treasury. Therefore, it would serve as a reserve 
for the Federal Reserve Note issues which now constituted the basic currency. At the 
government’s discretion, gold was supplied for settling international trade imbalances. In 
relation to gold content versus international gold currencies, the dollar was devalued by 
41.96 percent. Silver became nationalized, and a vigorous silver purchase program 
adopted. Finally, National Bank Notes were removed from the monetary system.51 
 By an executive order of March 5, 1933, which proclaimed the banking holiday, 
Federal Reserve banks or any other organizations were prohibited from shipping, 
earmarking, or in any way exporting gold or silver. The Emergency Banking Act of 
March 9, 1933, gave the President emergency authorization to regulate trafficking in 
                                                          
*
 A true gold standard is a monetary system under which currency can be readily exchanged for a specified 
amount of gold. A true gold standard is usually specified in terms of the convertibility of currency to gold. 
Often the amount is equivalent to the selling price on the international market. Nations maintaining the 
traditional gold standards of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were thought to be anti-
inflationary. With a true gold standard a nation does not limit the exchange of currency for gold or silver 
and the convertibility ratios are pre-determined according to the world market values for the precious 
metals. Roosevelt took the nation off the gold standard for a short period and placed it permanently on a 
limited gold standard. It is often referred to as a limited gold standard because the convertibility ratio was 
artificially set and pre-determined by the administration and restrictions were instituted prohibiting the 
hoarding of either gold or silver. See Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes and 
Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York, Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 290-291. See also The Age 
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gold, silver, and international exchange. In addition, it authorized the Treasury Secretary 
to require gold and gold certificates to be turned over to the Treasury in exchange for 
dollars. A Presidential proclamation of March 10, 1933, reopened banks but required 
specific authorization from the Treasury Secretary for transactions involving gold or 
foreign exchange. The banking holiday balanced the gold outflow initiated by the 
banking catastrophe in February, 1933. Gold exportation resumed on March 13, 1933, 
under Treasury licenses, and since export licenses were extended virtually without 
restriction, the position of U.S. currency in foreign exchange was barely affected. Foreign 
pressure against the dollar was relieved as the banking crisis disappeared during March. 
Most of the world at this time remained on some type of gold or silver standard or 
combination of both and Roosevelt gave no indication that he sought to permanently take 
the United States off of the gold standard. For those reasons the world assumed the 
United States would return to at least a limited gold standard at an early date.52 
 On April 5, 1933, came a drastic new development. The President issued a 
proclamation for the public to turn in all domestic gold to the Treasury by May 1, 1933. 
The proclamation nationalized gold by forbidding the retentive stockpiling of gold coin, 
bullion or certificates, and requiring all persons to turn them in to a Reserve Bank, 
branch, or organization, except for reasonable amounts for use in the arts and industry, 
and special coins editions. The public was allowed to hold a total of $100 per person in 
gold coin and certificates. Federal Reserve member banks were also required to hand in 
all gold coin, bullion and certificates held by them or owned by them to the Reserve 
Banks of their districts. Roosevelt decided to adopt a policy of currency devaluation in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Of Roosevelt: The Coming Of The New Deal, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1959), pp. 195-251. 
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order to facilitate price rises and with some general view to encourage commodity 
exportation. At this date he wasn’t sure as to the extent and organization of a devaluation, 
but the nationalization of gold was a solid forerunner to a devaluation procedure. All 
funds taken in raising gold prices would now accumulate in the Treasury instead of in 
private hands. Another preparatory measure along those lines was taken on May 7, 1933. 
In an evening radio address, Roosevelt insisted that the Administration had a finite plan 
for increasing general commodity prices and expressed opposition to the inclusion of 
gold clauses in government bonds and other securities. On June 5 Roosevelt’s official 
policy, written into a Congressional joint resolution, made unlawful the inclusion of gold 
clauses in private and government contracts.53 
 In spite of the continuance of a limited gold standard, it became apparent that 
dollar devaluation was ultimately unavoidable. The belief was reinforced by a growing 
sentiment in Congress for currency inflation to also include the use of silver. In addition 
to the change in convertibility ratio of dollars into gold, silver was also nationalized. The 
convertibility ratio of dollars to silver was arbitrarily set. On April 19, the Secretary of 
the Treasury issued a regulation specifying that licensure would be discontinued for the 
exportation of gold out of the United States for backing U.S. currency in foreign 
exchange conversions.54  
 President Roosevelt supported currency devaluation, but not an overall increase in 
the amount of money in circulation. In Congress, there existed strong inflationary 
constituents favoring an artificial increase in the amount of currency in circulation. 
Although their programs were distinctly out of compliance with the President’s monetary 
policies, their influence was too strong to allow them to be completely ignored. President 
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Roosevelt was able to achieve a middle ground permitting, but not compelling, the 
expansion of the amount of currency in circulation. The resolution was outlined in the 
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Relief Act of May 12, 1933. At his discretion, 
the President could instruct the Federal Reserve banks to buy additional government 
bonds up to the amount of $3 billion. Should the banks fail to initiate those purchases, the 
President could instruct the Treasury Secretary to release $3 billion of currency with 
which to retire a great portion of the government indebtedness? If he deemed it 
necessary, the President could either place our monetary system on a bi-metallic standard, 
or reduce the gold convertibility of our currency by not more than one-half of its current 
ratio. The triumph of the alternating theories was limited. With firmness Roosevelt 
ignored the broad range of powers placed at his command. The President continued the 
policy of progressive currency devaluation through transactions in international currency 
exchange.55 
 A Presidential proclamation of April 20, 1933, completed the partial ban on gold 
exportation established on March 6. With this proclamation FDR took the country off the 
gold standard. Roosevelt prohibited earmarking for foreign depositors and banned the 
exportation of gold coin, bullion, and certificates. Some exceptions could be authorized 
by the Treasury Secretary. Discussions of inflation and currency devaluation, begun by 
gold nationalization of April 5, increased at an accelerated rate. Reluctant investors, 
particularly foreign investors and depositors, began to remove capital from the U.S. and 
invest abroad. Pressure on U.S. currency from foreign investors was accelerated by a 
quick drop of currency market traffickers when the value of the dollar against other 
currencies dropped even further. In relation to the franc, the dollar dropped from 25.4 on 
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April 5 to 21.4 on June 1.56  
 During the summer of 1933, FDR embraced the monetary theories of professors 
George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson at Cornell University. In Prices, they theorized 
that the general commodity price levels of various farm products and raw materials may 
be controlled by changing the convertibility of U.S. currency artificially.* Apparently the 
continual devaluation of U.S. currency in international exchange made available a 
favorable opportunity for modification of gold convertibility without taking aggressive 
action. The Treasury only had to purchase newly mined gold to be marketed at the world 
price instead of the prior price of $20.67 per fine ounce. As U.S. currency declined in 
value, the world market for gold convertibility in U.S. currency would increase. By 
allowing an increasing amount of currency in exchange for an ounce of gold, the 
Treasury would witness the depreciation of the convertibility of gold into dollars. 
According to the Warren-Pearson doctrine, the American general commodity price levels 
would increase in proportion to the decrease of the gold conversion of U.S. currency.57  
 The effectiveness of modifying the gold standard is not easily measured. 
Immediately after the modification, U.S. currency began to depreciate. From April 20 to 
June 10, 1933 the price of gold increased 23.2 percent in the London free-gold market, 
while the price of seventeen of the most prominent American commodities in foreign 
trade increased forty-five percent. It is impossible to determine specifically how much of 
the increase was due to leaving the gold standard and how much may be attributed to 
                                                          
*
 Under this theory a nation on a gold or silver standard could raise the price levels of its exports by 
artificially setting the price of gold above that of the international market. This would ultimately make that 
nation’s currency less valuable (devaluation) and make the importation of that nation’s exports more 
attractive to foreign governments. See George Frederick Warren, Frank A. Pearson, and Frank Ashmore’s 
Prices (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1933), et al. and The Age Of Roosevelt: The Coming Of The New 
Deal, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), pp. 35-36, 197-198, and 
235-241. 
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other factors. It is apparent however, that it aided substantially in U.S. banking 
restoration, for it eliminated a significant contributor to many banking problems and it 
increased the gold stocks of the Federal Reserve from $2.7 billion on March 8, 1933 to 
$3.8 billion on April 5, 1933. The Reserve ratio* also increased from 45.6 to 59.7 
percent.58 
 A Presidential proclamation released on August 29, 1933, required the Treasury 
to accept gold from American companies for resale on the international market. The first 
transaction was initiated on September 8, at $29.62 per fine ounce. By September 20, the 
amount was $32.28, but then the devaluation program encountered an obstacle. U.S. 
currency steadied in relation to international currencies and, during the first half of 
October, recovered a considerable amount of the price decline it had lost. The 
international gold price diminished in the convertibility of U.S. currency, and by October 
16 had dropped to $29.00 per ounce. This was substantially lower than in the beginning 
of the gold purchase program. If the gold convertibility of U.S. currency was to be 
reduced further in compliance with the President’s policies, more aggressive initiatives 
would have to be administered. A Presidential proclamation on October 25, 1933, 
changed earlier gold policies. No longer was the nation’s gold price to be valued by the 
convertibility of U.S. currency by international exchange rates. Instead, the gold would 
be valued by the RFC, now permitted to buy all new gold mined in the U.S. On October 
25, the Treasury made its first gold sale at $31.36 an ounce, nearly forty cents above the 
                                                          
*
 The Federal Reserve ratio requirement is the amount of cash and other liquid assets a bank must keep in 
proportion to the percentage of its total deposits. The money must either be retained in the nearest regional 
Federal Reserve Bank or kept in its own vaults. The reserve requirements are a main regulator as to how 
much money a bank can lend, which is directly correlated with the rate of economic growth and the 
nation’s money supply. The Federal Reserve can control this by making the reserve requirement higher, 
which makes the amount of currency in circulation more scarce, thereby slowing economic growth rates to 
keep the economy healthy. See Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes and Jordan 
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international market. Official devaluation again depressed U.S. currency in relation to 
international currencies. Day by day, the value of U.S. currency dropped, as the RFC 
raised the gold price, setting figures just above the international market value. By 
December 1, 1933 the price was $34.01. This amount was sustained for two weeks. On 
December 18, 1933, the amount was elevated to $34.06, on December 31, to $34.45, and 
a final price of $35 was set on January 16, 1934.59 
 
GOLD RESERVE ACT OF 1934 
 By January 1934, the forty percent devaluation of U.S. currency instituted by 
President Roosevelt had been achieved, but a decline in the gold content of the dollar still 
depended on informal executive decisions, business relations with financial 
organizations, and federal regulatory agencies. Roosevelt still needed to execute a 
permanent policy by legislative action. In an announcement on January 15, Roosevelt 
asked Congress to adjust U.S. currency to sixty percent of its former gold value. He 
suggested the gold in the Federal Reserve banks be transferred to the Treasury in 
exchange for currency, so the revaluation profits on these gold stocks could be afforded 
to the Treasury rather than to Reserve banks. Of the $2.808 billion profit which the 
Treasury obtained on its gold stocks, $2 billion, FDR suggested, should be set aside as a 
currency exchange fund managed by the Treasury Secretary.60 
 Almost all of the suggestions were enacted in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. 
Instead of absolutely specifying the gold convertibility of U.S. currency, however, the 
Act permitted the President to set the amount of the gold dollar to between fifty and sixty 
percent of its former value. When the readjustment would take place was left to the 
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President. Under the act, the $2 billion Currency Stabilization Fund was confined to two 
years and could be discontinued sooner or prolonged for a year at the President’s 
discretion. A subsequent proclamation prolonged the program until June, 1939. The day 
after signing the Gold Reserve Act, the President set the new gold weight of the dollar. 
Now the gold dollar had to weigh 15 5/21 grains, 0.9 fine, which was 59.06 percent of the 
previous value. Gold would be worth $35 an ounce as compared to the former price of 
$20.67.61 
 The purpose of the gold purchase program was to raise general commodity price 
levels, particularly farm products and raw materials, which had maintained the largest 
relative decrease during the previous years of depression. That goal was, at the same 
time, pursued along with other New Deal initiatives. The National Recovery 
Administrations codifications and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s 
production regulations were the most effective non-monetary measures. The goals 
pursued by the administration were initiated without any large change in the amount of 
currency, although the Thomas Amendment established the legal framework for an 
increase even without the authorization of the Federal Reserve. Most farm products and 
raw materials produced by the United States had an international market. The U.S. 
emerged as a leading exporter and importer of farm products and raw materials. The price 
levels of such products in international exchange were primarily affected by supply 
versus demand. The prices were determined by events in the United States only insofar as 
they affected the amounts produced or consumed by the U.S. population. Even then, 
those values are much less in percentage to the differentiation in U.S. scarcity and 
surplus. Therefore, the decline in the international exchange value of U.S. currency 
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produced an approximate increase in the general price levels of particular commodities, 
such as cotton, petroleum products, leaf tobacco, wheat, and other products. Roosevelt’s 
goals to increase the prices of farm products and raw materials were largely achieved.62 
 The fall in the international exchange value of U.S. currency was primarily a 
result of speculative marketing of money with the hope of a short-term decline in gold 
stocks. The decrease was maintained by changes in the supply and demand* of exports 
produced by the decline of internal deflation. The resolution of the banking crisis and the 
increase of public confidence in monetary policies were accompanied by an increase in 
velocity,** an increase in purchasing, and rising prices. As a result, figures (velocity, 
purchases, production, and prices) increased in the U.S. in relatively the same proportions 
as they did in other nations. If the exchange rate of our currency had not declined, the 
price increase of farm products and raw materials would have made exports less 
                                                          
*
 The economics of supply versus demand is deep rooted in classic economists such as Adam Smith and 
later expanded on by Nobel Prize winning British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes established the 
theory that has come to be known as Keynesian economics. This theory maintains that economic recovery 
is best when it is stimulated by demand-side economics where growth is sparked not only by the supply of 
goods but also by an increased consumer demand with personal income growth. Largely in opposition to 
Keynesian economists are monetarist economists (like Milton Friedman) who contend that the most 
effective way to regulate total demand for raw materials is to control the supply of money. There exists 
much disagreement within both economics and politics as to the role of free markets and limited 
government and to the extent to how limited and just how free a market should be to flourish and grow. 
Scholars from Friedman to Marx disagree substantially on the role of government in political economy. For 
a more elaborate discussion of political economy see Jean Edward Smith and Herbert M. Levine’s Conduct 
Of American Foreign Policy Debated, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 407-424. 
See also Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New 
York, Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 692-693. 
**
 Velocity is a common term associated with economists that involves the rate of spending or turnover of 
money. In other words, it is the number of times a dollar changes hands within a given period. The higher 
the rate of velocity the higher the frequency that money changes hands. In the 1920s economist Irving 
Fisher invented the term. Fisher showed how velocity has a direct relationship to a nation’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Velocity is measured as the supply of money in relation to the GDP. Velocity affects 
economic activity that is generated by the currency supply, which is directly correlated to the amount of 
bank deposits and currency in circulation. The Federal Reserve Board regulates the nation’s monetary 
policies by an examination of the rate of velocity. An increase in velocity may generate the need for an 
increase in the volume of money. A decline in velocity generally indicates slowed economic growth even if 
the money supply remains constant. See Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes 
and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York, Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 771-772. 
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attractive and made imports more attractive. These forces were afterwards reinforced by 
the U.S. gold purchase program. U.S. purchase of American mined gold involved a 
decrease in export commodities. Since gold is a possible export commodity, the country 
experienced a decrease in the demand for currency by holders of other mediums of 
exchange to purchase domestically produced gold. The purchase of gold abroad involved 
an increase in the demand for commodities for importation in the form of gold, and 
therefore in the amount of money given in exchange for international currencies to 
purchase gold abroad. The primary purpose was to create a possible imbalance in the 
U.S. payment balance at the previous currency ratio. With a variable ratio, the possible 
imbalance was equaled by a devaluation of U.S. currency sufficient to initiate, through a 
rise in exports or a decrease in imports or a change in special funds, an amount sufficient 
to compensate for the gold.63 
 That gold was the item purchased only mattered in that Gold has always been the 
international and universal form of exchange practically throughout the history of 
mankind and currency.* Given a variable exchange rate, the purchase of virtually any 
commodity would effectively increase other commodity price levels. The prices of 
exported commodities would have changed at the same rate if the U.S. had purchased 
wheat, petroleum, farm products, involving the stockpiling surpluses of foreign-produced 
strategic goods. Of course, if one of these other products had been used as the medium 
for the purchase program, gold would have been one of the items of domestically 
produced resources, export of which was increased by the U.S. currency depreciation, 
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 Almost every civilization since the dawn of man has instituted gold and silver in some form or fashion to 
be used as currency. For the history of the coinage and usage of gold and silver as a form of barter, see 
Adam Smith’s An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, vol. I, pp. 24-32 (New 
York: Random House, Inc., 1994). 
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and one category of products produced internationally, importation of which was 
discouraged by the decline. As a consequence, the proposed variation of the purchase 
program intended to make the approximate increase of gold smaller or the average 
decline of gold greater than it would be otherwise. The use of gold as the medium 
probably gave a surplus of gold, just as the use of wheat, petroleum, or other farm 
products would have meant a surplus of such products.64 
 Placing this theory in a somewhat different perspective, allow the purchase 
program to be for OPEC oil. Then, given the internal monetary position of OPEC, the 
price of their petroleum in the amount of their money would increase. The price in their 
money of non-OPEC exports would probably decrease, since the decline in value of U.S. 
currency would increase the value to Americans in dollars and reduce the quantity 
amount required at the former OPEC value. The cost in OPEC currencies of products 
purchased by them from the U.S. would also tend to decline, since the depreciation of 
U.S. currency would result in a reduction equivalent to the previous currency price. It is 
not likely a predictor of what would happen to other prices. Some could maintain current 
levels, some would increase, and others decline, depending on their replacement in 
consumption and production for other products. Let us assume the U. S. were on a gold 
standard and be the only nation on one. Let’s also assume the U.S. made the decision to 
keep gold stocks plentiful, thus forcing all international gold to be purchased elsewhere. 
This could occur as a result of a general decrease in U.S. prices sufficient to cause U.S. 
currency to decline in value in relation to other foreign currencies, thereby making 
American produced goods and services less expensive on the international market. This 
amount should be greater than the decline to other currencies so that the set value for 
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gold, multiplied by the dollar value of other foreign currencies, yields a U.S. currency 
price higher than, or equal to, the selling price of gold in other mediums, times the value 
of those currencies in dollars. It would then be less expensive for foreign governments to 
purchase gold in other nations than to obtain it from the U.S. at a set dollar value. The 
United States could have avoided a decline in gold stocks at the expense of going through 
a deflation. At the lower general price level in the U.S., the prior gold stock has a greater 
value in reference to products and services. Therefore, it would be appropriate for the 
U.S. to allow part of the variation through a decrease in gold stocks weighted in gold 
bullion. It is clear how the changes would happen if all nations except the U.S. used gold 
standards. The gold surplus demanded by the United States would be supported both 
from new production and by a decline in monetary stocks that otherwise would have been 
kept. This would be equaled by a decrease in price levels in terms of international gold 
stocks. For the U. S., the principal effect of the existence of some gold standard nations 
or of all other nations’ adherence to the gold standard would be a difference in the 
volume of the devaluation of U.S. currency in relation to international currency. The 
devaluation would have to be sufficient to imbalance not only the variation in supply 
versus demand produced by the purchase program but also the decrease in the general 
price levels in gold value internationally. If the program pursued provided for purchasing 
a specified amount of currency each period in gold, there would be a secondary effect 
that the same amount of U.S. currency spent would purchase different amounts of gold.65 
 The use of gold as the medium did have an outstanding influence on the success 
of the program internationally. In the first place a contributing factor would include a 
specific good. The initiatives had a specific influence on gold producing nations. In the 
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second place the effect would exist only for commodities supporting the monetary 
standard. It had a special impact on gold standard countries. Being committed to sell gold 
at a specific value in relation to their own currency, those countries saw a depletion of 
their gold stocks, which in turn facilitated either abandonment of the gold standard or 
internal deflationary pressure. Entirely aside from the changes in supply and demand of 
products they imported and exported coming out of the gold purchase program, those 
countries were placed in the position of having to adjust their whole nominal price 
level.66 
 Since the U.S. Treasury had formerly valued gold stocks at $20.67 an ounce and 
paid only that value for the gold it attained from private citizens, commercial banks, and 
the Federal Reserve, it obtained an excess profit from a change in the value of the dollar. 
The Treasury could therefore print additional currency in the form of gold certificates up 
to a value of nearly $3 billion without additional gold surpluses and still comply with the 
legal requirement holding a specified weight of gold. Gold certificates could not legally 
be owned by private citizens, but they could be placed in the Federal Reserve. To receive 
its profits the Treasury had to turn over gold certificates to the Federal Reserve, receiving 
in return a deposit credit that it could convert into Federal Reserve notes or pay by 
check.* The economic effect was identical with an authorization to the Treasury to print 
and introduce into circulation nearly $3 billion of currency in excess of the $3 billion in 
currency already permitted by the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment 
                                                          
*
 The United States monetary system operates on the premise of a funded public debt. This system was set 
up upon the recommendations of Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary, who based our currency 
system on that of the Bank of England. Money (Federal Reserve Notes) gets issued because the federal 
government owes a bank. Each member bank of the Federal Reserve is required to buy government stock in 
the Federal Reserve which ultimately leads to the control in the amount of currency in circulation. See 
Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York, 
Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 546-547. 
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Act.67  
 Out of the profit, $2 billion was allocated to a stabilization fund set up under the 
control of the Treasury Secretary authorizing transactions in gold, foreign exchange, 
securities, and other credit allocations for purposes of stabilizing the exchange rate of 
U.S. currency. From February 1, 1934, the value of gold remained at $35 an ounce until 
the Nixon administration. In that sense, the date marked the return to a limited gold 
standard. However, the gold standard to which the United States returned was very 
different, both domestically and internationally, from the one it had left less than a year 
earlier. The U.S. Mint, for the next forty years, purchased all gold brought to it at a price 
of $35 an ounce but sold solely for the purpose of international balance of payments. The 
Federal Reserve continues even today to have a gold reserve requirement, but the state of 
the reserve has not been a primary influence on policy at any time since the 1930s.68  
 The specification in January, 1934, of a fixed gold price, rather than a market 
value as under the previous purchase program, meant that the amount of currency spent 
on gold was out of the direct control of U.S. authorities. At the fixed price, the U.S. 
government was obligated to purchase all that was offered, but the effects of those 
purchases were essentially the same as were transmitted with earlier programs. For the 
United States, the purchases brought about an increase in U.S. currency prices of other 
products relative to the U.S. currency value of imports. This can be attributed to an 
increase in prices of foreign traded products through the culminating effect of variations 
in exchange rates and in domestic commodities through changes in exchange rates and in 
commodity price levels internationally. For countries adhering to the gold standard, the 
value specified for gold by the U. S. determined the exchange ratios between 
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international currencies and U.S. currency. The arbitrary price of gold therefore 
stimulated a large increase in production and a rapid increase in government reserves. 
Production of gold in the United States including territories increased from lower than 
81.25 tons in 1933 to 1,250 tons in 1940. The world saw a rise of 781.25 tons of total 
production in 1933 to 1,281.25 tons in 1940. The Treasury gold reserve increased from 
6,250 tons when the specific price was artificially fixed in the beginning of 1934, to 
19,687.5 tons by the end of 1940.69  
 In purchases of gold, agricultural products, or other goods, the U.S. government 
has three approximate sources of funds: taxes, deficit spending, and creation of money. 
One variation encompassing a support program for commodities carries no authorization 
to create money, whereas the support program for gold does, thereby automatically 
providing the financial means for its continuance. Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve 
Banks can be increased through gold purchases by gold certificate credits equal to the 
amount of gold purchased times the official price of gold. Except for a minor handling 
charge (¼ of 1%), this is the amount the Treasury spent by drawing a check on its 
deposits in acquiring gold. Gold purchases were usually financed in this way. Increases in 
the gold stockpile produced no automatic budgetary pressure. The link between gold 
purchases and Treasury authorization to create money was the main remnant of the 
historical role of gold, and still served to give gold some special monetary significance 
until the 1970’s.70  
 Therefore the gold standard and monetary policies of the United States became 
intertwined. After 1934, the resulting policies were not a gold standard in the sense that 
the volume of gold or the maintenance of the total value of gold at a set value would 
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determine directly or even regulate the volume of currency. It is appropriate to label it, as 
Roosevelt did, a modified gold standard, ignoring the difficult problems of defining it. It 
was clearly a monetary rather than a reserve commodity currency, but it is impossible to 
accurately specify who managed the volume and under what theories. The Federal 
Reserve, the Treasury, and other regulatory agencies affected its volume by their policies 
in compliance with a number of goals. In reality, the Federal Reserve holds the 
authorization to make the volume of currency anything it chooses, within a broad range, 
but it has rarely related the goals under those terms. As long as the exchanges between 
U.S. currency and international currencies remained pegged, the behavior of relative 
stocks of currency internationally had to be close to what was produced by gold standards 
at the approximate international rate, even though the medium is very different. A 
modified gold standard probably is the best label to classify the resulting monetary 
standard which remained after FDR.71  
 Changes in prices in the United States after the abandonment of a true gold 
standard for a limited gold standard and purchase program under the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934 confirm the view that price changes are connected to changes in gold values and the 
volume of gold represented by the dollar. They can be examined through a comparison of 
the price of gold with the prices of thirty primary commodities, mostly raw materials.* 
According to Milton Friedman, the average prices of thirty primary commodities 
increased more rapidly than did gold prices from March to November, 1933, but the two 
illustrate a close parallel in their respective decline and fall. This connection clearly 
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 The thirty basic commodities looked at in this analysis included: wheat, corn, oats, rye, barely, flour, beef, 
pork, lard, eggs, butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton, print cloth, wool, silk, burlap, copper, zinc, 
lead, tin, silver, hides, rubber, linseed oil, turpentine, and petroleum. See Charles O’Hardy, Is There 
Enough Gold? pp. 172 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1936). 
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demonstrates that the change in gold prices was reflected in the prices of various 
commodities. The simultaneous drop in the two prices in July, 1933, is the result of an 
opposite influence, commodity prices decreasing the value of international currency. In 
July, there was a decrease in the speculative markets for cotton, grain, and stocks. This 
was mostly independent of international exchange controls operating to raise the 
purchasing power of U.S. currency and its value on the international market. One would 
conclude that the basic commodity price levels are tremendously affected by the price of 
gold, providing strong evidence for a commodity based currency theory. Roosevelt’s 
policies of devaluing U.S. currency brought about an increase in basic commodity prices 
and therefore achieved the objectives set by his administration. Prices of basic 
commodities were increased and they probably would be affected if there were only one 
nation in the world on a gold standard and it artificially increased gold values.72 
 
SILVER PURCHASE ACT OF 1934 
 One major aspect of the 1930s was the emergence of the silver issue. The silver 
price declined as world production was in excess of commercial demand. By December, 
1932 it had decreased to a record low of 24.25 cents per ounce.* Roosevelt artificially 
raised the price of silver the same way he did for gold in the 1930s. Silver mining felt the 
effects. In the fight for currency inflation beginning in 1932 and reaching a height in 
1933 and 1934, the silver enthusiasts saw an opportunity. Representatives and senators 
from the Western states controlled the seventy-third Congress between inflationists and 
monetary policy conservatives. They brought to the President a variation in the use of 
                                                          
*
 An ounce troy equals 480 grains. An ounce of silver was therefore initially worth 480 divided by $371.25 
or $1.2929 at the time of the Thomas Amendment on May 12, 1933. 
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silver for monetary purposes or currency inflation. The President decided to allow the 
administration to commit to a silver purchase program.73 
 The first step in doing something for silver was the Thomas Amendment of May 
12, 1933. The President was authorized to establish a standard silver currency and permit 
unlimited coinage of silver, if the Federal Reserve Banks refused his request to buy $3 
billion of government securities. For six months, some foreign debt restitutions to the 
Treasury were accepted in silver at a value of 50 cents per ounce. Roosevelt declined to 
use the authorization granted to him under the Thomas Amendment. The silver received 
in international debt restitution, 709.375 tons, was insufficient to have a lasting influence 
on the international silver market. Roosevelt stated on December 21, 1933, that the U.S. 
Treasury would buy all newly mined U.S. silver at 64.5 cents an ounce with the 
international price at 43 cents an ounce.74 
 The silver purchase program under this statutory enactment and later acts was still 
legally in effect until 1962. Continued Congressional efforts to repeal silver purchase 
policies were blocked. Under the authority of the legislation and continued Presidential 
executive orders, the Treasury received approximately 100,000 tons of silver, half in the 
first four years ending December 31, 1937, the other half from then to June 30, 1961.* 
The first 50,000 tons of silver included 3,531.25 tons nationalized on August 9, 1934. 
Roosevelt ordered all citizens, with exemptions for silver used in the arts and silver coins, 
to turn over their holdings of silver to the U.S. Mint at prices of 50.01 cents per fine 
                                                          
*
 On Jan. 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy asked Congress to nullify the Silver Purchase Act where the 
treasury is required to buy all newly mined domestic silver offered at the fixed price of 90.5 cents per 
ounce. He also called for a repeal of the silver transfer tax, under which the government receives half of the 
profits reaped from silver purchases. Policy embracing Kennedy’s recommendations was amended on June 
4, 1963. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History Of The United States, 
1867-1960 p. 485 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
52 
ounce, a similar policy to the nationalization of gold. The efforts were to reap for the 
government profits resulting from silver price rises. Another 27,500 tons consisted of 
newly mined U.S. silver. The remaining silver came from silver that was purchased 
abroad. The Treasury price for newly mined domestic silver was greater than the 
international price. Nearly all U.S. silver was purchased by the Treasury. The demand of 
American industry for silver was supplied by foreign silver. In April 1935, when the 
market price rose above 64.64 cents, attaining a height of over 81 cents at the end of the 
month, the Treasury raised the price two times, first to 71 cents an ounce then to 77.57 
cents. The market dropped at the end of 1935, reaching a level of 45 cents in the 
beginning of 1936, but the Treasury price remained at 77.57 cents until December 1937, 
then decreased to the previous level of 64.64 cents.75 
 If the Treasury ended silver purchasing at the end of the first four years, what 
would happen to the expanded silver industry, forcing adaptation to the commercial 
market? Legislators sought to permanently withdraw silver from the commercial market, 
thereby reducing the world silver supplies versus international demand, and artificially 
set an international price of silver. The Silver Purchase program promised no immediate 
and extensive monetary expansion. Constituents lobbied for a further increase of 
Treasury silver stocks. On May 22, 1934, Roosevelt introduced legislation which he 
thought was the minimum policy to satisfy their worries.76  
 The President’s recommendations were outlined in the Silver Purchase Act of 
June 19, 1934. In compliance with this policy, the Treasury was permitted to buy 
domestic and foreign silver until either the prescribed proportion of silver to gold was 
reached, or silver prices increased above the monetary value of $1.293 per ounce. Silver 
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owned by the public could be nationalized at the President’s discretion and bought by the 
Treasury up to 50 cents per ounce. Two days after the Silver Purchase Act was passed, 
the President issued a ban on silver exportation. The value of silver was expected to 
increase above 50 cents an ounce, and the ban would prevent citizens from avoiding 
nationalization at the 50 cent level by exporting silver abroad. Nationalization was 
commanded on August 9, 1934, and brought 3,531.25 tons of silver into the Treasury.77  
 Silver was purchased specifically to be used as currency. Since the government 
had no monetary use for silver, the bullion remained in the Treasury and certificates were 
issued against it. Under the law, the Treasury could revalue the bullion it received at 
$1.29 per ounce, and issued certificates against that arbitrarily augmented value. That 
policy would have given the government increased revenue. Instead, at the President’s 
direction, certificates were issued only against the bought value of the silver, and the 
issuance of more certificates against the revalued amount could be used as an additional 
reserve. Between June, 1934, and December, 1936, over $650 million of new silver 
certificates were issued.78 
 In terms of national effects, the silver-purchase program, like the gold-purchase 
program, can be viewed as a commodity reserve currency program, or a combination of a 
commodity reserve currency program and a stockpiling program. In contrast with gold 
and the use of a different commodity such as wheat, only the amount of national output 
was effectively supported. On the other hand, like gold and wheat, purchases were made 
from U.S. production, foreign production, and international monetary stocks. Two and a 
half times as much silver was purchased internationally as from U.S. production. As with 
gold, the silver program offered clear evidence of varying the levels of stockpiled 
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products and the remaining difficulty of relatively altering the approximate prices by a 
governmental purchase program. U.S. silver production more than tripled, from just 
under 62.5 tons per month to nearly 187.5 tons per month in the four years from the 
Presidential proclamation of December 21, 1933. One important monetary policy in the 
silver program was the connective link between silver purchasing and the issue of 
currency. The large purchase of newly mined silver, and the variation between the 
monetary value and the international price meant that purchases raised the ability to issue 
money by a relatively greater amount than the amount paid for the silver. The federal 
Treasury issued silver certificates equaling the amount actually paid for the silver, and 
treated the increased monetary value as an excess reserve.79 
 It is not easy to evaluate the monetary effects of the silver-purchase program. It 
involved printing more silver certificates, totaling over $2 billion, to add to the stock of 
money. However, the Federal Reserve was in a position to imbalance the direct effect of 
and the silver purchases resulting in a reduction of the gold inflow. The direct effect was 
that Roosevelt actually placed the U.S. on a bi-metallic currency standard because by the 
issuance of silver certificates both gold and silver was now linked to the monetary system 
of the United States. The additional silver certificates were a substitute for additional 
Federal Reserve notes which otherwise might have been issued. Up until the end of 1937, 
when silver purchases were the highest, it was likely that the silver purchases led to a 
more rapid rise in monetary stocks than would otherwise have occurred.80 
 The program involved government spending to stockpile a commodity and 
increase government assets, not in terms of budgetary figures but in terms of economic 
output. The expenditures were not large in comparison to the government’s budget. At 
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their peak, from the end of 1933 through 1937, they averaged $220 million annually for 
international and U.S. silver combined, compared to federal government expenditures 
averaging $7 billion annually. They were fairly large in relation to the needs of the 
business they intended to help. Total U.S. silver production, even valued at the Treasury 
price, averaged only about $40 million annually between 1934-1937. The total burden to 
the U.S. Treasury was, however, much greater. Therefore, as a measure to help the silver 
industry,* including companies producing silver but also people supplying labor and other 
resources for silver production, even immediate returns from the silver-purchase program 
involved total Treasury purchases from $5 to as much as $25 or more, for each dollar 
returned to silver producers.81 
 
CONCLUSION 
 What was the resulting monetary standard? The standard created by this new 
legislation is difficult to define. Legally, it could be classified as a modified commodity 
standard, for the law allowed the possibility of altering the gold value of U.S. currency in 
accordance with the increase and decrease of the commodity prices. After the law was 
passed, there was no change in the gold content of the dollar until the 1970s, and the law 
was changed to make the resulting monetary system a gold-bullion standard. So long as 
the government or regulatory agencies agree to purchase and sell gold demanded at 
                                                          
*
 The silver purchase policies of the Roosevelt administration in sum subsidized the silver industry. The 
federal government received in exchange a growing supply of silver for which it had no use and received 
no return. The cost of the silver purchase program to the United States government even exceeded what 
was paid for the silver at face value. Losses suffered by the government was as little as five to twenty-five 
times as much the government spent on silver. According to some economists this ratio is applicable to the 
$40 million spent annually on silver during this period. These losses the U.S. government and citizenry 
should not necessarily be viewed as evidence of criticism of the silver program. Several nations abroad 
reaped tremendous benefits with its sale.  See The Age Of Roosevelt: The Coming Of The New Deal, by 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company,1959), pp. 247-252.  
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approximately a pegged gold value at $35 an ounce, and to permit the gold sold and 
purchased to be exported and imported on an unlimited basis, and to permit the national 
currency stock to respond to gold movements, then the U.S. remained, technically, on a 
gold standard. The gold value of U.S. currency was maintained in approximation to the 
price of gold on an international market. Those are the requirements of being defined as 
having a limited gold standard.82  
 The nationalization of gold and silver by the Federal Government was probably a 
good thing. If gold is so valuable, and if, over the long haul, it is becoming relatively 
scarce, then it is just as well to be preserved from wearing out or disappearing in any 
other way, especially when paper and other forms of currency are able to assume the 
monetary functions more cheaply and as efficiently. The primary purpose for changing 
the gold dollar was to increase commodity price levels, and upon restoration of the prices, 
to establish and maintain a currency which will not change with the economy. Another 
reason, according to Roosevelt, was to protect the international commerce of the United 
States from the adverse effect of a declining international exchange. The main conclusion 
as to the gold and silver policies’ successes is that the major objectives sought by the 
Roosevelt administration were achieved through gold and silver policy changes. Prices 
and the economy recovered and the influences affecting them were mostly linked to gold 
policies.83  
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
 Once the United States government adopted the gold and silver purchase 
programs with the Gold Reserve Act and the Silver Purchase Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
international pressure was instituted on both monetary stocks and the loss of currency. 
Coins were melted down, valuables pawned, and smuggling of these precious metals 
became prevalent across many international boundaries. Despite all of the problems 
associated with the gold and silver purchase programs, economies adjusted to 
catastrophic trade imbalances around the world. Roosevelt’s efforts correspondingly 
brought the world to its feet, and the world whether willingly or reluctantly readjusted 
their monetary policies.84 
 
U.S. PRESSURE ON THE WORLD’S GOLD AND SILVER RESERVES 
 There was little two way exchange when Roosevelt authorized the U.S. Assay 
Office to buy and sell all gold offered to it either from private U.S. citizens or from 
central banks of Europe, most of which were on the gold standard. The guarantee of a 
$35 price started a virtual one-way traffic to New York for the next fifteen years. By 
1935, the world was experiencing major problems in maintaining both trade balances and 
monetary reserves of gold and silver. On March 25, 1935, the United States ambassador 
to the Court of St. James, in a press interview in London, urged currency stabilization at 
the proper time. On April 8, the Roosevelt Administration defended the United States 
gold and silver policies and stated its willingness to stabilize an international monetary 
fund, but not on terms disadvantageous to the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Treasury gold and silver stocks soared. Before the price rose to $35, the U.S. held 6.07 
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billion tons of gold. By 1938 they had 11.34 billion tons, and by 1942 20.205 billion tons, 
with the ultimate peak just over 22 billion tons attained in the late 1940s and the early 
1950s. This was 75% of all the recorded and estimated monetary gold by then and half of 
all the gold in the world that had ever been mined.85  
 The increase in the Treasury reserves was supported by the gold mining boom 
triggered by the price rise to $35. World output doubled to a new record of 1.2 billion 
tons by 1940, with the United States achieving a record production of 1.55 billion tons 
that same year, a figure not exceeded until 1988. Most of the new supply went into the 
Treasury’s stock. Despite the hoarding in Europe and the United States in the mid-1930s, 
jewelry demand had fallen and indeed the high price initiated much liquidation of 
ornaments. Effectively, there was one buyer of gold in the world, the U.S. Treasury. It 
has been estimated that between 1930 and 1939 while new mine supply was 9.126 billion 
tons, the addition to monetary stock was 10.634 billion tons. According to these figures 
the U.S. Treasury‘s stocks increased by more than the total domestic mine output. It 
further suggests that some of the gold purchased came from hoarded gold as well.86  
 
 EUROPEAN ABANDONMENT OF THE GOLD STANDARD 
 Beginning in 1930, nation-states containing international gold monetary 
authorities encountered problems staying on the gold standard. Around the globe 
countries were in threatened of a financial catastrophe. The dynamics of the different 
economies were weakened first by the stock market crash of 1929, catapulting severe 
economic problems. Exacerbating these problems was the failure of Kreditanstalt * in 
                                                          
*
 Throughout the 1920s, Kreditanstalt, Austria’s largest bank, became caught up in dangerous policies 
regarding credit extensions. During a number of years prior to the start of the 1930s Austria's imports were 
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Austria in 1931, bringing into suspicion the activities of many financial and investment 
organizations. Banks foreclosed on loan guarantees and currency was removed from 
circulation in England, largely paralleled to the problems encountered in the U.S.  The 
Bank of England’s gold supplies dropped by over thirty percent from the summer of 1928 
to the fall of 1931. The gold standard in England came under suspension prior to that of 
the U.S., on September 21, 1931. A couple of centuries of a steady and reliable gold 
convertibility ratio, except for the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and 
immediately after the First World War, ended. A new gold conversion rate was 
synthetically established for gold at a lower value than it had been before. The 
abandonment of the gold system by the United Kingdom did not indicate that the 
citizenry were unable to stockpile gold bullion or gold coin. Instead, it meant that the 
Bank of England was not required to market gold at any certain exchange rate. The 
British gold exchange functioned basically as it had before. Financial institutions and 
citizens were able to traffic the metal, for both domestic and foreign use, at the specified 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in excess of its exports, financing the difference by massive international lending, including the U.S.  In 
1930, reports about the security of Kreditanstalt led international and domestic Austrian investors to 
remove their deposits. In early 1931, the Kreditanstalt revealed that its losses amounted to greater than its 
equity assets. The Austrian authorities attempted to manage the predicament by elevating interest rates to 
make investments in their country more alluring. Austria attempted to restore confidence to investors by 
pledging that the Austrian authorities would insure the Kreditanstalt's deposits, but investors remained 
fearful that government support of the Kreditanstalt would lead to price increases and a weakening of the 
nation's economy. Large-scale capital movement accelerated, resulting in the financial crumbling of 
Kreditanstalt. As a result, Austria descended into the Great Depression. The economic tragedy of 
Kreditanstalt spread to the rest of the continent and as a result led to England’s exodus from the gold 
standard in September, 1931.Three articles by  J. Bradford Delong contain a discussion of this crisis in, 
"East Asia: Lessons From The Great Depression." Feb. 5, 1998, http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/OpEd/East_Asia_Lessons.html. (accessed Mar. 15, 2005); "The Economic Foundations Of 
Peace: International Economic Organizations.", Nov. 5, 1997, http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/Econ_Articles/lal.html (accessed Mar. 15, 2005); and "Those Who Do Not Remember History 
Are Condemned To Repeat It—And The Rest Of Us Are Condemned To Repeat It With Them: 'Lessons' 
Of History For The East Asian Financial Crisis.", Apr. 1998, http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/Comments/Santayana.html (accessed Mar. 15, 2005). See also The Credit-Anstalt Crisis Of 
1931, by Aurel Schubert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), et al. and A Short History Of 
International Affairs 1920 To 1934, by G.M. Gathorne-Hardy (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 
pp. 262-269, 339. 
60 
value for each particular day. Monetary reserves, in the past, consisted of the public's 
holdings and government stocks. This terminology was now redefined to refer to only the 
stockpiles of central banks. The citizenry now stockpiled gold in large quantities. As 
individuals in other countries became skeptical of their nation's currency, they started 
building up private holdings. The Bank for International Settlements* published that, 
within five years after England left the gold system, almost 3.11 billion tons, or seventy 
percent of all gold production during this time, was added to private holdings. The gold 
was acquisitioned because of apprehension of a continued drop in price and threat of 
war.87 
 Since 1931, when a monetary crisis in Europe had forced England off the gold 
standard and almost put Germany in bankruptcy, two strategies had emerged to counter 
economic depression. Nationalists urged dollar devaluation and high trade barriers to 
cushion domestic markets from the depression, at which point governments could begin 
internal economic recovery without interference from international events. Scholars felt 
that the depression worsened as international economies differentiated. The solution was 
simple: restoration of the gold standard and a reduction of tariffs. Overwhelmed by the 
economic crisis, most governments established aspects of both theories, mostly unaware 
of their contradictory nature. France installed trade barriers for protecting domestic price 
levels, and began stockpiling gold bullion to maintain the value of the franc. The English 
devalued the pound to improve its value on the international market and conserve silver 
reserves, while the U.S. tried to control production in an effort to increase commodity 
                                                          
*
 The Bank For International Settlements was created through the League of Nations in 1929 before the 
crash of the New York stock market. Although the primary purpose was to settle international deficits still 
unsettled since World War I, it would play a tremendous role throughout the 1930s in the balance of 
international currencies and trade deficits. See R.S. Sayers, The Bank Of England, 1891-1944, vol. I, pp. 
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prices, without regard to international markets. France, Great Britain, and the United 
States also launched an aggressive internationalist cooperation, the World Economic 
Conference. The conference was scheduled to discuss gold and silver prices, and to 
outline a policy to regulate international wheat production. On July 3, 1933, Roosevelt 
sent a statement to the London Economic Conference* rejecting a monetary policy 
introduced by the gold-bloc nations placing the United States at an unfair trade 
disadvantage. Five days later on July 8, gold-bloc nations of Europe officially announced 
they were going to remain on the gold standard.88 
 Due to the gold and silver purchase policies of the United States and famine, India 
lost 1.25 billion tons of gold to international markets. The Bank of France lost 200 
million tons of gold in the first month of the start of the U.S. gold purchase program as 
dealers in France traded in French francs for gold at the local traditional rate and sold it to 
New York.  On April 13, 1933, a license was granted by the U.S. Treasury for the export 
of $600,000 in gold to the Netherlands, which was having difficulties maintaining the 
gold standard only a month after changes in U.S. gold policies. This was the first export 
of gold by the U.S. Treasury since the proclamation of the bank holiday. Five days later 
on April 18, 1933, the issuance of any further licenses for the export of gold was 
discontinued indefinitely. The next day the Treasury Secretary issued an official 
statement that no further licenses would be granted for the exportation of gold from the 
U. S. for purposes of the restoration of trade imbalances. On April 20, 1933, FDR 
                                                                                                                                                                             
353-359. 
*
 The World (or London) Economic Conference in the summer of 1933 consisted of mostly European 
nations and the U.S.A. Among the items for discussion were import tariffs and monetary stabilization. Even 
though agreements met by the nations of France, England, and the United States didn’t last and would later 
be readjusted, the conference did bring about a temporary international monetary stabilization. Up until this 
time, international monetary stabilization was a main concern of the international community. See R.S. 
Sayers, The Bank Of England, 1891-1944, vol. II, pp. 453-459. 
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instituted a gold ban. It was an executive order making it unlawful to earmark gold for 
foreign accounts, or to export gold coin, bullion certificates, except gold already 
earmarked for foreign governments or central banks and the Bank of International 
Settlements, or needed for the fulfillment of obligations entered into prior to the order. 
Gold could only be exported at the discretion of the Treasury Secretary. This increased 
pressure on the franc, making it impossible to maintain the original gold standard.89  
 By June of 1935 France was experiencing problems of maintaining the gold 
standard and executives at the Bank of France disclosed the part played by the United 
States in both replenishing monetary gold stocks and keeping French francs in 
circulation. Efforts by foreign governments to get help from the U.S. for stabilization of 
their monetary systems were not unnoticed. On February 3, 1936, the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank obtained a license to ship $5 million in gold to France and the Netherlands. 
This was the first export since October, 1934. Five days later more exports of gold were 
shipped to Europe, amounting to $3.935 million. In September, 1936, the League of 
Nations Financial Committee asked France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland to revalue 
their currencies to the English pound and the U.S. dollar. On September 25, 1936, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced a shipment of gold to France of more 
than $43.532 million. Since the beginning of August, 1936, the United States had shipped 
a total of $197.7 million in gold to France. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau announced a 
tripartite agreement between the United States, France, and Great Britain for the 
stabilization of each country’s currency and for maintaining a stabilization on the 
international market. The agreement was only conditional on devaluation of the franc. 
The French franc was officially devalued on October 1, 1936, by twenty-nine percent of 
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its former value. Those efforts by the U.S. were minor and too late to keep foreign 
governments on a true gold standard. France devalued and came off the gold standard in 
1936, ordering its citizens to surrender their gold.90  
 On September 26, 1936, Poland announced it would not devalue its currency 
despite France’s decision, but was ready to join the tripartite agreement. The Netherlands 
and Switzerland came off the gold standard two days later. On the same day the 
Netherlands temporarily abandoned the gold standard and established a stabilization 
fund, but did not fix a specific value for the exchange rate. On September 30, the Swiss 
franc was officially authorized to be devalued by twenty-six to thirty-four percent of its 
previous value. Italy devalued its money and reduced import tariffs in October, 1936. 
Pressure was being felt in Eastern Europe as well. On September 26, 1936 the U. S. 
bought 500 tons of gold from Russia with $15 million from the stabilization fund. Poland 
would eventually be forced to leave the gold standard and only Belgium managed to 
maintain the gold standard until the beginning of the World War II.91 
 In late 1936, there were further changes to the imbalances in international trade 
and monetary gold policies. The U.S. Treasury Secretary announced that the United 
States, Great Britain, and France had reached an agreement providing for the purchase 
and sale of gold with stabilization funds, for stabilization of the pound, the dollar, and the 
franc. The plan was meant to be on a temporary twenty-four hour basis. In November 
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands joined in the September 25, 1936 tripartite 
agreement for the promotion of international monetary equilibrium. Belgium had already 
stated its intentions to comply with the policies of the agreement. The U.S. Treasury also 
abolished all private gold exports, stating that gold had to move only through the 
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currency stabilization fund. In autumn of 1936 the importation of gold and silver into the 
U.S. Treasury became so large as to be excessive. It was excessive in the sense that the 
treasury held more gold and silver in its vaults than was needed to back U.S. currency at 
the new artificially set rates. In December, 1936 the Treasury adopted a new policy on 
silver and gold. The purpose of the new policy was to prevent an increase in already 
excessive stocks. By the end of December the Treasury issued a daily statement of the 
amount of inactive gold.92 
 In May, 1937, the Bank of England purchased $21.409 million in gold as part of a 
proposed plan to relieve the load on the United States. On June 29, 1937, France stated 
that it could be forced to abandon the agreement. The next day, the French Cabinet 
Council changed its monetary policies of October 1, 1936, by eliminating gold content 
restrictions. This did not last. An agreement was reached on July 1, 1937, by the United 
States, France, and Great Britain for continuance of the tripartite arrangement. Problems 
occurred all through the following month, and in August the U.S. agreed to support the 
stabilization of world currencies, but did not favor stiff controls. In doing so, $10.25 
million in gold from inactive funds was engaged for shipment to France in November. 
This was the first major export of gold from the U.S. in several years. Also the U.S. 
Treasury released $5 million in gold from its inactive fund to be transported to England 
for the British stabilization account.93 
 The increase in the U.S. price of gold initially made the value of international 
currencies much greater than currencies not backed by gold. From January, 1933, to 
September, 1934, the increase was seventy percent for the currencies of France, 
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, and less than fifty percent for gold 
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prices. The gold standard countries’ conversion rates increased in relation to U.S. 
currency but also in relation to international currency conversion rates. The differential 
appreciation measures the specific impact of the American gold purchase program on the 
position of the gold standard nations. The reason they lost gold meant they bore a larger 
aspect of the effect of the increase of the importation of goods from the U.S.  Also, the 
gold standard countries saw a decline of exported goods to the U.S. than non-gold 
standard nations did. What this means is that because the gold standard nations’ 
currencies became more valuable in relation to U.S. currency, they became more likely to 
import U.S. products. This effect discouraged the U.S. from importing goods from 
countries like France, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium. However, there was an increase in 
the flow of gold into the U.S. Treasury from the gold standard nations. Non-gold standard 
countries also saw gold and silver being sold to the U.S., because the U.S. artificially set 
prices for gold and silver well above the world market price. However, non-gold standard 
nations did not lose as much gold as gold standard nations did. This helped to make 
smaller the initial impact internationally.94  
 In 1933-1936 the theory behind the installation and modification of gold 
programs was centered in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and the U.S., 
who were then maintaining effective gold standards. The drive against the franc was so 
great that, though there was an enormous gold reserve in the Bank of France, French 
authorities sought to prevent a decline of gold by deficit spending.* France decided to 
                                                          
*
 Deficit spending involves borrowing by a government to compensate for an unbalanced budget. Deficit 
spending is probably most efficiently defined by a shortfall in government spending in relation to a 
government’s funds, creating an imbalance that must be compensated through borrowing. It brings about 
increased economic activity for a short period, but eventually can quell economic activity by increasing 
interest rates. Heavy federal borrowing is often instituted at a time when consumers also want to borrow 
money. Because the government can pay any interest rate it needs to and citizens and businesses operate 
under limitations, they are forced out of credit markets by increased interest rates, thus causing economic 
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delay leaving the gold standard. The policy was a danger signal, precisely known as such, 
and raised the eagerness of private banks and citizens to transfer their French capital into 
gold while opportunities were still open to them. France remained temporarily on a gold 
bullion standard by instituting a policy of interest earning currency. A corresponding 
quest for gold led owners of international currencies to bid so high for the still 
convertible French franc that the principal purchasers of francs for the purchase of French 
products withdrew to a great extent from the market. This increased the imbalance of 
claims against French gold and, as these claims were processed, a drastic decrease of gold 
from France ensued in spite of efforts to stop it. The gold standard simply could not be 
maintained.95 
 Belgium was on the gold standard long after other nations had left it. The 
monetary authorities of Belgium into the 1940’s refused to issue the permits required for 
the import of gold until the exchange price of the belga increased far above the gold 
exchange rate. The public had been forced to cover their obligations at an amount 
considerably larger than they had any reason to predict. One specific aspect of a 
traditional gold standard is strict compliance to the policies under which it is maintained. 
Belgium, therefore, must be held to have abandoned the gold standard it was trying to 
maintain in order to get rid of the markets that it tends to attract. The Belgian policy was 
an admission that freedom from those markets is more dangerous than the standard and is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
growth to decline. This theorem is often associated with Keynesian economists who hold that the most 
efficient way to control economic growth is through governmental regulation of deficit spending. The idea 
of Keynesian economics was founded by winning British scholar John Maynard Keynes who challenged 
the ideas of previous economists such as Adam Smith who held that the most effective way for an economy 
to flourish is with very little governmental control. Other economists like winner Milton Friedman differ in 
that they believe the best way to regulate an economy is through the control of the money supply with very 
little other governmental control of economies and therefore are known as monetary theorists. See 
Dictionary Of Finance And Investment Terms, by John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman (New York, 
Baron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003), pp. 166-167. 
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also evidence that even a modification of the gold standard could not be maintained in 
Belgium, where gold markets are often strained. Problems with which we have been 
dealing are primarily challenges of nations that are already off the gold standard. They 
would not be in existence if a group of pure gold standards with no nations using gold 
and silver in circulating currency were the primary international makeup. Each nation in 
this discussion contains its own domestic and international components. The departure 
from strict adherence to pure gold standards, and the introduction of controls, arose partly 
from the existence of flexibility in the U.S. economy.96 
 Gold purchases under a gold purchase program coincide with a decline of funds to 
the U.S. from Europe mostly instigated by political changes. The first political change 
came about by the rise to power of Hitler in Germany. This led to an aggressive attempt 
to move capital out of Germany, primarily by Jews. Then the rise in apprehension of fear 
of war led to the movement of capital from France, Britain, and other European nations to 
the U.S.97 
 The U.S. gold purchase program created a deflation in the value of U.S. currency 
in relation to other international currencies. The deflation of U.S. currency caused a 
tremendous capital outflow in other nations all over the world. The capital outflow was 
greater than the gold-bloc nations were willing to undergo. Accordingly, in autumn of 
1936, France and Switzerland devalued their currencies in conjunction with an agreement 
between the United States, France, and Great Britain. Other gold-bloc countries either 
followed suit or abandoned the gold standard. From 1934-1936, mostly before France and 
Switzerland devalued their currencies, and the three years thereafter from 1937-1939, the 
dominance of the gold-purchase program appears to have been clearly greater in the 
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second period than in the first. By using gold, from monetary imbalances to the 
exportation of capital, the gold standard nations supported the imbalance of the assets and 
the gold transactions described previously. During the prior period the movement of 
money had more of an influence on trade imbalances than on gold transactions.98 
 Looking at cost of living in the U.S. compared with Britain, France, and 
Switzerland, U.S. values (even when adjusted in international exchange) were under the 
amounts in other nations after 1933. This was lower than it had been for several years. 
This is the result to be presumed if the gold purchase program had a greater effect than 
the cash outflow had.* A change in the prices of commodities in Britain, France, and 
Switzerland up until 1936 is direct evidence of the impact of the U.S. gold purchase 
program on those nations. After 1936, both France and Switzerland devalued their 
currencies and came off the gold standard. Gold losses encompassed a large payment 
imbalance reflecting an increase in prices domestically related to American prices. Once 
they devalued, the variable effect ended.99 
 After the French left the gold standard, the country with the truest pure gold 
standard was perhaps Cuba. Their monetary system prior to the 1940’s consisted of heavy 
coinage of silver pesos. For almost thirty years the Cubans used U.S. currency as their 
money. The amount of U.S. currency in circulation in Cuba was an amount equal in 
relation to a pure gold standard. Prior to 1933, they could, without any real change in 
their policies, have had gold, representing all U.S. currency, as collateral backing of the 
                                                          
*
 If the cash outflow from Europe into the United States had had the greater effect then we would have 
expected to see greater inflation than what occurred during this period. The increased inflation would have 
resulted in a continuance of the same cost of living rate or an increase in it. Because we see lower cost of 
living than we had seen in several years we would presume that the gold purchase program had a greater 
influence on increased economic activity at this time than the flight of capital did. See Milton Friedman and 
Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History Of The United States, 1867-1960. (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 420-492. 
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actual American notes in circulation.** During this period the approximate circulation of 
these notes in Cuba was over $400 million. This was around $100 per person, an amount 
tremendously over the amount existing in the U. S. at the time. In a very short time span, 
and without the replacement by any other form of currency, all but $25 million of the 
amount vanished in restitution of loans from the U.S. government. In light of domestic 
monetary price stabilization in Cuba, the question is whether the specified exchange ratio 
between the Cuban peso and U.S. currency did not initiate the loss of currency from that 
country. If non-transferable currency is desirable, a contraction of the peso as occurred in 
Cuba could be perceived as evidence of the influence of true gold standards providing 
artificial price settings. Inactive mediums of exchange should be provided through 
currencies with abandonment of rigid international currency stabilization.100  
 Sweden was the first nation and possibly the only country to change the gold 
value in an effort to counter gold inflation and to purchase products rather than a 
monetary metal. Beginning in 1931 Sweden began to purchase various strategic products 
and raw materials to serve as a reserve in times of shortage and to devalue its currency. 
Sweden appeared for a short period of time to maintain its leadership in freedom from a 
true gold standard by the purchase of products other than gold or silver as a currency 
stock, which was somewhat distinctive in monetary policymaking and later would 
                                                          
**
 The method in which the Spanish and French gold coins would be canceled which circulated as the 
primary medium of money for Cuba went into effect in 1915. This new policy recognized a national legal 
tender that would consist of metal currency, while U.S. money would also be used simultaneously in all 
forms. The Cuban money was supported by gold and quickly increased in value at a rate of three percent 
over its exchange in value of U.S. dollars. The U.S. dollar remained through 1932, virtually the only form 
of money in Cuba. In 1924 the U.S. dollar consisted of eighty-seven percent of Cuban money. 
Subsequently, after the beginning of World War II, in 1939, Cuba experienced difficulties with the 
circulation of its peso and instituted the use of the American dollar once again  and the use of the dollar was 
retired in 1945. See Monetary Problems Of An Export Economy: The Cuban Experience, 1914-1947, by 
Henry Christopher Wallich (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 31-49, 141-
149. 
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eventually cause prior monetary standards to be abolished.101  
 During this time, the only gold sold abroad by the U.S. was in exchange for silver 
purchases. On March 20, 1935, the U. S. Treasury sold one ton of gold to Mexico in 
exchange for silver. The next day, in an effort to remove pressures on other countries to 
sustain their monetary policies, the Treasury Secretary issued a press release stating the 
U.S. would accept applications by foreign countries seeking to purchase gold. On April 3, 
1935, the U.S. sold additional gold to the Bank of Mexico to increase its monetary stocks, 
in excess of 1.603 tons, valued at $1.8 million dollars. The Treasury sold 2.6875 tons of 
gold to Venezuela and 0.9375 more tons to Mexico, all transactions involving silver. The 
U.S. continued to sell gold in exchange for silver to Latin American nations by extending 
$6 million in foreign aid to Brazil to support currency stabilization.102 
 From 1933 to 1941, there was a drastic difference between capital movement* and 
trade balances in goods and services other than gold. A difference of a greater magnitude 
has never happened prior to or since that time. The variation is representative of large 
gold movements initiated by the gold purchase program and the transfer of stocks from 
Europe. The change from the total exportation and importation of capital reflected 
primarily the willingness of foreigners to transfer capital to U.S. dollars and securities 
rather than to retain holdings of other international currencies and securities. U.S. price 
levels were much lower than British prices and even lower in comparison to Swiss prices 
during the 1930s than during the 1920s and during the 1940s and 1950s. This variation is 
                                                          
*
 There was a huge movement of capital (money) during 1933 to 1941 from Europe to the United States. A 
combination of political and economic factors encouraged domestic and foreign owners of assets to sell 
their holdings and move their money to the U.S., when offered more political stability and economic 
growth potential. The contribution to the economic growth rates of the U.S. was tremendous. It is not likely 
that the flight of capital to the U.S. would have occurred if FDR had not restored and provided stability to 
American banking and finance. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History Of 
The United States, 1867-1960. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 420-492. 
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mostly reflected in the gold purchase program rather than the movement of capital.103  
 There was an increase in international new mine production in addition to large 
importation of non-monetary gold from India and to a much lesser extent China. These 
imports must be added to the production of newly mined metal in order to accurately 
calculate the available supply of monetary gold. The total importation of gold from India 
from September, 1931, to March, 1938, was slightly higher than the total production of 
newly mined metal for 1938. The imports from India are not great in comparison to the 
gold reserves in that country, or even with the total imports of gold over the last hundred 
years. Before India left a true gold standard in September, 1931, it held fourteen percent 
of international gold production. The value of gold exported after 1931 was no more than 
twenty percent of the gold stockpiled in India since 1493. India has absorbed gold since 
the dawn of man. The total importation of gold to India from 1910 through 1931 was 
more than 2,343.75 tons. The total exports from 1931 to 1938 were over 1,156.25 tons. 
India sold most of its gold at a huge profit. Prior to India’s leaving the gold standard, the 
value of gold on the Bombay market was 21 tola per ounce. During the 1930s after the 
installation of the gold purchase program, the average price of gold doubled. Those 
individuals who bought gold at 21 tola per fine ounce and sold it for more than twice the 
original price had transformed non-revenue producing capital into revenue producing 
capital by selling at huge profits.104  
 In previous eras Indian trade imbalances had been regulated, for the most part, in 
the form of gold importation. It was realized that in periods of economic turmoil India 
would rely on these reserves. Reserves are intended to be accessed. If no nation should 
part with its gold, then a country like South Africa should keep every ounce of newly 
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mined gold it produced. To a large extent the gold was sold to accommodate the 
problems of economic turmoil, but undoubtedly a considerable amount was sold to reap 
the profits from a high premium. Also, gold traffickers all over India were aggressive in 
stockpiling gold for future markets. The gold exported from India and gold exported from 
the West differed because the gold from India did not come from the monetary stockpiles 
of the country. The export of Indian gold supported currency exchange and was aligned 
with exportation of raw materials. The export of gold allowed India to import products at 
a magnitude which otherwise would have been impossible. It allowed proceeds from the 
sales of gold, in short, to be shown in the increased balances of savings banks and 
provided capital for the expansion of corporations as well as providing government credit 
for future expansion and in addition the capital to build up international silver reserves.105 
 As in the 1930s, South Africa today is the world’s leading producer of gold. 
Because of the gold purchase program in the U.S., gold production internationally, 
including South Africa, was greatly increased in the 1930s as compared to gold 
production levels of previous years. From 1932 to 1938, South African gold production 
increased by only 5.2 percent while the output internationally doubled. The large increase 
in international gold reserves, during that time, was due to increased production in 
nations other than South Africa. The relatively small rise in the percentage of newly 
mined gold in South Africa during this period may be attributed to the very large increase 
previously attained, and partially due to South African companies’ use of the increase in 
gold prices to work low grade ores for the extension of the life of the mines.  There was a 
decrease in the amount of gold taken with each ton of ore extracted by the large mines 
from 6.48 ounces in 1932, when South Africa left the gold standard, to 4.35 ounces in 
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1938, a decline of almost thirty-three percent. During the same period the approximate 
rise of gold production was 158 percent in the U.S.S.R., 119.9 percent in Australia, 104.5 
percent in the U. S., and 54.9 percent in Canada, which were the next four leading gold 
producing nations at that time. Today the U.S., Canada, Russia, South Africa, and 
Australia still lead the world in gold production.106  
 Throughout the 1930s the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British 
Commonwealth were the largest suppliers of monetary gold. During the 1930s and 1940s 
the proportion of international gold production in the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and the British Commonwealth was fifty-seven percent. The rise in production in the 
1930s in South Africa was the result of an expanded capacity for production resulting in 
five or six years where South Africa’s production was more than 468.75 tons yearly. 
According to the chief of the Soviet Trust which was concerned with gold production, the 
U.S.S.R. produced more than 343.75 tons of gold yearly by 1938. The production of this 
amount was mainly done in the absence of machinery. Canada’s gold production also 
rose quickly with the institution of the gold purchase program by the United States. 
Canada’s production in 1938 was over 156.25 tons, which was fifteen percent higher than 
in 1937, and fifty-four percent higher than in 1932. The international gold production by 
the start of World War II was approximately 1250 tons, twice the production during 
1929. With the installation of the gold purchase program, international production of gold 
in the 1930s and 1940s, was the highest it had been in history. Increased production and 
exportation levels are direct evidence that nations abroad used production and stockpiles 
of gold and silver to take advantage of the benefits of an increase in the value of those 
metals.107 
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ABANDONMENT OF THE SILVER STANDARD IN CHINA, INDIA, AUSTRALIA, 
SPAIN, AND LATIN AMERICA 
 Even though Great Britain left the gold standard on September 21, 1931, and was 
the first country to do so, it was actions taken by the Roosevelt Administration that 
caused other nations to leave gold and silver standards or greatly modify them. Silver 
also was as instrumental as gold in settling international trade imbalances. In fact, in the 
months that followed Roosevelt’s taking office, Great Britain, Italy, France, and Finland 
made payments in silver to the U.S. government to settle World War I indebtedness. On 
June 22, 1933, the London Silver Agreement was signed, requiring the leading silver 
producing countries to purchase and stockpile domestic silver. The leading users of silver 
were obligated not to change the silver composition of coins, demonetize silver, or 
dispose of silver in any way. On September 26, 1934, Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. 
bought 500 tons of silver sold by Russia, in an effort to stop an attempt by Russia to flood 
the silver market and to serve notice that the U. S. would do whatever it took to protect 
the monetary and exchange balance brought about by the agreement. Later that day 
executives changed their minds as to Russia’s motives and in the following days were 
attacked by the press for making such a big deal out of a small issue. China too was 
forced off the silver standard and the silver purchase program of the United States did 
cause difficulty to other silver standard countries as well.108 
 Most gold and silver bought by the Treasury was through direct purchase. China 
was the nation most affected by the silver purchase program. China, during this time, was 
on a bimetallic monetary standard with silver equal to gold in importance, and maintained 
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it in almost complete isolation from the rest of the world until the Gold Reserve Act was 
passed by the United States. Even though gold was of equal weight to silver, China had 
restricted its use of gold because silver was much more abundant in China. China at the 
time was on a silver standard, though for minor transactions it also used local currencies 
of copper and nickel, whose value in silver varied occasionally. The exchange rate of 
silver varied in relation to gold. China therefore avoided the initial effects of the 
international depression. Its currency depreciated relative to other currencies, so its 
domestic price level would remain relatively constant. After Britain’s devaluation at the 
end of 1931, and after the United States departure from gold in 1933, the situation 
changed drastically. China’s currency appreciated, the country was subject to the pressure 
of domestic deflation, and it experienced increased economic problems. The problems 
arose with a decrease in exports versus imports. The possible trade deficit was countered 
by the exportation of silver, which tended to decrease the domestic currency supply. The 
problem was somewhat relaxed by the ability to issue copper and nickel coins which 
could fluctuate in value in relation to silver, but it is not likely that the variation was of 
primary importance.109 
 China officially banned silver exports, but it was almost impossible for them to 
prevent smuggling, or to prevent the Japanese from aiding export from the Northern 
provinces. From the very beginning of the Silver Purchase Act, China lost silver reserves. 
The extent, to which the Treasury pushed the silver program, in addition to the flood in 
the market by the Far East, worked to bring closer the one to three ratio of silver to gold 
sought by the Roosevelt administration. Not all predictions became reality because of 
what happened to gold and silver. The dramatic rise in U.S. gold reserves was partially 
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due to an increase in domestic production and to a greater extent, imports. They kept 
pushing the achievement of the silver objective further away. The more silver the 
Treasury bought, the more it needed to keep purchasing, in an effort to keep up with the 
increase in gold reserves, let alone the ratio.110 
 The amount of silver purchased by the U.S. Treasury from China exceeded every 
other source, including newly mined American silver. In 1930 silver production in China 
was in excess of 3,906.25 tons. In 1934 Chinese exportation of silver surpassed 6,250 
tons, including an estimation for smuggling. Within two months of the enactment of the 
Silver Purchase Act of 1934, China’s silver stockpiles began to fall. The increased value 
of silver led to its depletion, and therefore resulted in deflation in China. This meant 
lower prices and tighter money. Because of currency inflation, there was a tendency to 
temporarily reverse a foreign trade imbalance. The loss of China’s monetary silver stock 
naturally affected bank reserves and initiated a decline in prices and monetary deflation. 
The situation is likened to that which existed in the United States during January and 
February of 1933. Silver proponents lobbied in 1932-1933 to increase the price of silver 
in order to restore purchasing power to half the world. After useless attempts to lobby the 
U.S. Government for accommodations to modify the U.S. silver purchase program, China 
imposed an export tariff on silver and silver continued to be depleted. On November 3, 
1935, China abolished the silver standard, de jure. As a result China nationalized silver, 
ordering owners of silver to exchange it for bank notes. It also went through a 
reorganization of its banking structures.111 
 Silver owners benefited from the increased international exchange value of silver. 
If silver had been a commodity, the U.S. purchase program would have been less 
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effective, enabling the owners of silver to release their silver at an extraordinary high 
price. Because silver was the monetary base in China, the catastrophe was intensified by 
the economic effects of the drastic deflation imposed on China and the resulting 
economic disturbances. The deflationary pressure imposed on the Chinese, along with the 
economic problems, certainly contributed to the political instability in China. Most of the 
political capacity had to be devoted first to unsuccessful attempts to prevent the export of 
silver, then to the monetary reform of 1935. In addition, by converting China from a 
silver standard to an effective paper currency standard, the reform rendered it both easier 
and more tempting to pay for later war expenditures by the inflation of its currency. 
Under pressure of war and revolution, China probably would have departed from silver 
anyway, changed monetary policy, and buckled to inflation. But there can be little doubt 
that the effects of U.S. silver policy on China’s monetary structure speeded up the 
likelihood of those events and increased their severity.112 
 Effective at 12:00 PM on November 9, 1935, the British Colony of Hong Kong 
restricted the exportation of Hong Kong currency and silver coins, Mexican dollars, and 
bulk silver, which replaced the ban on transactions of Chinese silver coin except with 
China. This action was a forerunner to the establishment of an artificial setting of 
currency convertibility, which was effective on December 5 through an ordinance of the 
Legislative Council ordering the removal of silver from circulation, with an amendment 
to monetary policies, and establishing an account for exchange stabilization. When 
looking at the close political connection between Hong Kong and China, the policy was 
needed in an effort to keep the Hong Kong exchange in line with China’s previously 
existing currency.113  
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 All other countries which used silver in any large amount also encountered 
problems from the U.S. silver purchase program. In January, 1935, Mexico tried to 
reduce its silver losses. Because of the increase in international silver values, the melted 
down price of the peso was over its currency value. Therefore, in an effort to keep the 
peso from being shipped to the U.S. either as coin or in a smelted form, President 
Cardenas decreed a bank holiday on April 27, 1935. He ordered all coins to be transferred 
to paper money, and banned the exportation of silver currency. At the time, some 
theorized that silver would no longer be used in Mexican coinage, but after an interval of 
a year and a half, Mexico, by changing its silver coins, had violated the London Silver 
Agreement.114 
 Other countries experienced problems associated with the U.S. silver purchase 
program. Like Mexico, countries all over the globe were hit by the increase in silver 
prices. Most of the sheltered initiatives they took resulted in a decline in silver usage. 
Australia also had to leave the silver standard, even though it would continue to be one of 
the world’s leading producers of both gold and silver. Central America, South America, 
Europe, Asia, and even Africa felt the effects.115 
 On April 3, 1935, Costa Rica prohibited the exportation of silver coins and 
bullion, and in August a new currency was introduced into circulation. On May 3, 1935, 
Peru made it unlawful to buy, sell, hold, or export silver coins, and they banned  
exportation of all silver in any form, with an exception for newly mined materials. An 
additional stipulation permitted a new subsidized coinage of copper and nickel, which 
had to be minted in London. By May 17, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Colombia had also 
banned silver exportation. In July, 1935, the legislative body of Colombia permitted the 
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removal of silver money from circulation.116 
 The Bank of Spain made ready for an increase from silver prices by printing a 
tremendous amount of five and ten peseta notes, which were held for issuance if the 
silver paseta began to be worth more than its face value. Italy’s proclamation removing 
silver currency and making it unlawful to hold silver was essentially a war policy. On the 
Northern coast of Europe, the city of Danzig* invoked the removal of silver money in 
circulation. Ethiopia banned the export of its money because smuggling of the thaler 
became prevalent. Further eastward, in the Middle East, silver money went for a price 
over its face value, and the government in Iran permitted an issuance of additional copper 
currency to replace the silver money that had been melted down and smuggled. The 
government in Thailand was waiting for a favorable opportunity to abolish the silver 
content of their coins, in the amount of 31.25 tons, because silver was too scarce to 
continue in circulation. Reports from Singapore noted that the Straits Settlement Treasury 
put into circulation worn out five cent pieces of the 1917-1918 issuance. Those pieces 
held less silver than their 1930s coins. The effort was only temporary because of the 
subsequent decrease in the market, while in the emergency period it served to prevent 
currency retention and smuggling of those coins.117  
 Because of the abandonment or modification of the silver standard by several 
foreign governments, the use of silver declined internationally. International markets 
began to decrease in May, 1935, but the first sign of a problem occurred at the end of 
                                                          
*
 This city lies on the northern coast of Poland. Although at one time or another a territory of various 
European empires including France, Russia, Prussia, Germany, and Poland, it obtained sovereignty with the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and was established as the Free City of Danzig where it remained until World 
War II. Afterwards, Danzig was included within the borders of Poland and remained part of that country 
and remains as such throughout the present day. See Merriam Webster’s Geographical Dictionary 
(Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, 1997), pp. 416-417. 
80 
June. The London exchange became overwhelmed by large orders from Indian traffickers 
at the time of the June settlement, and by a rise in Chinese offerings. The U.S. Treasury 
continued to buy large amounts of silver, but its bids were subsequently at lower values. 
By July, prices were declining so fast that the Treasury was forced to purchase silver 
mostly from international markets in an effort to prevent an entire collapse of the silver 
market. The Treasury Secretary proclaimed that over 781.25 tons of silver were bought 
on August 14, 1935, but the effect on prices was virtually unseen. The New York price, 
which had averaged 74 cents in May, 1935 dropped to less than 49.75 cents per ounce on 
December 24, and averaged 58 cents that month. Silver prices continued to decline, 
reaching 45 cents by July, 1936, where they remained for the rest of the decade.118 
Most problems involved with silver occurred in the last two months of 1935. Beginning 
at the end of October and running through the beginning of December, their was a 
continual decline in the London exchange silver market values. There were also no 
quotations for speculators and only a reduction on delivery prices. The U.S. Treasury 
remained the principal buyer of silver throughout 1935. Treasury officials stated on 
December 19, 1935, that the U.S. would purchase newly mined silver primarily from 
Mexico and Peru. In 1936, Canada and other South American nations were added to the 
list of nations that the Treasury primarily purchased silver. Also in 1936, the Chinese 
government was added to the list. Many nations had to adjust their monetary policies and 
systems to compensate for the loss in monetary gold and silver stocks. The Great 
Depression was not just merely transferred from the United States to other nations as 
some scholars argue. The purchase program by FDR served the main goal of raising the 
prices of the basic export commodities. The purchase program must also be credited with 
81 
helping other countries, such as India, to boost their economies. Even though the most 
conservative economists and scholars who disagree with most FDR’s economic 
initiatives, agree that Roosevelt was mostly successful in boosting the U.S. economy with 
only minimal negative effect on other nations and also aided them in avoiding economic 
catastrophe. FDR’s policies, although very needed at the time to bring the nation out of 
the Depression, should not be viewed as efficient universal principles to be pursued in 
managing every economy or in every era.119 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MONETARY POLICY AND THE COURTS 
 Roosevelt’s policies for managing the nation’s currency and U.S. gold and silver 
supplies not only had tremendous domestic and international dimensions but also 
withstood aggressive court challenges. One by one many of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
initiatives were struck down by the nation’s judicial system.* However, his monetary 
policies were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and endured for the duration of his 
presidency. Some scholars have challenged the soundness of the legal reasoning involved 
in the decisions of the Legal Tender and Gold Clause Cases that were heard by the Court 
during Ulysses S. Grant’s and FDR’s presidencies. Nevertheless, most economists 
believe that gold standards were not good for the economy and were difficult to maintain. 
Policies regarding the devaluation of the dollar along with the gold and silver purchase 
programs sought by the U.S. achieved the goals set forth by the administration. Because 
these programs were left intact, much of the improvement of conditions in the American 
                                                          
*
 The ability of the judiciary or the courts to decide whether the actions of the other branches of 
government are in agreement with the Constitution is referred to as judicial review. All courts, federal and 
state, can use the authorization of judicial review, but the Supreme Court of the United States has the last 
judgment as to the Constitutionality of laws or actions of local, state, or federal governments. Judges 
exercise their authority of judicial review specifically in actual controversies challenged in the courts. They 
decide only real disputes, not theoretical questions pertinent to our laws. The legislative branch is 
prohibited, for example, to request the Supreme Court for legal advice on whether their actions are 
Constitutional. The judiciary would decide this type of case only if the proposal became enacted and a 
person brought suit. Even though judicial review is not specifically scripted into the U.S. Constitution, it is 
implied in Articles 3 and 6. Article 3 states that the federal judiciary has the authority to interpret all 
controversies related to the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States. Article 6 implies that the 
function of courts must be administered for the protection and defense of the power of the American 
Constitution with regards for the laws of the several states in the union. In addition, in 1788 Alexander 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 78 proclaiming judicial review as a way to invalidate all governmental 
functions as out of compliance with the Constitution. In order to organize a tiered court system for the U.S., 
Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 25 of this law allowed for judicial oversight by the 
Supreme Court of decisions by lower courts (including states) that encompassed controversies involving 
federal questions. Based upon these premises the “Great” Chief Justice John Marshall permanently 
established the power of judicial review within the nation’s court system in Marbury v. Madison (1803). 
See John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation by Jean Edward Smith, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1996), pp. 309-326, for more complete discussion of this case. For additional discussion of Marbury v. 
Madison including its implications and applications in historical context see also Civil Rights And Civil 
Liberties Debated by Jean Edward Smith and Herbert M. Levine, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
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way of life, as well as the economic successes of his administration must be attributed to 
Roosevelt’s management of the U.S. Treasury, Banks, and the Federal Reserve.120  
 
PROBLEMS WITH NON-MONETARY NEW DEAL LEGISLATION 
 The most dramatized and intense scrutiny dealing with the Court came over the 
use of governmental measures to invoke economic recovery. The economic turmoil of the 
1930s had compelled the government to assume a number of responsibilities it was never 
assigned before. Elected to office on a pledge of drastic changes, President Roosevelt 
introduced a number of policy changes without the realization of the obstacles those 
policies would face in the courts. Congress was willing to comply with FDR’s ideas. 
Convening in an extraordinary session in March, 1933, it passed Roosevelt’s Emergency 
Banking and Relief Act in one day. In the ensuing weeks subsequent legislation was 
enacted founding the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the 
Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for the 
regulation of agricultural production. To the AAA the Senate and the House added the 
Frazier-Lemke amendment to maintain mortgages in agriculture from failure and 
subsequent alteration to raise the prices of farm products and permitting FDR to 
artificially set the gold convertibility of U.S. currency. Finally, the National Recovery 
Act was passed with broad implications permitting the President and trade groups to 
regulate commerce and production under statutory enactment.121 
 Congress did not legislate in its ordinary capacity. It rather supported the 
initiatives of the administration to answer the call of an emergency. Most of the 
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legislation passed came straight from Roosevelt. All of the documents had been 
constructed with great pressure and by some individuals with little experience in 
government. Relations between the Supreme Court and FDR were very good when 
Roosevelt took office. Prior to serving on the U.S. Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes 
had served as governor of New York. Roosevelt crossed party lines in order to support 
Hughes even though Hughes was a Republican. FDR entered politics after being elected 
to the New York Senate the same year Hughes had left the Governorship of New York to 
take a U.S. Supreme Court appointment. On the eve of his Presidential inauguration, 
Roosevelt wrote to Chief Justice Hughes reflecting on their friendship and expressing his 
gratitude to Hughes for agreeing to administer the oath of office. No one would have 
predicted the mounting tension as questions of the constitutionality of Roosevelt’s 
initiatives would arise in the courts.122 
 Roosevelt’s New Deal problems in the courts began with Booth v. U.S. in 
February, 1934. In this case the court unanimously held that an economic policy was 
unconstitutional because it decreased the salaries of retired judges of district and 
intermediate U.S. courts. The opinion stated that retired judges could be brought out of 
retirement in certain instances and therefore they remained, in essence, on the bench in a 
lesser capacity. As stated in the U.S. Constitution, their salaries* could not be reduced.123 
 In Lynch v. United States, (1934), the Court held unanimously that Congress had 
overextended the authorization to eliminate specific contractual obligations with the War 
Risk Insurance Act. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1934), also known as the “hot oil 
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cases”, the plaintiff had argued that the Petroleum Code had been used for a year without 
specific statutory authorization. The case involved the constitutionality of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. This Act provided for “Codes of Fair 
Competition”, in which representatives of the oil industry would meet to establish 
standards and rules, regarding wages for oil workers, rates of oil production, and oil 
prices. The President would review and approve each Industry’s Code, thereby giving it 
the force of law. This eliminated Congressional oversight and had the executive branch 
making law without legislative debate and discussion designed by our forefathers. 
Individuals had been arrested, indicted, and jailed for violation of statutes not in 
existence. The Court estimated that hundreds of policies and executive orders were 
written unlawfully. The judges were astonished by the magnitude and recklessness of 
unlawful presidential public policymaking. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion 
himself. He held that the problems were rooted in Section 9(c) of the National Recovery 
Act. Congress had not issued any authorization to allow the states to regulate the oil 
industry or an oversight of the oil industry across state lines. It only gave the President 
the unchecked authorization to issue policies and to oversee the production of oil as he 
saw fit. Noncompliance with an executive order was made unlawful, punished by 
penalties and jail sentences. Congress gave executives the ability to make policy in order 
to remain in compliance with the law.124  
 R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., (1935), brought about an overturn of the 
Act authorizing an automatic retirement and pension system for railroad employees. A 
majority of five, with Justice Roberts speaking for the majority of the Court, held that the 
Act violated due process of law by confiscating the property of one and giving it to 
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others. Justice Hughes dissented along with Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. 
Acknowledging the problems with the legislation, they challenged the Court’s opinion 
that it was not a regulation of interstate commerce.* The dissent felt the Court should 
permit legitimate compensation for individuals injured without fault of the employer. 
They also allowed for legitimate payment for individuals who provide services to the 
business and become ill or injured over years of work or growing older.125 
 The government searched for a valid case to test the constitutionality of the NRA. 
The government feared that the NRA, one of its most effective initiatives, would be ruled 
unconstitutional by the courts. The search was for a case in which they believed there 
would be the greatest chance for program to be upheld. Employers were rebelling, small 
companies maintained that the NRA led to monopolistic behaviors, and the public was 
dismayed at the program’s relationship to inflation. Lawsuits mounted and the 
administration brought suit to test the validity of the program in the Supreme Court in an 
effort to deter the fall of the NRA. In U.S. v. Belcher, (1935), the government filed a 
lawsuit challenging the Lumber Code of the statute. They wanted to bring a case before 
the Court that they believed would be most likely decided in favor of the government. 
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They hoped that this case would deter other more questionable lawsuits from being filed. 
After the suit was filed, in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General recommended 
to have the case dismissed to avoid having the Act struck down.126 
 In another case, Schechter v. U.S., (1935), a poultry trafficker from Brooklyn, 
New York appealed to the Supreme Court to examine a Court of Appeals decision 
upholding the Live Poultry Code of the NRA. The differing views in the case illuminated 
the insignificant regional commerce the NRA was opting to oversee. The Schechter 
brothers were convicted of marketing unhealthy chickens to a slaughterhouse, permitting 
the selection of particular poultry specimens from their holding facilities, and the traffic 
of chickens to unauthorized purchasers.* Chief Justice Hughes, for the Court, wrote that 
the NRA was a combined agreement among those constituting individuals involved in 
commerce and industry. He maintained, that in addition, it was an unconstitutional 
execution of public executive power because it virtually eliminated free market 
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competition. Individuals who did not comply with those policies could be charged with 
crimes under the stipulations of this Act. The NRA had to be categorized as 
governmental regulation. The NRA contained a couple of primary problems. It consisted 
of a forfeit of the making of governmental public policy to industry and the President. 
The establishment of these regulations was intended to oversee intrastate commercial 
activity without a specific relationship to interstate commerce in the statute. Hughes 
stated the difference between Congressional regulations having clauses intended to 
permit the executive to make policies that are later specified and imposed on the public 
by the business community. The Recovery Act, he said, allowed for no provisions dealing 
with commerce, companies or any other organization. Instead of establishing laws of 
oversight, it permitted certain interests to formulate public policy. The Court held it was 
out of compliance with the constitutional clauses outlining Congressional oversight. He 
also found that the Live Poultry Code had nothing to do with the market of poultry from 
outside of New York or with the marketing of products to the Schechters. The total of the 
Schechters’ commercial activity was completely inside New York state. There existed no 
transfer of products and services into and out of the state. The inquiry by the Court was 
whether the Schechters’ commercial activity was either directly or indirectly related to 
business activity taking place out of the state bringing them within the scope of federal 
authority, and in the Court’s view it did not.127  
 In Local 167 v. U.S., (1934), the Court also held that a group of citizens, 
commercial interests, and a labor union’s efforts to take over the poultry business within 
the city of New York was out of compliance with the Sherman Antitrust Act* because it 
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 The Sherman Ant-Trust Act of 1890 was the first in a series of antitrust laws that effected banking and 
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involved interstate commerce. This case, although filed during the Hoover 
administration, became relevant to the New Deal, because it said that efforts by the 
government to regulate agriculture that were not directly associated with interstate 
commerce were unconstitutional. The last word on the NRA was also affirmed by a 
couple of other unanimous decisions, one striking down the Frazier-Lemke Act for the 
relief of agricultural debts and the other reprimanding the President for unlawful 
dismissal of William E. Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission, in Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, (1935) and Humphreys Executor v. U.S., (1935). 
Justice Brandeis for the Court chastised the Frazier-Lemke Act for permitting an 
unlawful takeover of citizen’s property in order to be used by the public without 
providing those citizens with appropriate restitution. In Humphreys Executor the Court 
maintained, by way of Justice Sutherland, that the Federal Trade Commission constituted 
a self-governing, impartial entity provided with the main duties of the performance of 
their agenda like those of a court. This differed with the postmaster whom the Taft Court 
had said could be dismissed by the Chief Executive, in that an FTC employee could only 
be fired in certain instances approved by Congress, and Roosevelt had virtually admitted 
making Humphrey resign for discrepancies he had with the President over certain 
policies. While the Court was officially deciding this case, the Commissioner’s death had 
no bearing on the outcome. The case exemplified the Court’s unwillingness to broaden 
Presidential authority beyond the oversight outlined in the Constitution and the statute. 
Three unanimous decisions were issued on the same day, Monday, May 27, 1935, all 
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either in whole or in part, declaring FDR’s programs to be unconstitutional.128 
 For two additional years the Supreme Court continued to declare policies of the 
New Deal legislation to be unconstitutional. Unmoved by the dismay and aggravation 
from FDR, the Court subsequently invalidated legislation which it found to be 
unconstitutional. The next legislative statute to be ruled unconstitutional was an aspect of 
the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 permitting the change of state savings and loan 
associations into national ones, out of compliance with state law in Hopkins Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Cleary,(1936). The Court maintained that it was an 
unlawful imposition of provisions in the authority of the federal government onto the 
reserved authority of the states* contained in the Tenth Amendment.129 
 In U.S. v. Butler, (1936), the Court questioned the constitutionality of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). Since the beginning of our nation’s history the 
government had attempted to regulate farm productivity. Through this statute the 
Agriculture Secretary predicted the needed output of each yield that could be sold at 
different amounts and the portion of land sufficient to grow the proposed quantity. Land 
allocations were then made available to all producers, and by reduction in their yield 
subsequently they were authorized to receive a payment funded primarily by taxation of 
the retail sale of the various products. The lawsuit came before the Supreme Court in 
1936, appealed by Butler, executives for the Hoosac Mills Corporation, to prohibit the 
imposition of this taxation. In the Court’s view a progressive interpretation of spending 
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ability did not authorize the AAA to continue to conduct its operations. The Court 
established that Congress held the ability to provide subsidies to agriculture, but the AAA 
was also specifically controlling yields. Does the government have the authority to 
administer taxation for this cause, without relaying its functions to any national 
governmental organization? Again the Court was faced with a law that was out of 
compliance with the U.S. Constitution. The Court held the taxation power was not a solid 
medium on which to set up a major change in policy. Previously, the Court had said that 
Congress could not stamp out child labor with the use of taxation. On the same day the 
Court had unanimously nullified an Act with the taxation authorization to monitor the 
traffic in stocks with the Chicago Board of Exchange. Congress had organized the AAA 
by way of tax policy in complete disagreement with or lack of knowledge of 
constitutional restrictions. It was vaguely trying to structure the usage of taxation to 
complete the task of a regulatory power controlling local markets. This did not fall within 
the prescription of the Commerce Clause, the Court decided.130 
 The Court did, however, uphold some legislative Acts. It validated the Trading 
With the Enemy Act, the National Bankruptcy Act, the Ashhurst-Sumners Act making 
the transport of prison manufactured products in commercial activity between the states 
unlawful, and the Chaco Arms Embargo legislation. In the latter suit the Court validated 
the broad scope of Presidential authority in foreign relations. This issue dealt with 
international dimensions, was important, sophisticated, delicate, and permanent. Because 
of those reasons, the Court held, the President alone has the authorization to talk to the 
representative of the foreign government.131 
 The Court also reaffirmed Congressional authority to organize and monitor the 
92 
Wilson Reservoir on the Tennessee River, in Ashwander v. TVA ( 1937). The Court 
maintained the wartime and commercial provisions provided for in the constitution 
allowed for sufficient latitude for this function and to market electrical production at the 
reservoir and was concerned with structured allocation of government property and was 
therefore valid. Since the organization of the Tennessee Valley Authority contained 
various dimensions the Court stated no opinion as to its constitutionality.132  
 Prior to adjourning for its 1937 session break, however, the Court invalidated a 
couple more legislative measures. In Ashton v. Cameron Co. Water District, the court in a 
five to four decision struck down the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 as an assault on 
state’s rights. The dissenting Court refused to examine filed briefs in which the state itself 
agreed as infringing on any state’s reserved powers. Essentially it was the tri-division 
among the Court leaving the Guffey Act in shambles. The Guffey Act became law in 
1935 in an effort to allow the bituminous coal industry to operate under new protocol 
when the NRA was struck down. It also authorized federal regulation flowing from the 
Supreme Court’s prior opinion. When the suit came to the Supreme Court in Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., five Justices were in opposition to the Guffey Act. The Justices were 
opposed because the federal government was trying to introduce regulation on a 
delegated power that had been left up to the states. The Court maintained that the 
difficulties it was written to correct are all local problems which the Federal Government 
would make a move out of its lawful authoritative capacity in an effort to regulate.133 
 A dialogue of disagreement became prevalent all over the country. Citizens who 
were previously uncertain in disagreement with the Court now seized the moment and 
were aroused by the opinions. The magnitude to which the Court’s majority had 
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interpreted some cases added to the Court’s growing negative reputation overall and FDR 
said he would add additional Justices to the Supreme Court of the United States in order 
to change decisions that gave his policies difficulties. Most of the questions of the 
constitutionality of carelessly written legislative Acts had a solid foundation. Among the 
dozen opinions invalidating Roosevelt’s policies, half were unanimous, and in two others 
the decisions were eight to one. In the cases where Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and 
Cardozo were in agreement, the other conservative members most often agreed with 
them.134 
  
VICTORY FOR ROOSEVELT’S MONETARY LEGISLATION 
 Because of a Joint Resolution of Congress on June 5, 1933, payments in gold by 
the U.S. Treasury were ruled unlawful. January 17, 1934, became the date by which all 
gold had to be turned over to the Treasury, and two weeks thereafter FDR, acting with 
delegated authorization, devalued U.S. currency forty percent, decreasing its defined gold 
content from 25 8/10 grains to 15 5/21 grains pure. Three creditors rebelled. One was a 
railroad security owner, the next the holder of a gold certificate, and the last the holder of 
a security. All three contended with the government’s authority to take their gold and to 
nullify their gold contracts.* The constitutionality of the prohibition was decided by the 
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U.S. Supreme Court in the gold clause cases. Thus the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 initiated 
dozens of hard fought legal battles making their way to the Supreme Court in the 
beginning of 1935. On January 8-11, 1935, oral arguments were presented to the 
Supreme Court that were related to the gold abrogation clause. This legislation provoked 
various lawsuits that were decided at the same time on February 8, 1935 with Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes speaking for the Court. The Court upheld the abrogation of 
gold clauses* involving private responsibilities and responsibilities of the federal 
government. Congress’s power, the Court held, came not only from the power to coin 
money, but also from the total authority given to Congress, embracing the powers in tax 
collection, to borrow money and coin money, and to regulate interstate commerce.135  
 One of the cases, Nortz v. United States, involved a claim that a $10,000 Gold 
Certificate represented ten thousand dollars, with each dollar weighing 23.22 grains of 
gold. The certificate was turned in resulting in an assessment of $10,000, with each dollar 
weighing 13.71 grains, which was not an equal amount of gold conversion. Put another 
way, gold had gone up in value from $20.67 per ounce ninety-nine percent pure to $35 
per ounce, and so the plaintiff maintained he should have received the same number of 
ounces and not the same amount of U.S. currency, regardless of the current gold price. 
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Thus, the plaintiff calculated that approximately $16,931.25 of 13.71 grains per dollar 
would be needed to equal $10,000 of 23.22 grains per dollar. The court ruled in favor of 
the Government because the plaintiff could not prove that he would suffer an actual loss 
by being required to accept the equal amount of $10,000 in another form of exchange.136 
 Congress permitted challenges in opposition to the U.S. government relative to its 
contractual agreements and had set up the U.S. Court of Claims to handle those cases. It 
was here that Nortz and subsequent plaintiffs filed their original cases. The Court of 
Claims listened to the disputes, but failed resolve them. Instead, the lawsuits were 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Nortz had charged the enforced exchange of his gold 
certificate, representing bulk gold, for irredeemable certificates was an unauthorized 
deprivation of “life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness”. The Court 
maintained that the Constitution does not contain a provision for restitution of every 
damage. The judiciary has always maintained that when a wrong produces demonstrable 
losses and this can be reduced to a currency value on displaying former and later values, 
the instigator will be commanded to pay compensatory damages to the one suffering. In 
some circumstances those currency payments would be commanded without looking to a 
before and after test. Nominal damages may be awarded when a right has been violated. 
Sometimes punitive damages, those deliberately in direct proportion to the injury may be 
administered to make an example of the lawbreaker. The Court held that nominal and 
punitive damages are exceptional and not an absolute right.137 
 The imposition of damages settled this lawsuit. The certificate, the Supreme Court 
held, specified money, not bullion, and currency Nortz was provided. His effort to use the 
international market for an amount lost was considered invalid. The Court held that Nortz 
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had no right to gain restitution from such losses in international exchange rates. Because 
gold coin is classified as currency, as a medium of exchange, and restrictions associated 
with the government’s right to part of its ownership, therefore, Congress could prohibit 
its exportation and regulate its use. Since the assessed damages could not be used, a 
decision against the United States on any other grounds would involve the awarding of 
nominal damages. The Court held that Congress had not given the Court of Claims such 
extraordinary jurisdiction. On these grounds, the Nortz suit was accordingly dismissed. 
The issue of losses and the view by the Court also coincided with the other gold clause 
cases which called for restitution by the government of the gold clauses of securities. The 
Court specifically challenged that the legislative branch could alter its own deficits by the 
same process it had performed in private contractual agreements, since the Fourteenth 
Amendment* provides that the validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law shall not be questioned.138 
 Another case, Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., involved a security issued by 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that required the installment of $1000 and interest in 
gold based on the amount or an equal mass and purity in other barter in existence as of 
February 1, 1930. The challenger requested gold in its 1934 assessment, or an equivalent 
of $38.10 at the new price of gold for his old $22.50 security. In this lawsuit the 
challenger was defeated by the government because the Court decided that contracts 
setting up installments in bullion or money of a certain specified mass or purity provoked 
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a controversy with the authorization of Congress to monitor the nation’s monetary 
system, and it perceived them as being inadequate.139 
 Acknowledging that this was a lawful contract when entered into, Hughes 
maintained that it came under the scope the Fifth Amendment,* unless it conflicted with 
other Constitutional aspects such as the U.S. congressional authority to regulate interstate 
commerce. Previous laws such as the Legal Tender Act did conflict with rights specified 
under contract. The difference was that its impact could have been devastating in 
practical application, but was indirect. However, in this case the Court would not say, as 
it had held in prior decisions concerning the Legal Tender Act, that the provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment minor aspects and did not apply to this case. The U.S. Treasury and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation filed petitions to participate amici curiae.** Their 
interests included creditors of the debtor, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. Here the 
government differed from the two contracting parties and changed their opinion. The 
gold clauses could be struck down only if they attempted to conflict with other 
Constitutional provisions like the Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. An 
example of another application of this principle given by the Court would be a contract to 
pay a given cargo fee despite whatever the Interstate Commerce Commission might 
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prescribe, or a contract to establish a monopoly entered into before the passage of the 
antitrust act.140 
 The Court maintained that individual groups cannot eliminate their 
commercial activity out of the jurisdiction of the rule of constitutional oversight by 
entering into agreements about them. The decision then maintained that the gold clauses 
would make borrowers to purchase $1.69 in money while receiving payment in that 
medium at their existing rates. The decision holds that it is out of the Court’s jurisdiction 
to deal with consequences on the premises that punishment may eliminate an 
infringement of constitutional guarantees. The Court was determining the constitutional 
provisions concerning Congress’s power over the currency system* of the nation and its 
attempted aggravation. Using that authorization Congress attempted to organize a 
monetary system, and a relationship among the types of money. Both the Senate and the 
House were authorized to use a standard currency and to do away with a binary system. 
The suggestion that these gold clauses are binding agreements and cannot be invalidated, 
operates upon the assessment that groups from the private sector may enter into and put 
in force agreements which could impose limitations on their power. The Court 
maintained that the clauses interrupt the usage of authority allocated to the legislative 
branch in the U.S. Constitution. The Court maintained that Congress willingly or 
unknowingly found that those difficulties were in existence.141 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Donald A. Ritchie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 18-19. 
*
 The power of Congress to coin money has caused little controversy. It is likely that the framers of the 
Constitution meant this authorization to extend to the regulation of the mass or composition of U.S. 
currency, rather than to artificially set its value. As a result of the restrictions over money given by the 
Constitution, the legislative branch has regulated within the realm of banking, structured a nationwide 
banking and Federal Reserve System, distributed currency, regulated money, devaluated the currency, 
chose monetary policies, imposed taxation state bank issuances, and formed other financial organizations. 
See Asher Isaacs and Reuben E. Schlesinger, Business, Government And Public Policy, pp. 27-28 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1964). 
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 In Perry v. United States, heard also by the Court February 8-11, 1935, also part 
of the Gold Clause Cases, the holder of a 4.25 percent U.S. gold stock, sold in 1918 and 
expiring in 1934, requested restitution to be made with gold coin. The security called for 
the redemption of its original purchase price and interest in the amount of gold coin at the 
date of sale in 1918. A $10,000 bond printed in 1918 required the redemption in U.S. 
gold coin of the present weight of assessment. The challenger requested restitution of 
$16,931.25 with interest in legal money. The $16,931.25 was according to the plaintiff 
the amount the U.S. government needed to pay to compensate for the government’s 
devaluation of the dollar. The challenger said that the U.S. government had to 
compensate for the quantity of the gold bond in gold coin as the agreement stipulated. 
The Court of Claims relayed a couple of inquiries to the Supreme Court to sort out. Did 
the challenger have an unrestrained right to restitution in lawful currency in excess of the 
printed amount of the bond? Was the government required to service this request?142  
 The Court maintained that the responsibility of the government to pay for the 
plaintiff’s perceived loss conveyed a legal question distinct from the amount of the 
bondholder’s recovery. The Nortz case, although the opinion was issued on the same day 
and argued during the same period, had already banned the international price of gold as 
a value of assumed loss. They reasoned that internal prices were the only available 
measurement of the buying ability of U.S. currency. The Court accordingly dismissed the 
lawsuit for the reasons that the plaintiff could not demonstrate, or attempted to 
demonstrate, in regard to buying potential, how any losses had been sustained.143 
 The Court managed to uphold the government’s installation of its own gold 
clauses, but gave a specific interpretation of rights for restrictions not in existence. Justice 
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Harlan F. Stone came to the same conclusion with a concurring opinion changing the 
majority decision on a split court because this case involved a government security and 
not a contract between private citizens. Stone reasoned that the responsibility of the gold 
clause in government securities was less than in the contracts of private entities. In some 
situations, Stone reasoned that the Contract Clause was not applicable even to private 
agreements where specifications are not described or are left undefined. In these 
instances the government had proposed restrictions upon the continued authorization to 
manage our monetary system. Stone held the Court should not decide any question 
involving agreements jeopardized by the regulation of U.S. currency. Stone stated they 
may only be executed with specific authorization from the government instituting the 
availability of a lawsuit upon its gold clauses. In addition he said it would not be 
profitable if the challenger were afforded definite privileges for the restitution of gold 
clauses. Based upon that principle Justice Stone failed to agree with most aspects of the 
decision, because the majority’s opinion is suggestive that the exercise of the 
authorization to borrow currency by way of loans does not override the exclusive 
prohibition from a lawsuit. In addition, Stone maintained that this could be a forerunner 
to the regulation of U.S. monetary policy by the courts.144 
 The Court saw that this case was different from others and questioned whether 
security issuances were a state or private matter. Their reasoning was that the security in 
question was the direct responsibility of the U.S. Government. The problem of an 
outsider interfering with a monetary matter was not present. The Supreme Court held the 
contract was invalid so far as it overrode government responsibility created by the 
security. The majority opinion stated the contractual responsibilities still existed despite 
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problems, but as the action was for violation of contract and the plaintiff had not shown 
any loss in relation to the amount it could buy, he was not entitled to the amount of 
16,931.25. Therefore the case was dismissed by the Court based upon this premise.145  
 The Court justified its position by establishing congressional authorization to 
regulate currency and set up a monetary structure to manage the country’s currency. The 
Court further questioned whether Congress could use its power so as to invalidate the 
terms of a contract. The Government attempted to justify the Joint Resolution resulting in 
the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. The Government proclaimed before that Congresses could 
not validly restrain the seventy-third Congress from using its constitutional empowerment 
to shift the gold convertibility of the dollar, extend credit, or oversee international and 
commercial activity between the states. The Government maintained the proposition that 
with Congressional authorization, it could change existing monetary policies. The 
Government would also be at liberty to disregard that commitment and modify the terms 
of its obligations if a later Congress finds their fulfillment invalid. The Government’s 
query questions are raised involving issues that are far more important than the specific 
claim of the plaintiff. Based upon this reasoning, the Government argued, the 
specifications of the bonds may be invalid and the value for restitution may also be 
altered. The statement suggests that Congress could completely disregard the 
responsibilities of the Government at its own discretion. The Government, according to 
this principle, could acquire currency through loans and the agreement was only 
obligatory when the government gave its approval.146  
 The U.S. Supreme Court maintained when referring to the Constitution there is a 
significant variation between the authorization of the Congress to control or get involved 
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in the agreements of private individuals when they are at odds with legislative authority, 
and authorization to change or retract the amount of its own actions when it has borrowed 
currency under the authority which the Constitution confers. The U.S. retains rights but 
has obligations like those of persons who are involved in contracts.147 
 The Court also found that despite U.S. commitments in contractual arrangements, 
the challenger was not given an award because he could not demonstrate he had suffered 
specific damages because of the decline in value of U.S. dollars. The Court saw that 
dealing in gold had been outlawed before the decline in convertibility, and the total 
internal economy had gone through several changes. The subsequent events made it 
impossible to assign any specific amounts for losses born by the plaintiff because of the 
change in the convertibility of the gold dollar.148  
 The Court held that damages suffered by the plaintiff, if any, were brought about 
by the contended invalidation of an agreement, and it was inappropriate to assume the 
challenger was entitled to obtain gold coin or bullion for foreign export or for trafficking 
in international exchange or for other purposes contrary to the control over gold coin. 
Congress had the authority to regulate the nation’s currency. The plaintiff’s losses could 
not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time of the 
alleged breach of contract. The Court held the discontinuance of gold payments and the 
establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which all forms of 
money of the United States were to be sustained at parity had a controlling influence 
upon the domestic economy. The monetary policies of the nation were adjusted to the 
new basis and a free domestic market for gold bullion was non-existent. The Court would 
not accept the plaintiff’s demand that he be paid in currency of an equal amount of 
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buying capacity just because of the calculations of the devaluation, which amounted to 
$1.69 of the new money for each one dollar of old, regardless of whether he could 
produce proof of any particular damage.*149 
 Four dissenters, Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler, not 
only contended the challenged legislative acts would end up in confiscation of property 
rights but declared the damage was represented by the sixty-nine cents discrepancy 
between the previous and current amounts. Justice McReynolds dissenting separately 
held that if this principle went on to be put into action, the legislation in the challenge 
would bring about confiscation of property rights and negation of primary commitments. 
He stated that righteous persons hold denial and the taking away of persons’ property 
with disappointment, but in this instance it is requested of the citizenry to assure that the 
Constitution has specified provisions to do each and no definite delegation of such power 
is in existence.150 
 Justice Stone, writing his own opinion, in a partial concurrence with the 
majority’s conclusion, held it was pointless to question whether the government was 
excused from responsibility by way of its authority to adjust the purchasing power of 
currency. Should the legislative branch want to continue payment in gold or administer 
other currency stabilization initiatives, the Court’s decision could be a stumbling block 
except that Congress stopped the ability of the public to file a lawsuit. Stone maintained 
the founding fathers of our nation did not mean for the government to have permission to 
                                                          
*
 In 1977, the abrogation of gold clauses was repealed by Congress. American citizens since that time can 
buy and sell gold freely, and courts can enforce gold clauses. Today, contracts can provide for the payment 
in U.S. dollars, scrip pegged to the U.S. dollar, or an alternative currency. Contracts crafted between 1933-
1977, could not include clauses that specified for certain payments to be made in gold. See Lewis D. 
Solomon, Rethinking Our Centralized Monetary System: The Case For A System Of Local Currencies, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), pp. 103-104. 
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unbridle its responsibilities and undermine the very privileges which they were trying to 
guard. Stone said the gold clause did not recently come into existence and for more than a 
century persons operated under similar contracts. Securities were marketed for billions of 
dollars to finance World War I, public employment, transportation, and buildings. Under 
this principle Stone maintained that the Court should invalidate this Congressional 
activity in no uncertain terms whatever.151 
 Whatever the rationale which motivated the Court members to uphold or 
condemn the government’s invalidation of its own gold clauses, the most significant 
aspect was that the government became immune for the time being. However, the 
foundation of the majority decision suggested a different outcome would be attained as 
soon as a security holder obtained ability to show losses in the light of internal buying 
ability. After the 1935 gold clause lawsuits, the Treasury requested the “turning in” of 
gold securities before their specified due date. This relationship was transformed in its 
entirety into foundational theory when Congress, as of January 1, 1936, nullified the 
government’s agreement to allow lawsuits to come forth on monetary policy, and it 
stopped lawsuits against the federal government in the Court of Claims relative to the 
gold clause abrogation.152 
 In addition to the Gold Clause Cases, the Court subsequently upheld FDR’s 
monetary policies in other cases brought before it. In Holyoke Water And Power 
Company v. American Writing Paper Company (1937), the Court subsequently did away 
with another indirect gold clause. This suit included a rental obligation of a gold clause of 
a relatively complicated substance where the renter was committed to pay annually, not 
in gold coin, but an amount of currency which would purchase a quantity of gold equal to 
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$1,500 of United States gold currency of the standard fixed by law in 1894. The Court, 
speaking through Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, invalidated certain specifications of the 
agreement and held the method of restitution illegal, and served a writ of mandamus to 
have the loan canceled by an installment of $1,500 of paper money.153 
 The Court maintained that the argument for the appellant was that the result of the 
agreement in its enforcement to these lease agreements was to cause the buying power of 
currency to increase and decrease with variability in the mass and purity of the currency 
policies, and thus do away with the anticipation of the groups assuming that the policy 
would remain consistent and the purchasing power fairly the same. Such, indeed, was the 
effect, and the agreement of the groups was invalidated in that regard. The dissatisfaction 
of the outlook and also the agreements may be a lawful usage of authority when goals 
and pacts are inconsistent with the public’s well being, and in this instance the agreement 
should be defined.154 
 The four justices who dissented so forcefully in the Gold Clause suits did not try 
to write a brief in Holyoke Water and Power Company v. American Writing Paper 
Company, but just subtly notated their conflict with the result reached and so gave a 
revealing manifestation indicating where their opinions were in complete opposition.* 
Acceptance of the decision did not constitute a virtual desertion of a quest for agreements 
that would result in non-flexible guidelines and balanced standards. However, the search 
increased speed as the array of approaches and structure relative to our laws were put into 
                                                          
*
 Gerald T. Dune has noted that the five justices who upheld the gold legislation were easterners and had 
spent most of their pre-judicial careers wrestling in some manner or other with the increasingly complex 
problems of urban and industrial societies. The four dissenters, on the other hand, came from more rural 
backgrounds and from various locations throughout the country. Much research exists as to the influence of 
both political ideologies and backgrounds of judges which ultimately influence their decision-making. See 
Gerald T. Dune, Monetary Decisions Of The Supreme Court, pp. 96 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1960). 
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action. Nonetheless, the Holyoke Water and Power Company v. American Writing Paper 
Company suit’s outcome served as an example as a classic jurisdiction in relation to 
financial policies. The majority maintained in this instance that the obligation of contracts 
clause contained in the U.S. Constitution is not absolute.155  
      In Smyth v. United States (1937), a security holder was denied an installment in 
gold payments. He proposed an argument that the Treasury specification of restitution 
was invalid and provided a statement for payment for the ensuing maturity date at a later 
time. The Supreme Court’s opinion written by Justice Cardozo maintained that the 
document failed to confine the treasury to a forbidden medium of payment. It therefore 
stopped the additional payment of interest. In an opposing argument, Justices 
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler stated that as the security’s deliverance specification 
provided for restitution in gold currency, a statement nullifying that agreement is a 
corrupt means to do away with a written agreement. In addition, the Court had assumed 
responsibility for the contractual agreements with the gold abrogation lawsuits in 1935.156  
       Justice Stone, in agreement with the majority’s decision, said that the Court 
rightfully saw the securities here in these suits as leaving to the Treasury the 
authorization of shortening their due dates by affording installments or lurking in wait to 
fulfill those contracts on a time period in reference to their maturity. Stone went on to say 
the responsibility of the securities, viewed in the spirit of the inherited tradition of the 
judiciary and former gold abrogation lawsuits, the Court maintained that agreements have 
to be interpreted to be gold weight attempting to require installments equal to eligible 
money. Stone stated that doing away with gold as monetary medium, and the regulation 
on its exportation and gold’s usage in international balance of payments by actions in the 
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legislative branch, did not excuse the Treasury of responsibilities to recompense the listed 
gold amount of the securities in eligible money. Agreeing, Stone stated the decision 
should be on the side of the security holders only if the Joint Resolution of Congress of 
June 5, 1933, mandating the turn over of all gold contracts in eligible money proves to be 
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.157 
 Stone maintained that a definitive judgment on the federal question now must be 
decided. The statement in this concurring opinion held that Treasury securities do not 
reside under a different classification than those of individual citizens and the legislative 
action constituted a lawful usage of the authorization to monitor our monetary policies. 
Stone clarified the distinction by saying that the attempt of the Treasury to honor its 
agreements with gold, if required, works to use the constitutional authorizations 
correspondingly to the same level as do bonds issued by private entities. This applies 
insomuch as the government relies on absolute protection from court challenges by 
prohibiting a filing by way of the U.S. Court of Claims. If that reservation had been 
contained in the monetary policy lawsuits of 1935, in reference to contractual 
agreements, gold stipulations do not have to be entertained in order to avoid a court 
challenge and would have undermined the U.S. Treasury practice of the delay in gold 
clauses and the decline and fall of the value of U.S. currency.158  
 Stone reasoned that the emergence of the inability to be challenged in the Courts 
serves as direct evidence that the authority to gain capital by the acquisition of a loan 
from the U.S. government should not be interpreted as a constraint on the Congressional 
authorization to coin and regulate the nation’s currency. Reviewing the possible 
contributors in which those authorizations are transferred onto the federal government 
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like that of the instance of securities of states, cities, and private entities, its relationship 
with the security owners does not change in any instance. Stone, elaborating further, 
contended that no action was ever implemented which would justify how the 
authorization to organize the monetary system, that is not controlled by the Fifth 
Amendment concerning contractual agreements, is regulated by the Treasury. He 
contended that the United States was able to do away with its authorization from the 
ability of the public to file a lawsuit. Stone in a solidifying ending maintained that the 
credit authorization cannot be enforced to make the Treasury to grant restitution. He also 
proclaimed that it made the government unable to use the specifications enshrined in the 
Constitution to formulate monetary policy in which restitution should be granted.159 
 In Guaranty Trust v. Henwood (1939), the majority invalidated an alternative for 
the owners of currency securities to opt for a different money plan to constitute guilders, 
pounds, marks, or francs as a way to provide a different option for a loan that would have 
to be compensated for in U.S. currency only to a pegged amount. In this instance the 
securities of railroads, distributed and marketed in 1912, authorized payment in gold 
currency or an equal amount in international exchange. The legislative branch abrogated 
gold money in 1933. The security owners, were running in the red and restructured 
protocol after three years. The owners of the securities instituted an authorization 
constituting a Dutch guilder amount, which would have added up to a larger amount of 
U.S. currency than agreed upon, because of the currency devaluation. Writing for the 
majority Justice Black proclaimed that the reservations of the securities are, by way of 
the legislative action, contradictory to governmental policies and not consistent.160  
 Justice Stone dissented, along with Chief Justice Hughes and Justices 
109 
McReynolds and Butler. They failed to agree that the legislative action on June 5, 1933, 
nullified the obligation of contracts to use guilders to satisfy the owners. In disagreement 
they theorized that the owners might request to be paid in gold currency of a pegged 
standard or an equal amount in dollars. The optional obligation was for the balance of 
payments internationally of particular values of several international mediums of 
exchange, with a lack of regard to their gold convertibility on the date of maturity. The 
agreement to take responsibility for the bond was unrelated to gold or gold convertibility 
as if the contract had specified for the payment of a particular amount of wheat, sugar or 
coffee, or to provide a particular service. When the legislative action was taken there 
existed several contracts of U.S. citizens requiring payment internationally only with 
foreign money, and the artificial change in gold convertibility of the dollar tremendously 
raised the weight of those agreements with the urgency of requiring payment with U.S. 
currency at a lower value than the international conversion mandated for their 
redemption. The legislative branch failed to attempt to eliminate any member of the 
United States of their contractual obligations. It is not perceivable as well, by the majority 
that the legislative action allowed for the invalidation of any agreements redeemable in 
any international monetary medium. After the artificially instituted loss in value of U.S. 
currency, the requirement on citizens of the U.S. to meet those requirements 
internationally by redemption in international currencies was probably as large whether 
the responsibility was nonnegotiable or to redeem with a stipulation which had occurred, 
or whether the agreement was to purchase in an internationally recognized form of 
money or to give products which have to be received by the usage of devalued U.S. 
currency. The dissenters saw nothing in the Congressional record relative to specification 
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of the invalidation of Treasury payment in the medium of gold or an internationally 
recognized medium of exchange. Dissenting, the Justices put forth the proposition that 
the majority cannot be at liberty to hypothesize what the legislative branch could or 
should have done, or of every small possibility to do away with the strain of the country’s 
money change in value for individuals who entered into agreement for funding to come 
from other currencies abroad unrelated to gold convertibility. They maintained that if the 
Court’s decision be verified, the opinion is so comprehensive as to invalidate all 
thinkable requirements for redemption in international currencies, transfer of goods, 
relating services as a different approach for the redemption in U.S. currency whether it 
encompasses a gold standard or not.161 
 Roosevelt’s silver policy was upheld as well in United States v. Hudson (1937). 
Eight Justices unanimously upheld the Silver Purchase Act in this decision as Justice 
Stone didn’t hear the case. The dispute in this case involved a tax of fifty percent all 
profits derived from the sale of silver. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
sale of a half million ounces of silver in which he was forced to pay a fifty percent tax on 
$8,621.96 he had received in profits. The opinion written by Justice Van Devanter held 
that like all the other cases involving the Gold Reserve Act this case failed to violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.162 
 Therefore the suits concerning monetary policies solidified a continuous cycle in 
American judiciary instead of an irrational movement in the Court’s Constitutional 
doctrine.* In particular, it should be mentioned that the victories for monetary policy 
                                                          
*
 Holders of certain European obligations had better luck in enforcing gold clause payments in foreign 
courts. The reason is twofold. First, not many European issues contained a gold clause, whereas it was put 
in American obligations explicitly expressed in contracts. Therefore, the aggregate economic effects of 
European judicial decisions were marginal. Second, while most European countries reduced the gold 
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came about prior to the Court’s 1937 change by a trend to validate most of Roosevelt’s 
policies. Outside the findings for the Tennessee Valley Authority, the gold legislation 
was the only policy of major New Deal economic initiative ruled to be constitutional by 
the Court in the 1934 and 1935 terms. In addition, the Court was unanimous in upholding 
the silver legislation in 1937.163 
 
ATTRIBUTING ROOSEVELT’S ECONOMIC SUCCESSES TO MONETARY 
POLICIES UPHELD BY THE U.S. SUPRME COURT 
 Roosevelt’s monetary policy stands largely alone as legislation that withstood 
tremendous challenges in the Courts. Almost all of the First New Deal legislation was 
struck down by the courts with suits brought against them, but Roosevelt’s monetary 
policies were upheld by the Court in suit after suit brought before it. Especially FDR’s 
economic programs designed to boost the American economy were ruled 
unconstitutional. Monetary policy sought by the administration withstood the Courts, had 
tremendous international and domestic applications and implications, and should be 
given credit for almost all of his economic successes. Most of FDR’s attempts at 
influencing the economics of the nation are aligned most closely with the philosophies of 
notable economists like Karl Marx and John Maynard Keyes who held that the best way 
for economies to flourish is through tremendous governmental regulation. His monetary 
policies tended to support the free market and the protection of property. It is true that 
Roosevelt tried other means and methods to bring the nation out of the Great Depression 
but many of these, especially those making any kind of tremendous impact on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
content of their currencies, none prohibited the exercise of gold clause rights as did the American Congress.  
Gerald T. Dune, Monetary Decisions Of The Supreme Court, pp. 97-98 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
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nation’s economy, were struck down by the courts. If Roosevelt’s monetary policies had 
not been upheld by the Courts then the nation would not have had the economic power to 
combat World War II and would not have emerged from it as strong economically as the 
nation did.164   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rutgers University Press, 1960).  
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CHAPTER FIVE: MONETARY POLICIES DURING WORLD WAR II AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 
 World War II left a nation stronger than at any other time in our nation’s history. 
When World War II started, America’s banking and financial institutions had fully 
recovered from the banking crisis of 1933. The war brought with it much unwanted 
inflation, but banks and the Federal Reserve were in a position to alleviate some of the 
impacts. Reacting to the situation, the Federal Reserve was able to make necessary 
adjustments to combat inflation by selling government securities and bonds. Also, gold 
and silver continued to flow into the Treasury at an even greater rate during 1938 and 
beyond with the start of the war in Europe. It was not World War II that brought the 
nation out of the Great Depression as is generally thought. The administration already 
had effective policies in place to continue economic recovery. It is true that the expansion 
of the available money supply played a great role in the strength of the economy during 
the war and its aftermath. However, the gold inflow into the United States would have 
been very minimal if the gold and silver purchase programs had not been in place and the 
nation’s banks had already recovered to be in a position to combat the changing dynamics 
of the economy.165 
 
 WORLD WAR II INFLATION 
 World War II, as with other conflicts in this country’s history, brought with it 
undesirable inflation. The nation’s per capita income grew by two and a half times the 
amount it was during the previous ten years from 1930-1939. The nation’s stock of 
money increased three times the amount it had been from 1933-1941 and wholesale 
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markets more than doubled. Per capita income grew at an average of 10.7 percent per 
year, the nation’s stock of money grew at a rate of 12.3 percent per year, and an increase 
in wholesale prices of 8.2 percent per year. Personal income, production, and 
employment mostly declined from September, 1939, until Germany attacked Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the fall of France. The British and European allies 
started putting in large defense contracts with U.S. manufacturers in 1940, which brought 
about dramatic increases in the U.S. economy.166 
 The root cause of World War II inflation may be best classified by a large amount 
of capital export. The largest rise occurred from 1940 through 1944. The increase 
continued for four more years reaching an all-time high in 1948 as the U.S. extended aid 
to war torn nations. Capital exportation became a larger portion of the GNP than any 
other time. After the total exports had decreased after World War II, industrial production 
and economic activity continued to flourish with number greater than levels of the 1930s. 
Many of the obstacles facilitating inflation during World War II can be attributed to the 
Lend-Lease Act* of 1941 when the U.S. became involved in the war and took on 
responsibilities for financing foreign government wartime purchases. In World War II 
general price levels increased quickly from 1941 through 1947 without regards to any 
rise or fall in capital transport. Scholars mainly credit one attribute to a inflexible 
                                                          
*
 On March 11, 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, authorizing the President to utilize heads of 
departments or agencies to sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise get rid of any item of 
defense to the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the 
U.S. without regard to the terms of any existing legislation. An initial appropriation of $7 billion was made, 
and it provided that up to $1.3 billion of items could be disposed of from existing public government 
property. Sales were undertaken, as a result, in large quantities to foreign governments. Altogether during 
the war Congress appropriated $63.8 billion for the Lend-Lease program. As a result, exports which had 
been decreasing rose immediately after the passage of lend-lease, giving additional stimulus to the U.S. 
economy. See Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial History Of The United States: Fiscal, 
Monetary, Banking, And Tariff, Including Financial Administration And State And Local Finance, 440-441 
(New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952). 
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organization of exchange regulation applied internationally. The values of products 
throughout this period is clearly seen in internal market regulation instead of exchange 
controls. Price controls and rationing existed in a greater capacity in European nations 
than in the U.S. As a result, foreign governments were less subject to inflation.167  
 Comparisons between markets and the movement of move in war and peace are 
virtually impossible given the tremendous problems with transportation and financial 
agreements. During World War II capital movements stayed in sync to the general price 
levels to a greater extent than where they resided during peace. This was largely observed 
with a major counterbalance of outflow of wealth modification to the approximate price 
levels. The wholesale price levels rose at a proportion of four percent every year during 
World War II deficit spending. To handle inflation, the FDR tried to install price controls 
in the beginning of 1942, and the Truman administration did away with these practices in  
the middle of 1946. Price controls took the form of price maximums, concentration of 
production assemblages, discontinue of discounts on transactions, and alterations to the 
market of a product along with changes in the value or services offered. Where market 
restrictions had the most in, shortcomings sometimes developed with products such as 
meats, gasoline, and other foods. The government was then had to induce rationing these 
items.168  
 Economic growth from 1940 to 1942 was enormous and after the middle of 1940 
there prevailed tremendous rises in the general price levels which discouraged the 
holding of assets in the form of money. Both the citizenry and corporations were 
prohibited from consuming income to buy the types of goods they maintain as adding to 
their total value. These funds typically soak up a huge segment of enlargement of 
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earnings. To recompense, investors enlarged their collection of additional possessions in 
the flow of government stocks and money at unparalleled heights as a percentage of their 
earnings. Private reserves for the duration of this era were a great deal more than can be 
related with larger amounts of earnings because of the war limitations. Consumers 
accrued much additional liquid assets than they would have otherwise depleted on 
building homes, cars, and resilient commodities. A ban of nonmilitary automobile 
manufacture took effect on February 1, 1942, and many other sturdy products by 
September, 1942. As a consequence, prices ascended much less rapidly during World 
War II than the reserve of the nation’s currency.169 
 When looking at the successes of Roosevelt’s monetary policies it is important to 
mention the role of taxation in curbing World War II inflation and to help pay for the 
War. As inflation began to rise, the policy of the government was to raise taxes to help 
curb the trend. Raising taxes began in 1940 as government spending increase twofold and 
continued to rise. To assist in diminishing the effect of inflation and to help pay for the 
war, the FDR asked for higher taxes afterward passed by Congress. Quite a few of the 
revenue acts were approved in the 1940s.* A sum of 46 percent of World War II was paid 
for by way of taxation. Even though taxation played a role, the economy was already 
strengthened by FDR’s monetary policies coming out of the 1930s, enabling an extensive 
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 The Revenue Acts of 1942, 1943, and 1944 were passed in addition to other tax revenue sources that were 
in place at that time. They were passed in an effort to help finance World War II and at the same time deter 
inflation. These Revenue Acts passed during World War II greatly broadened the types of products that 
were previously not considered luxury items. The Revenue Act of 1942 raised income taxes and set a 
maximum excess profits tax of 75 percent. It also eliminated loopholes in community properties protected 
in some states, introduced new excise taxes, and increased estate and gift taxes. The Revenue Act of 1943 
went further in increasing the taxation of alcohol, luggage, cosmetics, jewelry, furs, and other luxury goods. 
The Revenue Act of 1944 froze social security taxes, decreased the number of exemptions for income 
taxes, and generally raised income taxes. See Paul Studenski and  Herman E. Krooss, Financial History Of 
The United States: Fiscal, Monetary, Banking, And Tariff, Including Financial Administration And State 
And Local Finance, pp. 445-449 (New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952). 
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tax base to be available. Sound monetary policies must have contributed to the rise in 
economic growth, and taxation itself was in place primarily to suppress inflationary 
pressures. Therefore, even the profits harvested from taxation must be rooted in 
Roosevelt’s monetary agenda.170 
 
GOLD AND SILVER DURING THE WAR 
 The gold rush into the U.S. Treasury sparked by the gold purchase program of the 
United States looked as if they were decreasing in 1935. However, the U.S. gold stock 
subsequently rose at a slower pace until the latter part of 1936 when France discontinued 
the gold standard. After the beginning of 1936, approximately 50 percent of U.S. gold 
importation came from France. Over the course of 1937 France became an importer 
instead of an exporter of gold to the U.S. The U.S. Treasury actually lost gold from 
October, 1937 until February, 1938, but in little quantities. Removal of European capital 
resources out of the United States stopped in 1938 when political instability intensified. 
With the eruption of war the gold inflow into the U.S. recommenced. In 1940, the fall of 
France exacerbated the gold inflow even more with England’s pains to strengthen defense 
manufacture. Even though the Lend-Lease Act was passed in 1941 relieving European 
allied nations of direct financial responsibilities to the U.S., consequently slowing gold 
inflows, the Treasury still sustained the accumulation of gold stocks. 171 
 Gold acquisitions by the United States continued all through World War II with 
even a drastic rise in 1940 as international governments transported gold to fulfill the 
obligation of defense contracts. The British government compensated for military 
provisions by first by marketing $335 million in U.S. stock and moving over $2 billion in 
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gold to the United States. The U.S. later went in debt for a large number of acquisitions 
by mandating services of international governments to the United States. The U.S. went 
through an incredible enlargement in its monetary stockpile during World War II in 
Europe in September, 1939 until November, 1941, entirely as a result of a tremendous 
increase in monetary gold stocks. From the beginning of the war in Europe in 1939, 
through December, 1941, the U.S. stock of money grew by 29 percent.172 
 During World War II, a several nation states tried to fight inflation by marketing 
gold to the citizenry either for their own specific avail or, as in the instance of several 
others in Asia and the Middle East, for other offshore accounts with the allied countries. 
In the case of India and the Middle East, gold sales were embarked on by those nations 
not only as a way of serving to fight inflation, but also for the reason of acquiring local 
legal tender for defense spending. Inflation in those nations tremendously made less the 
buying power of English and U.S. currency with exchange values remaining virtually 
consistent from 1939 until the end of World War II. However, the value of those regional 
monies increased twofold after 1939. As a result, it was possible to buy twice as much 
regional currency with one gold ounce as could be bought with an equivalent value of 
British or American currency. Governmental bimetal marketing as a way of fighting 
inflation were also used in Greece, Mexico, Chile, and China. Sales of silver were 
administered for the same reasons in India and Iran.173 
 The most severe gold marketing plans were those instituted in the nations of the 
Middle East and to a lesser extent in India. Gold sales by the government in the Middle 
East for the utter function of fighting inflation began in Iran in June, 1943, in Iraq, 
Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in August, 1943, and in Egypt in November, 
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1943. Those methods of liquidating assets were stopped in June, 1944, in all of the above 
nations with the exclusion of Iran were sustained until autumn of 1944. Government 
authorization of gold sales in India started in the summer of 1943, and were sustained 
until April, 1945. Apparently there was some tendency for wholesale markets to stabilize 
throughout the official gold sales period in those countries. In India, a decrease in the 
wholesale price increases occurred after the execution of gold sales, but only a portion of 
the responsibility may be credited to the gold selling policies. Between September, 1943, 
and March, 1944, wholesale price levels in India dropped 14 percent, and they stayed 
relatively constant from the spring of 1944 until at least 1946. Scholars have attributed 
this fall to a rise in confidence in monetary policies, execution of allocation and cost 
measures, and a decrease of Allied defense spending.174 
 In Syria, prices rose by more than 300 percent between January, 1942 and June, 
1943. Here many merchants administered their values every day in relation to the price of 
gold as an alternative of the nation’s currency. The same circumstances existed in Greece 
where gold had a tendency to replace the paper money as the generally accepted standard 
of value, and rents and commodity values started to be quoted in terms of gold bullion. 
Gold bullion was also marketed by the Germans in 1943 and 1944 as a way of quelling 
inflation. The Bank of Greece administered the market of monetary gold after 
reoccupation. In the beginning the gold sales were victorious in placing limitations 
inflation, but after adequate amounts of bullion were released to the citizenry to serve as 
an additional exchange medium, its exchange rate in terms of money and products 
declined very quickly. The collective worth of gold coins in circulation went beyond 
several times the currency in circulation. In Egypt the market value of gold increased at 
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the same time with wholesale prices from 1939 until June, 1943, when the highest price 
of the yellow metal attained heights equal to almost all the nations in the Middle East. 
Much of the gold marketed in India and the Middle East was probably bought by citizens 
as a substitute to currency retention or depositing money in banks.175 
 Internationally, the bimetallic values were progressively more restricted and more 
regulated throughout World War II than in previous years. After the beginning of World 
War II in September, 1939 gold sales were stringently regulated in Great Britain and 
other key markets over seas. In England, the gold exchange value was pegged at 168 
grains or 3/8 of a troy ounce per British pound where it stayed until June, 1945, when it 
was elevated to 172 grains. The Indian value for gold bullion, until the start of World 
War II, was similar to the British price. It gradually went up after that as Great Britain’s 
currency went down. In autumn of 1939, the Indian government halted all movement of 
gold across their borders excluding special authorization, but there was no interference 
with the non-monetary gold market within the country. The price remained relatively 
constant until November, 1941, when it began an upward climb, and it kept increasing 
after the beginning of war in Asia, reaching an all-time high of over 98 rupees with 
equivalence to around $78.00 per fine ounce in April, 1943. This great rise was the result 
of expected inflation during war affecting virtually all countries on earth and partly to the 
usage of gold as a concentrated asset reserve in time of need. From 1943 on, official sales 
of gold were used by England and the United States governments to acquire rupees for 
their usage in India and to aid in quelling inflation. This marketing lessened the value of 
gold in international trade. Also, the international demand for gold declined somewhat 
from 1943-1945 as the decline and fall of the Axis nations appeared to be unavoidable.176 
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 In July, 1939, the Senate silver bloc prevailed in establishing, by legislative 
action, the national convertibility for silver at 71.11 cents per fine ounce. Simultaneously, 
the British market had fallen, on the premise of a U.S. Senate bill halting all acquisitions 
of international silver. The American market for international silver dropped 
continuously until it was set by the government at 35 cents per fine ounce, where it 
stayed until August, 1942. World War II incited a large industrial want for silver. By the 
middle of 1942 all international silver was being consumed by industry, and in 
September, 1942, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) instituted a price of 45 cents 
per ounce for international silver. In July, 1943, Congress passed the Green Act, which 
permitted the market of excess government silver for industrial purposes at 71.11 cents 
per fine ounce. By the summer of 1945 the government’s surplus silver became 
tremendously less by the market of the metal authorized by the Green Act and by lend-
lease transport to other nations. With the possibility of a shortage of industrial silver there 
was pressure for a higher price to attract international silver into the United States. On 
September 20, 1945, the OPA raised this price to 71.11 cents. In the meantime, on 
August 20, 1945, the War Production Board eliminated the restrictions on the use of 
various classifications of silver, so all silver was valued by the same criteria, with regard 
to its value and exploitation.177 
 Various countries beginning with World War II in 1939, started hoarding silver as 
a currency store. Those nation-states involved the Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Iraq, Jordan, Ireland, and Southern 
Rhodesia, all of which were members of the British Commonwealth of Nations at the 
time. The primary reason for storing silver was to organize an arrangement of mutual 
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exchange and market regulations, regulating transactions with non-silver using nations, at 
the same time giving virtually absolute liberty of financial responsibility with the 
members. One rationale involved the acquisition of money outside the region, 
specifically American currency in an effort to compensate World War II.178 
 Along with the start of World War II, the value of silver also began to rise with 
the United Kingdom’s pains to further depreciate their currency. In October, 1939, the 
importation of silver unless specifically authorized, in England, was unlawful. This 
resulted in lifting the English value of silver from the New York price. Hereafter, the 
British market was different from that of New York and often higher than its price. After 
prices declined in the spring of 1940, the price levels stabilized and leveled off. The 
Indian government sold its silver supplies in Great Britain in huge amounts from then on. 
With the start of exchange on January 3, 1945, price levels were altered to pence per 
ounce, 0.999 fine in an effort to sustain consistency with the American standard, and the 
convertibility of the British pound was structured consequently. When the price of U.S. 
silver increased to 71.11 cents in September, 1945, the English value was again adjusted 
to be consistent with the U.S.179 
 The Indian convertibility ratio of silver from September 1931 until the end of 
1941 can be paralleled to much of the dynamics of the United Kingdom’s and U.S. 
markets. Following September, 1939, the market was protected from both the British and 
American exchanges by controls on the fluctuation of silver prices. With the acceleration 
of aggression in Asia in December, 1941, silver in India began an escalation similar to 
gold and for virtually identical causes. A highest level of 143 rupees per ounce was 
attained on April 24, 1944. In June, 1944, the price levels began a downward spiral when 
123 
the announcement was made that the United States would allocate 100 million ounces of 
silver to India on a lend-lease contract. Later the quantity was raised to 223 million 
ounces. Marketing of silver really started in August, 1945, and while the price went down 
some, it stayed fairly high throughout the rest of the year. The Indian convertibility ratio 
may be very closely traced to that of the United States and Great Britain from 1936 to 
1941, but it hovered primarily at a lower rate from then on because of tariffs place on 
silver. Beginning in 1942 the ratio mirrored changes in the values of both gold and silver. 
When gold prices increased more quickly than silver the convertibility increased. The 
inclination since the beginning of 1942 decreased somewhat as the demand for silver 
internationally was larger for silver than for gold, primarily for the increase in industrial 
use. The Chinese had no formal silver market, for under the silver standard there could be 
no noteworthy change in the value of silver bullion in relation to silver currency. The 
Chinese administered a silver currency at approximately the rate of 29.5 cents throughout 
1936 and 1937, until the spring of 1938, which was many months after Japan attacked 
China. The value was lowered and the convertibility ratio decreased dramatically. 180 
 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LONG-TERM ROOSEVELT MONETARY POLICY 
 Scholars basically agree the United States completed economic recovery from the 
Great Depression in 1942, re-establishing full employment in that year after twelve years 
of high unemployment rates. Monetary policies were the primary influence from 1933 
through 1940 and continued to emerge with increasing importance in 1941. World War II 
monetary policies were instrumental in the lowering of unemployment rates and not just 
the enter of the United States in World War II. What ended the Great Depression? Many 
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historians and economists have argued that World War II alone ended it. The scholars 
maintaining this argument are mostly associated with demand-side economics and 
include John Maynard Keynes, Robert Mundell, Arthur Laffer, Victor Canto, and 
Seymour E. Harris. The conventional doctrine was confronted by J. Bradford Delong and 
Lawrence Summers. They provided an estimation that an excess of five-sixths of the 
decline and fall in unemployment rates were attained prior to 1942. They synthesize that 
almost none of the previous 1942 declines was associated with World War II. Christina 
Romer also makes this assessment by stating that World War II budgetary policies 
constituted virtually no role in the recovery from the Depression until after 1941. Romer 
holds Roosevelt’s monetary policies as the exclusive reason for the recovery. Romer also 
states that the only feature leading to economic successes after 1938 constituted the gold 
increase in United States Treasury stocks. But this increase would not have happened 
unless the U.S. had such extensive gold and silver purchase programs already in place, 
which is a direct result of the monetary policies of the administration.181 
 World War II and the fiscal policies of the administration only topped off the 
economic recovery after it was already underway in the years prior to it. Monetary 
policies were the most influencing factors in the recovery throughout the administration. 
Unemployment was at the highest rate in history in 1933. More than fifty percent of the 
rates had been diminished by 1941-1942. The unemployment rate for 1942 was 4.7 
percent for the civilian population and 4.4 percent for the labor force with the armed 
forces included. The GNP of the United States in 1929 was $709.6 billion. This number 
dropped to $498.5 billion by 1933. The GNP of the country progressively rose until it 
attained $1.08 trillion by 1942. If fiscal policies constituted the greatest influencing factor 
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during World War II, a continuous increase every year leading up to the war should not 
be evident. Actually the GNP gradually rose in the approximate same proportions each 
year Roosevelt held the office.182 
 World War II did not end the Great Depression in the sense that the total 
economic well being attained its greatest height during the war. For example, real 
consumption per capita was lower during 1942 and 1945 than in 1941. This was largely 
due to rationing and the finance of the manufacture of defense products. Significant 
enlargement of monetary stockpiles transpired from 1938 through the end of World War 
II and instituted a tremendous affect on the country’s total rise in GNP. Enlargement of 
bank reserves produced encouraging inflationary outlooks, discouraging superficial 
interest rates adequate to incite the needed rises in interest rates and increased expenses 
associated with interest rates. The biggest change in governmental policies during World 
War II consisted of government acquisitions and taxation, but these alterations 
constituted a narrow effect on the economy as the unemployment and GNP developments 
for America continually changed at a dynamical consistent degree contrasting sharply to 
previous years.183  
 While countless nations experienced a depression at approximately the same time 
as the United States, the decline and fall in economic productivity and the subsequent 
recoil were to a greater extreme in the United States than it was internationally. The 
severity of the Great Depression was also larger in the United States than in any other 
country other than Poland. The American Depression was consummated by a decline and 
fall in consumption and finished by a rise in ventures to a measure substantially varying 
from the experience of most other developed nations. The economic tumult of the 1930s 
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was experienced by countries in all regions of the world. Countries as heterogeneous as 
the United States, Germany, Chile, and Japan all felt tremendous depressions in the 
1930s. The international implications and applications, particularly the role of the gold 
purchase program, were monumental in the causation of the slump and transmission to a 
certain degree, the depression from one country to another.184 
 While various countries began their economic recovery at relatively the same 
time, there was much discussion in when each economy was in economic terms fully 
recovered. Rehabilitation from the depression is most often measured by an examination 
of when industrial production reached its highest point prior to the Depression. This 
happened in 1932 for New Zealand, 1933 for Romania, Greece, and Japan, 1934 for 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Chile, 1935 for Great Britain, Norway, Hungary, and 
Estonia, 1936 for Germany, and 1937 for Italy, Austria, and Canada. The United States, 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands, and Poland did not recover fully until 
after 1937.185 
 The economic revitalization of the United States from the Great Depression has 
been contrastingly depicted as incredibly fast and incredibly slow. It was rapid in the 
sense that the growth rate of industrial output was significantly great in the years between 
1933 and 1937 and after 1938. Monthly industrial production increased by 79 percent 
between March, 1933 and the highest point in July, 1937. The annual industrial 
production in the United States in 1933 actually increased faster than in any other 
country. The growth was not limited to industrial manufacture. The GNP went up at a 
standard rate of almost 10 percent each year in the four years between 1933 and 1937, 
and repeatedly in the three years between the recession of 1938 and U.S. involvement in 
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World War II in December, 1941. The revitalization has been categorized nevertheless, 
slow in the sense that the decline and fall in output in the United States was so brutal in 
spite of the extraordinary expansionism, the GNP did not return to its pre-1929 level until 
1937. The U.S. did not return to its pre-1929 growth rate until 1942. This fact leads to a 
common conclusion that the Great Depression did not cease until the outbreak of World 
War II.186 
 The war was not the chief foundation of the American recuperation, at least not in 
the same manner that is characteristically contemplated. The U.S. economy began 
recovering in 1933 predominantly because of tremendous increases in the money supply. 
Soon after taking office, Roosevelt, instituted emergency provisions designated to him by 
Congress, allowing the U.S. currency to depreciate. A new lower price for the dollar was 
fixed by law in January, 1934. This devaluation greatly increased the total value of the 
United States gold reserves. The Treasury opted not to ignore the increase in the value of 
gold reserves and issued gold certificates equal to the amount of the increase and 
deposited them in the Federal Reserve. As the government spent money, these gold 
certificates were converted into Federal Reserve notes, which are a component of the 
monetary base. Devaluation also brought in a large inflow of monetary gold from abroad 
as foreigners traded gold for the new less expensive dollars. After 1934, gold continued 
to flow into the United States because of the new price and political unrest in Europe. 
Hitler’s quest for Europe caused Europeans to want to invest in American assets, which 
required they buy U.S. currency with gold. Instead of stabilizing this gold inflow by 
borrowing the dollars to trade for the gold, the Treasury paid for the gold with deposits at 
the Federal Reserve, and then replenished the accounts by issuing gold certificates.187 
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 As a result, money supplies in the United States grew by 12 percent between 
April, 1933, and April, 1934. Also, the monetary base increased another 40 percent 
between April, 1934 and April, 1937. The monetary base increase is direct evidence that 
the money supply was growing during the 1930’s as a result of policy decisions rather 
than political events in Europe or changes in the economy because of the recovery itself. 
Prior to the expansion of the money supply, devaluation assisted the recovery by serving 
as a warning sign of a change to a more expansionary monetary system. It advocates that 
the decline in value instantaneously encouraged acquisitions of agricultural apparatuses 
and additional principal supplies by producing opportunities of prospects in currency 
inflation, and economic progress. After 1934 the tremendous increase in the American 
money supply instituted precisely the effect on the U.S. economy that economists would 
forecast. Statistics demonstrated that interest rates declined and fell stridently in 
connection to the flow of gold into the U.S. Treasury. The action capitalized because the 
nominal rates subtly fell and actual and predicted inflation rose substantially. The 
producer price index rose at eight percent every year between January, 1933, and 
January, 1937. The fall in interest rates was pursued somewhat rapidly by a revitalization 
in expenditures initiated by falling interest rates, such as construction spending and 
citizen consumption of resilient products. This result may be seen in the fact that the 
American recovery, more than any other country, was led by a rush in the manufacture of 
investment goods. An additional piece of evidence suggesting a causal link between the 
fall in interest rates and the tremendous increase in specific categorizations of spending in 
the United States is the fact that American consumer purchases on durable products went 
up prior to consumer spending on services did. This serves as a good indicator that some 
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factor affected only durable good purchases, such as the fall in interest rates instituting 
the healing from the Great Depression.188 
 The increases in the money supply during the recovery can hardly be considered 
an accident caused by international developments or a predicted outcome of boom/bust 
economics. The political cataclysm abroad caused some gold inflow into the United 
States, but this would not have transpired without the extensive gold purchasing program. 
Some scholars even attribute international gold and monetary insufficiencies to escalating 
pressures leading up to the start of World War II. The Roosevelt administration 
deliberately opted to devalue U.S. currency and not to steady the ensuing gold 
movements, because it desired to amplify the monetary stocks and initiate inflation. The 
international gold movements offered a suitable method for the administration to change 
the conservative policies of the Federal Reserve. Previous presidents failed to adjust or 
attempt to alter any existing policy of the Federal Reserve. In absence of the bimetallic 
acquisitions programs, Roosevelt and the legislative branch may have modified the 
Federal Reserve’s powers to make the Reserve to enlarge the money stocks. Devaluation 
proved to be critical because no country would be able to pursue such dynamic 
expansionary monetary initiatives for a never ending period and remain fixated on a 
certain exchange rate. FDR’s judgment to abandon gold, which was a true gold standard, 
constituted a vital component of America’s economic rebound.189 
 
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE END OF THE REIGN OF ROOSEVELT WITH 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 The swing in the practices of the Federal Reserve System throughout World War 
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II mirrored the pains by the federal government to administer to the nation’s 
indebtedness. The government debt throughout World War II built up in excess of $250 
billion dollars and encompassed around 60 percent of all the remaining deficit of the 
country. The foremost objective of monetary policy during the period became the 
preservation of the market in government stocks and restrictions on the rise of surrender 
in these securities. Prior to 1937 Federal Reserve acquisitions and sales existed 
predominantly for the principle to sway the number of member bank stockpiles and of 
member bank indebtedness at the Reserve banks. Policies were intended to impinge on 
the interest rates, including surrender on the government's securities, and the implications 
were expected to result primarily from changes in the ability and motivation of banks to 
lend and purchase securities.190 
 In 1937, Federal Reserve policy changed as for the first time the Federal Reserve 
bought durable government bonds for the purpose of limiting their price decline. After 
reaching high levels in the later part of 1936, the prices of long-term government 
securities and quality corporate bonds began to fall early in 1937. This decline did not 
extend to Treasury bills and notes. The Reserve System in a reaction, acquired more than 
$200 million of the durable bonds and reduced its holdings of the shorter-term ones by 
$150 million. As a consequence, the decline of government bond prices became ceased 
and reversed. The System sustained its elastic strategy from the beginning of 1937, until 
after December 7, 1941. Prior to World War II, there was a tremendous decline in bond 
value. To discontinue the downfall, the Reserve System declared that every Reserve 
Banks stood ready to extend credit on government stocks, at the same value, to non-
member as well as member banks. The rate at New York and Boston steadied at one 
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percent and five other Reserve Banks established a privileged one percent rate on loans 
backed by governments. The Reserve also acquired $500 million of stocks on the free 
market. Only one other time between the later part of 1939 and December, 1941, did the 
Federal Reserve foresee that it was necessary to acquire bonds to soften a decline and fall 
in those values.191 
 The excessive boost in Federal Reserve affiliates credit and deposits from 1938 
forward served to slow a rise in Treasury bill rediscount rates. The Federal Reserve 
increased its individual claims by discounting member bank bills mostly secured by the 
government. In World War II the Federal Reserve raised its outstanding credit by buying 
government stock. The increase in bank reserves allowed an extension in the existing 
bank credit. In July, 1940, the surplus funds of associated banks were nearly $7 billion 
and the reserve ratio of the district banks resided at eighty-nine percent. Throughout the 
rest of 1940, commercial banks enlarged their holdings of government securities by $1.2 
billion with holdings of member banks alone increasing by $1.1 billion. Inflation was a 
concern with bank credit on hand in huge numbers. In addition member banks were 
almost totally out of debt to the Federal Reserve System.192 
 The first step the Federal Reserve took raised the reserve requirements of member 
banks. By the middle of 1941 there was a shortage of tactical materials. The 
government’s spending program was exciting business activity, public purchasing, and 
general commodity price levels were going through the roof. Wholesale prices were at 
ninety-two percent of the 1926 level, which had been twenty-two percent higher than in 
1939. The price index of twenty-eight basic commodities was fifty-five percent above 
1939. On August 9, 1941, Roosevelt allowed the Federal Reserve Board Of Governors to 
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regulate the terms on which public credit could be extended in an effort to depress 
installment buying. Despite the substantiation of inflation, the Treasury financed almost 
half its defense deficit by selling securities to commercial banks. As a result, demand 
deposits went up from $50 billion to $60 billion, and government deposits in commercial 
banks increased by almost $1 billion. Meanwhile, excess reserves went down only to $3.4 
billion because of the continual compilation of gold. This was offsetting to bank 
financing and a further hindrance by the increase in inflation. The Treasury began 
offering savings bonds from $25 to $1000 to quell the purchasing power of consumers. 
By December, 1941, the sales from these bonds totaled $2.5 billion while redemptions 
were only $14 million.193 
 From July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1946, the Federal government spent $387 billion, 
ninety-five percent or $360 billion of which was used up on defense. In 1945 alone $100 
billion was consumed by the defense budget which was more than ten times the highest 
prewar annual spending. The war spending was completed exclusively without lessening 
the sum of individual consumption while in the same period adding to production. Total 
consumption by the public is defined as the total sum of products and services consumed 
by individuals. There were several goods rationed by the federal government but on the 
whole the totality of the value of products and services consumed by individuals 
remained unchanged. By the end of the reign of Roosevelt the whole population’s basic 
needs were better provided for than they were at the time he began his first term. 
Between 1942 and 1945 $24.5 billion in savings bonds was marketed in the amounts of 
$10 to $100. By June, 1945 only $7.6 billion of these were traded in.194 
 The complete holdings of all commercial banks doubled between 1941 and 1946. 
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Funds invested in government shares virtually increased by four times while other 
investments increased only somewhat. Agricultural loans lingered around the same 
figures while real estate, industrial, commercial, and consumer loans went down. The 
only financial credit which illustrated an increase was that which added to paid for the 
war. Credit extended for defense spending, assured by the government augmented 
continuously. At their height in June, 1944, they symbolized about twenty-eight percent 
of the entirety of the outstanding credit of the insured commercial banks. Currency 
enlarged in circulation along with bank deposits. In 1941, it was in excess of $9.6 billion 
compared to $26.5 billion in 1946. The sum of money in circulation rose from $48.6 
billion in 1941, to $106 billion in 1946. The Treasury safeguarded the gigantic 
amplification in money as necessary for the increased industrial bustle caused by paying 
for World War II. The totality of money in circulation in 1945 equaled half of the 
nation’s GNP, a tremendous amount by modern standards, yet Secretary Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau did not regard it as too much. Today the portion of the GNP that should 
consist of circulating currency that is considered healthy to the economy varies around 
ten percent. However, it should increase or decrease at the same rate as the GNP.195 
 As commercial bank deposits enlarged, reserves started to become smaller. At the 
same time, district bank reserves declined as a consequence of an increase in government 
deposits and large exportation of gold surmounting to $951.7 million throughout 1944 
and 1945. The money held in the district banks slowly moved toward a 40 percent 
minimum. On June 12, 1945, legislation amended the Federal Reserve Act reducing the 
reserved requirement against Federal Reserve notes and deposits to 25 percent. Congress 
also revoked the Federal Reserve System’s permission to issue Federal Reserve Bank 
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notes and the President’s authority to release $3 billion in currency. It also made enduring 
the consent to use government obligations as refuge against Federal Reserve notes.196 
 Defense spending not only raised the total stock of money but also altered the 
configuration of American banking. Prior to World War II, big business was intensified 
in New York and Chicago, but the war brought with it additional production centers, and 
other regions started to surface as banking and commercial centers. In 1939, there were 
eighty-one banks with reserves of over $100 million with twenty-five of them residing in 
New York and Chicago. In 1946, there were one hundred-eighty banks with over $100 
million each, with only thirty-four in the Federal Reserve cities. There was also an even 
greater growth rate among smaller banks. Seventy-one percent of the banks that held 
under $1 million grew by three-hundred percent or more between 1939 and 1945.197 
 Between July 1, 1940, and June 30, 1946, the full amount of government 
purchasing was equal to $1.042 trillion, of which the Federal government spent $387 
billion was barely over one-third. Throughout 1945 alone, it accounted for virtually half 
of the collective purchasing of $214 billion. The immense raising in purchasing caused 
by World War II constituted a corresponding increase in household income and the GNP. 
Because all credit acquisitions by the government symbolized additional loans to other 
entities, Federal spending and the gradual rise in the Federal debt was balanced by the 
liquid assets of the other portions of the economy including banks, businesses, 
individuals, and state and local governments.198  
 Commercial banks came away from World War II with assets that doubled the 
amount achieved prior to the war. Investment accounts increased 25 percent from the 
amount it achieved prior to World War II. The ratio of total capital to assets to a large 
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extent became smaller both during and after the war, which is considered by economists 
to be safer for a healthy economy. The capital to assets ratio is defined as the amount of 
cash or readily available funds that the bank can liquidate versus the total amount of 
funds a bank owns, has deposited in it, or cash on hand. The Federal Reserve controls the 
quantity of currency in circulation at any one given time by restrictions placed on banks 
for their capital to assets ratios. During the 1930s the mean profit for U.S. banks 
constituted 2.5 percent of their entire net worth and 2.1 percent for corporations. During 
World War II the portion of net profits for the banking industry and virtually all 
businesses rose swiftly. In 1944 the amount of total profit for insured commercial banks 
increased to 9.7 percent yearly. Leading manufacturing corporations averaged profits of 
9.7 percent and large trade corporations averaged yearly profits of 10.4 percent. From the 
beginning of the banking crisis in 1933 until the end of World War II, banks assets had an 
almost continuous growth rate. Growth rates were accompanied also by an ongoing 
increase in bank capital. Bank assets, however, increased at a more rapid pace than bank 
capital. Therefore the ratio between the two increased. The decline was accelerated by a 
tremendous increase in banking assets during the war, and the capital to asset ratio 
reached its lowest point at the end of 1945 at 5.5 percent. During 1946, there was a 
shrinkage in bank assets primarily caused by debt reparations. This brought about a halt 
to the bank asset to capital ratio decrease. The average ratio for commercial banks at the 
end of 1946 was 6.3 percent.199 
 A decline in bank loans during the beginning of World War II brought a rise in 
the ratio to twenty-nine percent in 1943. This was up from the 1938 ratio of twenty-six 
percent when there had been a continuous rise in the ratio since 1933. By the end of 
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1946, the expansion in bank loans was primarily responsible for a decline in the ratio to 
twenty-three percent, below the 1938 levels. The capital-deposit ratio had been 
established in the early twentieth century as a one to ten minimum standard. More and 
more banks slumped under this capital standard and the administration was criticized by 
various scholars. The FDIC, the Treasury, and Federal Reserve all used a one to ten ratio 
as minimum standards until 1935. Governmental branches and organizations eventually 
tranquilized the enforcement of stiff capital to asset ratio necessities. The FDIC sustained 
the embracement of the one to ten theory with not much influence on the capital ratio. 
Bank credit was determined to play a major role in financing World War II, and it was 
just not practicable to preserve a one to ten ratio. On November 22, 1942, the National 
Association of Supervisors of State Banks and the three federal regulatory organizations 
released an order eradicating administrative procedures and assessments of the capital 
ratios to finances by banks in United States Treasury stocks.200 
 At the end of Roosevelt’s presidency, only a very tiny part of commercial banks 
maintained total capital accounts identical to as much as ten percent of the amount of 
bank assets. In 1946, insured commercial banks contained ninety-three percent of the 
total bank capital with ratios of capital to assets below ten percent. In thirty-seven percent 
of the banks, the ratio fell under five percent. Big banks are inclined to hold most of the 
deposits and are likely to have smaller capital ratios than little ones. The nation’s deposits 
were mostly intensified with lower capital ratios. In 1946, forty-two percent of the 
nation’s deposits resided in banks’ vaults with capital ratios of less than five percent. In 
annual reports for 1943, 1944, and 1945 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
system proclaimed that the enlargement in deposit liabilities was correlated by increased 
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owning of U.S. government stock, and the relation of capital accounts to assets other than 
cash assets as high as they were before and during the early stages of World War II. In its 
1946 annual report, the Board designated that the decline in bank holdings of United 
States Treasury stocks and the rise in credit extensions over the course of the year 
probably would necessitate amplification the capital of commercial banks.201  
 The Comptroller of the Currency synthesized that the decline and fall of the 
capital ratio throughout World War II was offset primarily by the growth in assets 
consisting of rises in the marketing of United States Treasury stocks, and he showed 
sensitivity for the alterations in the requirement. Bank capital was not satisfactory, in the 
Comptroller’s view, for the functions of economics in time of peace in which the banks 
might be required to raise their credit extending activities. His problem solving 
constituted urging banks to inspect the competence of existing capital construction in 
regards to the nature and magnitude of bank business increases likely to be maintained in 
the upcoming years.202 
 New requirements for ratios of capital to total assets were suggested by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In the 1945 yearly press release the FDIC said 
the use of capital to risk assets such as assets other than United States government stocks 
and money was suitable for individual banks. Since the increase in bank assets 
throughout World War II occurred dealt with non-governmental securities, a requirement 
far under the one to ten ratio could now be allowed.203 
 The complete compilation of the national deficit on June 30, 1940, was $43 
billion, prior to when the U.S. became engaged in World War II. This may be contrasted 
to $278 billion on December 31, 1945. In spite of the demise of interest percentages, the 
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relative and complete confinement of loans, by calculated interest payments, greatly rose 
throughout World War II. Interest payments went up 248 percent at the same time the 
total deficit itself went up by 502 percent between 1940 and 1945. The ratio of public 
debt went up from 1.34 percent of the national income in 1940 to 2.30 percent in 1945. 
Federal Reserve Banks began the policy to engage in the marketing of U.S. securities 
when the war came.204 
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Conclusion 
 World War II was expected to end with high rates of unemployment. This 
however, did not happen as America emerged from the war stronger than ever before. At 
the end of Roosevelt’s presidency the U.S. emerged as the World’s largest creditor 
nation. This contrasts sharply with running a deficit when FDR first came into office in 
1933. Without sound monetary policies and the restoration of banking and financial 
institutions many of the wartime concerns of postwar deficits and high unemployment 
might not have been realized. Gold and silver stocks continued to rise throughout the 
administration with tremendous international and domestic implications and 
applications.* An argument is made by some scholars that the U.S. merely transmitted the 
Great Depression to other nations. I would argue that it is true only to an extent. Other 
nations did profit, after either completely leaving or modifying their gold and silver 
standards from the gold and silver purchase programs sought by the United States. In 
addition, it must be recognized that the world market price for gold, especially after 1940, 
actually stayed well above what the United States government was paying for it. After all, 
                                                          
*
 Some of the most conservative scholars and economists in history even though disagreeing almost 
entirely with FDR’s policies for tremendous governmental controls on the political economy agree that the 
gold and silver purchase programs instituted by Roosevelt largely achieved the goals of his administration 
to raise the average general price levels of agricultural products and raw materials. Scholars such as Milton 
Friedman, from the University of Chicago school of thought who primarily believe in limited government 
and free markets, agree that the goals set forth by Roosevelt raised the prices of the basic commodities. 
Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976, has been one of the strongest critics of almost 
everything that FDR attempted. Programs such as social security, increased governmental expenditures on 
health care, employer provided health insurance, price controls, rationing, government subsidized 
businesses, and other governmental economic functions have all come under intense scrutiny by many 
reputable economists. Various examples, of governmental actions taken throughout history by various 
nation states has been used by Friedman to substantiate this claim. One such example includes the 
economic recovery of West Germany after World War II came much quicker than that of East Germany 
because West Germany’s economy operated with less governmental restrictions and much freer than that of 
East Germany. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History Of The United 
States, 1867-1960, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 420-492. See also 
Germany Beyond The Wall: People, Politics, And Prosperity by Jean Edward Smith, (Boston: Little, 
Brown And Company, 1969), pp. 83-113. 
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what good is it for the U.S. government to continue to stockpile something well above the 
international market for it with no apparent use for it. This thesis rests on the premise that 
Roosevelt raised the value of the U.S. dollar, restored the nation’s banking and financial 
institutions, and strengthened America’s economy for decades to come.205 
 This qualitative analysis of monetary policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
administration covering his entire presidency is unparalleled in American history. This 
original research demonstrates that Roosevelt’s economic successes were primarily the 
result of his monetary policies. Although many of FDR’s economic policies were ruled 
unconstitutional, his monetary policies were upheld by the Courts. An attempt has been 
made by some scholars only to look at what Roosevelt tried to do, instead of what 
actually happened. Roosevelt attempted many programs, but in retrospect many of them 
could not be implemented because they were ruled to be unconstitutional. The thesis 
demonstrates that almost all of FDR’s economic successes were the direct result of the 
gold and silver purchase programs sought by the United States and the consequent 
restoration of America’s banking and financial institutions. The thesis also challenges the 
theory that World War II alone brought our nation out of the great depression and that 
America merely transferred the depression entirely to other nations. Many of the New 
Deal initiatives where struck down by the courts but, his monetary and banking policies 
were upheld by them. Although other nations faced difficulties maintaining either gold or 
silver monetary standards, once currency stabilization was reached, many countries 
financed the war, and economic hardship was remedied by selling gold and silver to the 
U.S.  Roosevelt’s monetary policies had tremendous implications and applications, both 
domestic and international, and continued to be the driving force behind a postwar 
141 
economy in which the United States became the world’s largest creditor nation. In 
conclusion the point should be made that Roosevelt was successful in instituting the gold 
and silver purchase program to get the economy going again and it was his most 
successful program and should be credited for most of his economic successes. By doing 
so Roosevelt instituted radical changes that were desperately needed at that time to bring 
us out of the depression.206 
 FDR did more to reinforce individual property rights of citizens inherent in the 
jurisprudence of Chief Justice, John Marshall, than any single act of the forty-two 
Presidents with the restoration and stabilization of banking and finance. Jean Edward 
Smith in John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation demonstrates that one of Marshall's 
greatest accomplishments includes the protection of private property rights Marshall 
believed that the protection of citizens private property serve as the cornerstone for the 
preservation of civil liberties. FDR's monetary policies including increased regulation of 
banks not only protected those rights in the United States but also moved toward the 
protection of individual property rights internationally with currency stabilization. Even 
though some scholars have challenged our governments movement away from the ability 
of currency to be converted into a specified weight of silver or gold, most economists 
believe that economies function best when they are independent of any gold or bimetallic 
standard.207 
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